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PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN MAKING THE PEACE

EDITORIAL NOTE

OUR absorbing interest in planning for a durable peace now finds expression everywhere—even in technical and professional journals. Through the following pages several writers have set down considerations that seem to them vital in fashioning a psychologically sound basis for the war-settlement. Though diverse and somewhat fragmentary in character these ten papers offer significant ideas that should be weighed carefully and blended in proper proportion with the work of others into some final design.

Taken as a group, whatever their individual specialties may be, psychologists are strikingly public spirited, humane, and world-minded. Perhaps less than any other group do they believe that the abolition of war is an unattainable ideal. But perhaps more than any other group do they know that no peace treaty in and of itself can solve mankind's present problems. They know that it will be the *attitudes* of the common people toward the peace terms that will be the deciding factor. Economic, political, and military plans for peace, important as they are, run the risk of overlooking the wants and fears, the guilt and aggression, the pride and imagination of mankind. Questions of reeducation, of training democratic leaders, of guaranteeing a self-respecting status for all, of creating new identifications, have much to do with our search for a common meeting ground for the peoples of the world. Only when such a common ground is found can all nations work together effectively in their crusade against war, depression, disease, and ignorance.

It is true that psychologists alone (without the cooperation of other scientists and of statesmen) could not develop a successful formula for peace, but it is equally true that without the application of psychological wisdom no such formula can possibly be evolved.

PSYCHOLOGY IN THE MAKING OF PEACE

BY GARDNER MURPHY

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SINCE it has been widely recognized that the peace treaties which concluded the first world war failed largely because of their failure to take into account the complicated psychology of the nationality groups involved, it is gratifying to note the beginning of serious psychological study of the problems which will mark the peace after the present war. Though scholars are still somewhat insulated from men of affairs it will not, I believe, be possible to ignore altogether the psychological effort now beginning to take shape—to ignore, for example, the basic principles of planning recently worked out by Eugene Lerner.¹

But my thesis is that it is not enough to indicate the general direction in which the coming peace treaties must be aimed; it is necessary also to define a specific method of liaison by which psychologists, without ostentation or overplaying their hand, could assist in the coming peace-making process.

It might be worth while to consider the psychologist's role in the peace-making and peace-maintaining functions under three heads: (1) intensive studies of the deeper predispositions and demands which the populations of victor and of defeated nations will exhibit under the stress conditions which a dictated peace will involve; (2) the analysis of the psychology of committee and conference procedures, drawing together all the historical and experimental material which might promote effective group thinking on the part of the victors and a minimum of personal humiliation on the part of the vanquished; (3) a systematic study of the means of communication which exist between people and their governments, between governments and their people, and directly between the peoples of the world, in order to make possible a maximum of understanding and to prevent the clogging of the channels of intelligence and good will by distortion, wedge-driving, and appeal to

¹ Lerner, E. Preface to the psychology of peace and reconstruction *J. Psychol.*, 1943, 15, 3-25.

renewed violence. The present sketch will deal chiefly with the first of these three problems.

I

Pursuing the first goal, the time has already come for a coordinated, systematic study of world populations in terms of their personality dynamics and social field relationships. Such studies are already under way in Washington and to some extent in various scattered university circles. They have apparently not proceeded far, but can be augmented and redirected, and very much need to be supplemented by fresh, large-scale, psychological investigation. Such investigation will, of course, be worthless except in the hands of those familiar with European history, with a full knowledge of the rise of nationalism and the transformation of capitalism under the industrial revolution, as well as a knowledge of the development of means of public communication and the devices for sweeping national populations into a warlike mood. The job is big and it is tough. The psychoanalytic suggestions, for example those dealing with frustration and aggression, those dealing with narcissism, masochism, rationalization, etc., are of course useful, but need to be basically supplemented in two ways: first, by abundant concrete direct empirical evidence, not of a sort sufficient to satisfy the psychoanalyst but of a sort sufficient to satisfy historians and social scientists; secondly, such studies will have to be supplemented by precise studies of separate cultural and subcultural groups, and of regional, class, religious, and ethnic problems.

To begin at home, the psychological study of our own population, as it relates to readiness for the kind of peace which would endure, has made considerable progress. Both private and public interviewing and polling procedures have been hammering away for many months on attitudes toward peace-making and towards the structure of the post-war world. There exists privately, available to the peace-makers, a relatively clear picture of the distribution of such attitudes in the American public today, and such studies are being continuously carried forward so that the picture will always be up to date. It is unfortunate that such material is in general confidential. But it is not difficult for psychologists who are in earnest about the matter to make contact with the data.

The one thing about such information which is grossly defective at present could be called failure to investigate what might be called

the "directions in which people are willing to be led." It is patent that the intricate economic and political structure of peace cannot be left to referendum or plebiscite; the degree of integration is too fantastically complex. In terms of Jeffersonian democracy, however, there is a basic need for grass-roots support for an expertly planned peace, a basic need that the general direction and aim of peace be such as will be emotionally acceptable to most Americans (as well as to most of the rest of the world). In these terms psychologists can contribute a great deal by studying intensively the various aspects of public response to the references made by the President and by others to the peace objectives which we are pursuing, by way of discovering what sorts of statements bring acquiescence or enthusiasm, which ones arouse confusion and doubt, which ones antagonize the listeners. It is absolutely imperative that the general orientation of the American public to a new world organization be intimately understood.

We deal here, however, with something more than willingness to take a single step. We deal with deeper semiconscious or unconscious readiness for one or another kind of new world order. One is reminded of Piaget's distinction between "spontaneous conviction" and "liberated conviction." The child, says Piaget, may give an answer to a question rather promptly and clearly and so betray the basic structure of his thinking, even though he has never before been confronted by such a question. These "liberated convictions" betray the *basic way in which his mind works* and are, for some purposes, better than the "spontaneous convictions" which show what he has *already* been thinking about. In the same way, the problem of the peace-makers is not so much a question of giving Americans what they now want, for none of us can dream of the utterly different economic and political structure which will be the reality of a few years from now. Rather, the question is whether, deep down at the roots, we are ready for the tone, the tempo, the accent which a new type of living will mean for us. Psychologists can here do something certainly which no other group is quite ready to do. They can help to find in what direction we are capable of being led, in order that the peace-makers may be realistic, not only as to what is economically possible, but as to what is psychologically sound.

But our responsibility does not stop with the study of our own population. For historical reasons, psychology and psychologists

have become concentrated in this country. We cannot even enjoy the intellectual isolationism of attending to our own psychological problem; we must help in the study of psychological adjustment on a world-wide scale.

Let us look at some of these wider problems as they appear in Germany. There has been a great deal of broad, vague, and suggestive discussion of what has got to be done about Germany. We are told (quite accurately, I believe) that since 1933 the population of Germany has been hardened, disciplined, brutalized into a phalanx of iron men and women, and particularly iron youth and even children for whom nothing can be done but to break or melt them up. A man who knows Germany intimately assures me that no one who has not been in Germany since 1935 would recognize present-day Germany. On the other hand, historically, Germans have been noted for sentiment, romanticism, impracticality, esthetic richness, a love of folk-songs, children, and toys. All that Weimar stands for in pathos and other-worldliness, in romance and tenderness, is at least part of the psychic structure of those now adults; and, if cultural continuity means anything, it must exist somewhere in all of them. Since the time of Frederick the Great, this dualism of German character structure has been present, with the emphasis ebbing and flowing between the two. The dynamic relation of the two trends is obscure and calls for investigation.

Now, no one can make peace intelligently without a very full and rich utilization of both historical streams, not merely as broad contributing factors in "Germany as an entity," but as phases of the personality structure, varying in form in accordance with age, sex, religion, region, class status, military experience, and many other factors. Within the last few months a good many writers have participated rather violently on one side or the other of the controversy as to whether Germany is brutal or at a deeper level basically romantic. The hour is too late, the danger too great, to permit any of us the ego-inflation of being "right" in this debate. A psychologist who does not objectively face all of what Germany is, including not only the gross distinction just made but a hundred less striking ones, is likely to be sand in the gear box rather than a lubricant when peace is made. In particular, the psychologist would have to understand the German educational system and the development of the sense of public unification through the experience of World War I, the Weimar Republic, the violent repressive but

unifying forces in national socialism, and the struggle of the long and catastrophic World War II.

When we turn to Italy, the same dualism on a minor scale can be found, but the central problem is probably quite different. It has to do with the essentially individualistic, esthetic, lush quality of Italian living. The intensity of affect, the tremendous need for individual outlets, expressing itself in magnificent opera on the one hand and in arbitrary excrescences of despotism on the other hand, are all magnificently formulated in Nietzsche's expression "the tropical man." On the surface, Italy today can be classified as the little wheel tagging after the big wheel, as in the simile of the old-fashioned bicycle; politically and militarily this is true. The fact remains that Fascism started because Italy was politically retarded, individualistic and disorganized, not averse to romantic forms of despotism, and, in an adolescent sort of way, resonating to the power motif of modern statehood and militarism. Some other disease germ beside Fascism may well come out of Italy again if the psychological errors of the peace treaty are as gross as those of the Versailles peace-makers. The problem again is not for the present writer to tell the psychologists what the solutions are, but rather to show how much there is for them to do if they will function as psychologists in the critical hour.

Thirdly, the issue regarding Japan is just as important, and perhaps more important. Half the population of the globe, living today in China and India, will vibrate sympathetically to the attitudes coming after the war from the only industrialized nation in the Far East. The history and social institutions of Japan are hardly known at all to Western scholars. The problems are as complex as those of Germany. Romance, other-worldliness, self-immolation, the contradictions of feudalism and the code of Bushido, the glory in caste prerogatives, the limitless degradation of the outcast Helots, the crushing ego blow which Commodore Perry brought to the gates of the Empire, the incredible Westernization of the surface phenomena of life, the basic conservatism of the peasants and mountaineers, all these things must be intimately understood in the fashion which Margaret Mead has called that of the "participant observer." It has become fashionable for journalists and radio announcers to say simply, as Cecil Brown has done, that these people are barbarians and must be crushed. Much the same was said of Germany in 1918. Whether it was "true" or not is irrelevant;

this attitude has inexorable consequences as a part of the factual picture. Psychologists and social scientists who know something about Japan must be found; we must go out into the highways and byways and compel them to come in and help those who, like the writer, have only a sketchy and remote familiarity with the problem; and they must be willing to work fast and dig deep.

The problems of Hungary, Roumania, and Poland, of Bulgaria, the Netherlands and Belgium, of Greece, Denmark, and Norway stand out here, when one recalls that Nazi ideology has, even under conditions of conquest, had a chance to spread. Quislings have been found; propaganda has had its way here and there. At the same time, the despots have created on every inch of conquered soil a degree of misery and an intensity of revenge-fantasy that the shrewdest psychiatrist would be taxed to the utmost to handle. The peace-loving Norwegians cannot fall back, the day after the peace treaty, into the patterns of peace. The wound is too deep; the degenerative processes of such pathology are in many ways irreversible. Psychologically trained students of these and of all the other war-torn nationalities must be found, integrated into a cooperating group.

In all of the nationality groups mentioned above, psychologists where they existed have long since been ferreted out, utilized for totalitarian purposes, or thrown into concentration camps, or subjected to other inhuman pressures. American psychologists will, therefore, have to do much of the task for them by making maximum contact with those few who remain. The problem is different, however, with regard to (*a*) China, which has a nucleus of well-trained psychologists and knows that it wants more, (*b*) the Soviet Union, which has psychologists specially trained in terms of the Soviet system, (*c*) France, which has managed somehow to keep a certain amount of genuine psychology going, and (*d*) Britain, to whose psychologists it would be absurd for us to offer more help than is wanted.

Here arises, however, the vast problem of international scientific cooperation. It is not a minute too soon for us to make our contacts with the psychologists of China, the Soviet Union, and Britain, with a view to cooperation in methodological problems, as well as in questions of regional coverage.

Up to this point, we have written as if psychologists worked more or less autonomously as psychologists. Here, however, we could

make an absolutely fatal blunder. We could fantastically envisage ourselves as "giving suggestions to" the peace-makers and almost build up a pretty picture of ourselves as those who will really make a sound peace. The plain fact is that psychology has not yet proved its value to most Americans. It is almost unknown to those in high administrative circles. Partly because we have simply not done good enough work, partly for reasons of cultural lag, psychology is still an outlying island, the inhabitants of which are curious strangers to those at the citadel. Rather than bemoaning the situation, the only thing we can do is to study at first hand the actual peace-making machinery which already exists. By going to Washington and making contact with those who are charged with such duties, by studying the activities of the many peace-planning organizations, and by following, as closely as possible, the contemporary material of economics, international trade, and government, it may be possible for us to round out a picture that somebody else is making. We cannot *make* the picture; we cannot *sell* a complete plan to Washington; we can, however, discover the general direction in which the peace-making plans are moving, or ready to move, note where such agencies would like additional information, and find the way to give such information clearly and intelligently. We are not peace-makers; we are one of a number of social-science groups which will be used if we are ready with something which is really good and which is clearly needed.

II

Our second main objective as psychologists, as I see it, is to formulate what is known about the committee and conference methods as they would apply to the peace-making situation. This would mean first of all a study of the history of diplomacy and of peace conferences and treaties during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with special reference to the economic, political, and diplomatic aspects of the Treaty of Versailles and the other minor treaties of the period, followed by an intensive study of diplomacy and peace-making during the inter-bellum period, acquiring a broad knowledge of the personalities which rose and fell with the tide of diplomatic struggle. Integrated with all this, however, there would have to be a complete technical report of research on committee and conference procedures, including not only the handful of experimental studies in the strict sense, but the vast series of studies of

conference procedure and of parliamentary practice which have been made by such groups as The Inquiry and by students of government, law, and industrial personnel problems. Much of the material is "raw material"; much description and integration will be needed. A competent monograph or two covering all of the above-mentioned materials might easily show the points of gravest personality tension at Versailles, *e.g.*, the most catastrophic errors in conference procedure, the reasons why expert opinion was accepted on some points but rejected on other comparable points. A report, if subtle, rich, vivid, and even humorous, might help the strategists of world peace.

III

Thirdly, since the middle of the nineteenth century, a challenge is offered us through the fact that the organs of communication have been completely remade. Person-to-person transmission of news, abetted by occasional belated newspaper reports and the sending of special official messages, has been supplanted by world-wide networks of information and misinformation, which is cheap and easily directed. One of the major catastrophes of capitalist organization has, of course, been the private ownership of the means of communication, especially the press. The peace could easily go on the rocks through the one simple factor of reactionary or retributive attitudes on the parts of the few interested in manipulating world-wide public opinion. It is true that Hitler never got a parliamentary majority by propaganda alone; he had to use force. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the controlled means of communication such as the Hitler phonograph disc which carried his speech over and over, all day long, all over Germany, and the accompanying barrage of radio propaganda, played a very important part. The degree to which the Japanese population can be cut off from communication with the rest of the world, if the peace treaty allows it, can hardly be overemphasized. Systematic study of "*communications*" by committees of the American Library Association and of sociologists marks the beginning of an infant science, many of the problems of which are intensely psychological. Every student of propaganda, of radio-listening habits, of reading habits, of attitude-change in all forms, has a major task here. For the problem of maintaining the peace is largely a problem of integrating and implementing the forces of international rationality and good will in whatever form

they exist, and, when they are frail and uncertain, intelligently, tactfully, continuously shielding them and helping them to grow.

Nevertheless the modern study of public opinion through systematic empirical methods of interviewing and polling and the effort to determine the deeper basis upon which attitudes rest have made far more progress in the United States than elsewhere. And public opinion in a broad sense is the only real safeguard that peace can know, public opinion not in national, but in international, terms. Psychologists must find a way not only to do solid and substantial public-opinion research as soon as possible after the cessation of war; they must be ready at the right hand of government to assist the *maintainers* of peace in keeping open by all possible means the channels of communication between peace-loving men over the face of the globe, and the channels of communication between such men and the governments which serve them.

The first, most pressing, immediate step here is the articulation of psychology in the government service with private psychological effort throughout the country, serving in the broad interpretation of American attitude trends. The second step is the extension of such psychological cooperation to include the opinion work being carried on in Canada, Britain, and Australia; the third, to prepare the way for world-wide psychological cooperation of this sort. Here, as elsewhere, we know in a general way what is needed. Our errors in the past have often been errors of failure to implement, failures to give articulate form to the broad proposals that we knew were needed. We need to do less private talking to one another, more institutionalizing of our service. We need to build now, while the war goes on, a network of public-opinion research centers which would serve as a buttress to the concrete peace-maintaining structure which will be set up by the coming peace treaties.

IDENTIFICATION AND THE POST-WAR WORLD¹

BY EDWARD CHACE TOLMAN

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I

ONE psychological process which seems to me to need especial emphasis in planning a post-war world is "identification." Identification was apparently first noted and named by Freud. But his conception became unnecessarily complicated and it was too closely bound up with his whole psychoanalytical system.² I shall not here mean by identification, therefore, Freud's own concept, but merely a certain general neo-Freudian notion which seems now to be widely accepted by most psychologists and sociologists.³ Examining further this neo-Freudian notion we find that it really covers three somewhat different, though related, processes.

First, by identification may be meant the process wherein an individual tries to copy—to take as his pattern or model—some other older (or in some other way looked-up-to or envied) individual. This tendency is, of course, especially observable in children. It is the form of the process with which Freud was most concerned. He saw it primarily in the attempt of the small boy to mold himself after his father. The boy wishes to copy the father and (according to Freud) to replace the latter in the mother's affections. Or the girl tries to take on the pattern of the mother. Children thus tend to identify with the parent of the same sex. And later identifications are said to follow and symbolize these earlier ones. We as adults have heroes, social and political leaders, movie stars, and the like, with whom we identify in a similar way to that in which as children we identified with our parents.⁴

¹ The author regards the present contribution as an extension of the argument contained in his *Drives toward war*. A summary outline of this book will be found in the book review section—EDITOR

² See, for example, the presentation of Freud's doctrine in Healey, Bronner, and Bowers, *The structure and meaning of psychoanalysis* New York Knopf, 1930. Pp 240-247.

³ Many who accept this general notion would, indeed, violently deny any direct Freudian affiliations.

⁴ It must be noted that older individuals can also identify with younger. For not only do children identify with their parents but, *vice versa*, parents often identify with (i.e., live vicariously through) their children

A second process also meant by identification is the adherence of the individual to any group of which he feels himself a part. This, according to Freud, is a symbolic repetition of the feeling of the child for his siblings. But, in any case, it is a very real phenomenon with which all sociologists are familiar. It underlies patriotism, and mob action, the Oxford Group movement, and the activities of the Townsend Clubs.⁵ And in a recent study of a simple village, it appeared that identifications with one's family groups, with one's co-religionists, and with one's fellow villagers were all very important features of life in the community and appeared most clearly in "such indexes as proverbs, swearing expressions, names, addressing others, marriage, and patterns of conflict and co-operation."⁶

Finally, the third process also usually called identification is the acceptance by an individual of a cause. One accepts and gives oneself not only to groups, but also to seemingly quite impersonal causes such as the progress of science, temperance, public health, wearing the right clothes, internationalism, the abolition of war, etc. Such cause-identifications are legion; and they vary from the sublime to the ridiculous. It is my belief, however, that they are, in the last analysis, but expressions of what were initially and more fundamentally group-identifications. The essence of a group-identification is, I would hold, the fact that one desires "to love" and "to be loved" by some group. And such desires lead inevitably to one's adopting the values and causes proclaimed by the group.

To sum up, there are three interrelated kinds of identification: (1) that of an individual with some other older and more important (or in some other way envied and preferred) person whom the individual in question wants to be like; (2) that of an individual with some whole group which he wants "to love" and "to be loved by"; and, finally, (3) that of an individual with a cause proclaimed by a group.⁷

⁵ See, for example, Hadley Cantril, *The psychology of social movements*. New York: Wiley, 1941. Cantril implies, though he does not explicitly state, this relationship between identification and group action.

⁶ Afif I. Tannous, "Group behavior in the village community of Lebanon." *Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1942, 48, 231-239.

⁷ It may be pointed out that identification with groups and with causes, as I am here conceiving them, are undoubtedly closely related to what social psychologists are now calling "morale." See, for example, Goodwin Watson, *et al.*, *Civilian morale*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942, especially the definition of morale given by G. W. Allport, *op. cit.* p. 5.

II

I wish to consider, now, the second of these processes—that of group-identification—more fully. For it is the one we shall be primarily concerned with in the present argument. It appears to be a most powerful propensity. Every one of us here in America tends to identify, in differing degrees, with such groups as his family, the other members of his socio-economic class, his occupational or professional colleagues, the co-residents of his municipality, the citizens of his state (especially if the latter be California), the citizens of the USA, the peoples of the Western Hemisphere, the English-speaking peoples, and the like.

And, insofar as one does thus identify, he tends to feel at one with each such group. *Its* fortunes are *his* fortunes; *its* goals become *his* goals; *its* successes and failures, *his* successes and failures; and *its* prestige becomes *his* prestige. And, in the extreme case, the continued life and immortality of such a group comes to be felt to be the equivalent of and a substitute for his own personal life and immortality. A man will die in order that his country may live. The latter's life comes in some mystical way to be identical with and a substitute for his own personal life.

III

But, we must ask, what are the characteristics which make a given group a strong evoker of identifications? Five such features or characters suggest themselves:

1. The possession by the group of common characteristics which clearly set off the group members from nonmembers will favor identification. If the members all have a common language, a given skin color, a particular name (*e.g.*, Greeks, Romans, Americans), a particular territory (*e.g.*, North America, the Western Hemisphere), a common history, and the like, identifications will be enhanced.

2. Distinctive symbols and rituals which belong to the group, such as a flag, a song, a fraternity pin, fraternal rites, and the like, will also all help to make identification easy. During a war much use is, of course, made of such symbols and rituals. We rise and sing the national anthem and salute the flag, thereby enhancing our patriotism, *i.e.*, our identification with the national group.

3. A common goal animating the group and giving it a feeling of mission will increase the readiness to identify. Thus "block

organizations" today are groups whose members are coming to identify to a surprising degree simply because such block organizations have the obvious and common goal of protection against air-raids. Or, to take another example, the Nazis have been tremendously strengthened in their identifications with the party by being given the common mission to spread the master race over Europe.

4. A set-up in the group which capitalizes and symbolizes the early family relationship and structure will strengthen identifications. Japanese patriotism (perhaps even more than other patriotisms) employs this device. Gunther quotes the following from the Enthronement Edition of the *Japan Advertiser*:

Not only is the Shrine of Ise a holy spot in the religious sense, but it is the visible symbol of the nation's whole being. The Japanese attitude toward it is one of *makoto*, a word which cannot be accurately rendered into English. Patriotism, nationalism, Emperor worship, the attitude toward the throne, are words or phrases used for *makoto*, but each of them is very inexact. Loyalty, filial piety, the emphasis on the family rather than on the individual, are still other attempts to put *makoto* in English. *Makoto* embraces all these, but no one of them has the exact connotation to the Japanese consciousness that it has to the American or European. Foreign thought does not comprehend the reverence, loving loyalty, respectful *kinship* of the Japanese toward his Emperor, and therefore toward the nation, and therefore toward himself as a part of the nation."⁸

Here, it is obvious that the nation is patterned after and symbolizes the family.

5. Identifications are strengthened by common enemies. Thus Jews to the Nazis, or Negroes to a lynching mob, or capitalists to the communists, or communists to the solid business man, perform a tremendous function in enhancing intragroup unity.

IV

We turn, finally, to our main problem—identification and the post-war world. For, insofar as the human beings in the world are distributed into (and identify with) geographically separate, mutually exclusive, political groups and insofar as such groups compete for the same goals—viz., territorial rights, natural resources, and the like—there are bound to be wars. The only conceivable way in which wars can be overcome is through the development of widespread identifications with some all-common supranational

⁸ John Gunther. *Inside Asia* New York. Harper, 1939, p. 7. Primitive tribes also capitalize on the same sort of structure in their concept of the ancestral totem animal.

group. Only if individuals belonging to every tribe (or to every modern surrogate for a tribe, a nation) can come to identify, not merely with their own tribal groups as such, but also (and more powerfully) with such an all-inclusive supertribe or World State can wars be abolished.

Furthermore, such a World State or World Federation will operate only if (in addition to appropriate and wise political structures) this State or Federation be lent psychologically requisite, identification-evoking characteristics. It must be provided with all the necessary psychological *accoutrements and trappings*. It must be made tremendously appealing. Or, to return to our list of identification-evoking characteristics suggested above, this means: (1) that the members of the World State should possess features in common setting them off from nonmembers; (2) that the World State should have distinctive symbols and rituals; (3) that there should be a common mission animating its members; (4) that its governmental structure should symbolize early family relationships; and finally (5) that it should have some outside enemy or enemies which threaten it. Let us consider each of these in more detail.

1. *The Possession of Common Features.* The members of the World State must be given common features which set them off not from individuals outside of the world (for we know of none such) but from themselves in their own narrower roles as members of mere subordinate groups. I can think of two types of such setting-off features:

a. There could be a common world language. This would not supplant the narrower national tongues but would be an auxiliary to them. Individuals all over the world would be required to learn it in addition to their own separatistic tongues.⁹

b. There could be a common basic education. I would envisage, that is, the setting-up all over the world of special classes (for children and for adults) in which the official world-language and the basic facts of the world constitution and of world problems such as raw materials, trade, public health, disease, population pressures, and the like would be taught and discussed. Such an educational set-up should be an integral part of the peace covenant. Such a

⁹ For a most impressive discussion of this need for a world language and the problems involved in selecting such a language see Albert Guérard, *The France of tomorrow*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1942, Chap. XII. Also Albert Guérard, *International language and national cultures*. *Amer. Scholar*, 1941, 10, 170-183.

common language and such a common education would constantly emphasize our common human similarities in contrast to our subordinate separatenesses of skin-color, race, geographical location, and the like.

2. *Distinctive Symbols and Rituals.* There should be a world flag and a world anthem. The children and adults in the world classes should salute their world flag and sing their world anthem as we now arise and salute our national flags and sing our national anthems. There must also be a common currency and common postage. For (aside from their economic benefits) such a common currency and common postage would have enormous symbolic and ritualistic values. If on every coin and on every stamp we saw not, as now, a narrow tribal symbol and a narrow tribal motto but a world symbol and a world motto, it certainly would help all of us to identify with the larger world whole.

3. *A Common Animating Goal or Mission.* Such a common goal or mission for the World State might consist of two main features:

a. First, there could be the universal aim of no further wars. There are undoubtedly films documenting the present war which could be constantly shown to keep alive the horrors, the complete senselessness, and the destructiveness of modern war. Such films must be shown again and again in our world classes. They might succeed easily in building up a feeling of common aim or mission.

b. A second aim could be the more even distribution of the world's goods to all peoples and to all individuals. This aim could be continuously discussed in the world classes. But this, it may be said, is postulating too Utopian an impossibility. Individuals and groups, it will be contended, are too selfish. They would rather continue to have wars, no matter how horrible, than give up any of their selfish privileges. And this, of course, may be true. But if so, there is no hope and we may as well stop talking. But the presupposition of the present argument, and indeed of this whole Symposium, is that there *is* (or *could be*) a large enough or powerful enough proportion of the world's population who are not too selfish, who are willing to pay the price, and who would be able to put over such a "world new deal."

4. *A Set-up Which Symbolizes Family Relationships.* This requirement suggests to me that the international government should have—in addition to a Secretariat, a Legislature, and a

Court—an Executive Head (individual or committee). For such a head would symbolize a father (or group of fathers) to whom all individuals could feel loyal. If this executive head were a committee, then it could comprise one European, one Middle Easterner, one Asiatic, one African, one American, etc. Or, if the world as a whole is to be divided into a series of component federations, as many post-war planners have been suggesting, then such a Committee could have one representative (father) from each of such component federations.

Secondly, the World Government must have some well-located geographical seat, which will show up bright and important on the map. And the buildings of the world government, located at this seat, should be of unexcelled grandeur. They should symbolize one's idealized home. There should be pictures of them in every hut and hovel. They should be "archetypal" in character. And there should be movies depicting the governing bodies "carrying on" in this "home" surrounded by delightful pomp and circumstance.

5. *Common Enemies*. This requisite would seem the most difficult to encompass. If only the men from Mars were a reality and if only these Martians would attack us, then we of this world would surely experience a tremendous surge of mutual loyalty. Our international conflicts would die overnight as we marched (or rather "flew") together against such a common enemy. But not only is such an eventuality a pure phantasy, it also, from our present point of view, would be extremely undesirable. For such an interplanetary war would be far more horrible than our present mere earth-bound wars. If we must have enemies against whom to unite, the only ones which can serve will be the intransigencies of inanimate nature, on the one hand, and such minority human groups as seek to break away from the World State, on the other. And to fight these world enemies, we shall need a World Army or Police Force. This army or force must be a company of Sir Galahads ready to ride against all disruptive forces—whether they be recalcitrant rebel groups or the inanimate drags of ignorance, disease, fire and earthquake. This World Force must combine the hardiness and the romance of the Northwestern Mounties with the ministering and scientific qualities of the International Red Cross. To adventurous and idealistic youth all over the world such a Force would symbolize both the stern and the helpful fathers (or, perhaps,

a gang of brothers). And in it, youth from all parts could be drafted, or enlist, without fear or favor. Such a Force would symbolize the authority and the loving care of parents and the democratic give and take of siblings.¹⁰

If the makers of the post-war peace have enough daring, enough unselfishness, and enough understanding of the "psychology of identification," then such a World State, to which we all could become overweaningly loyal, will be founded. If not, let us abandon hope.

¹⁰ Such a force would not only fight the *common enemies*, but also it would symbolize the early family set-up.

It must be admitted that, anthropologically speaking, this is probably being far too glib about fathers, brothers, and siblings "all over the world." But essentially I believe what I am proposing to be basically correct.

WHY DO GERMANS SO EASILY FORFEIT THEIR FREEDOM?

BY CHARLOTTE BUHLER

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THERE was a saying in Austria before it became Nazified. It ran as follows: "In England everything is allowed that is not expressly forbidden. In Germany everything is forbidden that is not expressly allowed. In Austria everything is allowed that is expressly forbidden."

This mock doctrine ridicules subtly the rigid intolerance of the Germans as well as the somewhat sloppy tolerance of the Austrians themselves as compared with the weighed tolerance of the English. The English tolerance is born from strength, the Austrian from weakness; and the German despises both.

Ever since Germany plunged the world a second time into a devastating war, author after author has been trying to explain to the rest of the world and to himself the strange and complicated phenomenon of the German psychology and mentality. We all feel that the highest moral values of human life and its true happiness are at stake at the moment. This fight divides the civilized world into two opposite camps. It is more than a struggle for power and possessions; it is a spiritual fight over fundamental principles of life. Only by a full understanding of the philosophy and psychology of Germany will we be able to negotiate a lasting peace in Europe, and only a full understanding will enable us to educate its youth. Such an understanding involves an analysis of the fundamental values of life and their motivating power. And it needs a frank admission and clarification of assets and liabilities on both sides. These are the aims of the present study.

In the beginning we are brought face to face with the problem of tolerance. In a conflict between two duties, two responsibilities, two-sided interests, there is sometimes not even a way out. Only an arbitrary decision is possible. The most frequent of such conflicts is that between human and superhuman, personal and impersonal, values. There are people to be helped, protected, spared,

encouraged, respected; and on the other hand there are truths, merits, progresses which must be furthered. Should a man be allowed to leave his post where he is on duty and to rush to the bedside of a very sick wife? Should a man with mediocre talents be allowed to keep a position because he has a large family to take care of? Should no allowances be made for such weaknesses?

An example of a public leniency which must be called a general weakness is, for instance, the attitude toward begging in Southern European countries. The same middle-class orderly citizen would, if living in certain southern countries, as a matter of course give money to beggars and would, if living in certain northern countries, hesitate or refuse because begging should not be encouraged but should be taken care of by social agencies. The best slogan for a leniency born out of weakness is the Austrian formula: "Da kann man nix machen" ("There one can't do anything"). The Prussian calls this scornfully the Austrian "Schlampererei" (slovenliness).

In opposition to this tolerance born out of weakness stands that tolerance which is born out of *strength* and out of certain fundamental convictions. There is a housewife, middle-class, anywhere in any country, with an orderly little household. She likes to run it well. She has a maid, a nice person, decent, willing, but sometimes failing in this or that task. What does she do? No German housewife would hesitate for a moment to tell this maid at once exactly how she should work. This same housewife, if American, English, Scandinavian, would hesitate quite a time before criticizing, would think very carefully of the words she should use to make her criticism as tactful as possible, and she would frequently prefer to tolerate the imperfections rather than say anything at all. Trivial as this example seems, it reveals fundamentals. Germans coming for the first time into Anglo-Saxon countries are very often puzzled by the complete lack of criticism and by the polite appraisal of seemingly everything. They generally interpret it as neglect or insincerity. They fail completely to see the real principle behind this hesitation, the principle of the *respect of the individual's unviolated integrity*.

What does this mean and imply? First of all, it is, if rightly understood and applied, the full liberation of the human mind, it gives to every individual in these countries a frankness, open, unafraid and at the same time unaggressive, which only the most

fortunate of European Continental youths can afford and are allowed to develop. It is these human qualities of unabashed unaggressive frankness and of unrestrained freedom for which the democrat pays sometimes the price of manners or discipline or of excellence rather than perfection at the cost of freedom. But imperfection is tolerated not in complacency but with patience and with something beyond patience, namely, with an *ultimate belief in the human being's potential goodness*.

Tolerance of imperfections, if born out of strength, implies confidence in human nature, confidence in the future, that things will work themselves out. This must be discriminated from the complacent "somehow" it will work out. And again it is the opposite of that distrust which from the medieval inquisition through autocratic monarchs up to Hitler's Gestapo and subleaders has been formulated in various ways in emphasis of people's incapacity to follow the right path to perfection without guidance and chastisement.

There is something more than measured tolerance of imperfection and belief in potential qualities of human nature which is characteristic of the tolerance of Anglo-Saxon countries, and that is a sense of proportion for single events in relation to time and the universe. In the well-grounded solidity of their existence, the Anglo-Saxons seem to have learned better than other nations how to integrate their failures into the total of their being. The extreme opposite to all Anglo-Saxon sport spirit can be seen in the incident of the German boys' football team which, shortly before the present war, came to England and was beaten. The boys refused to be photographed for the press because they had brought shame on their team, school, and fatherland. This is an impossible conception for an Englishman or American.

We say that in a conflict between the demands of objective ideals, on the one side, and the consideration for human beings, on the other side, a measured tolerance of imperfection would be the solution which grows out of respect of other human beings, of a sense of proportion, and of confidence in human nature. The opposite solution of the same conflicts would be insistence on the objective ideal as the absolute guiding principle, with disregard of all human feelings and human weaknesses. That is precisely what idealistic philosophy demands and that is precisely the principle on which all Prussian education is based. According to this philosophy

and these principles, there can never be really a doubt as to what has to be done in a conflict, for in every case the higher objective ideal has to be followed and human suffering cannot be considered. There is in this conception no other name but weakness for all personal considerations in such conflicts. The impersonal values are of a higher order and are absolute as an imperative.

Of course, in all human ethics there is an absolute imperative of conscience and duty. A man must be able to deliver his own brother to the hands of justice if this brother has stolen, and a soldier is court-martialed everywhere if he disobeys orders even if he has brought victory to his flag. But the difference is whether one adheres to the laws of duty and conscience so rigidly, strictly, and formally that no human considerations ever can pass through, or whether one uses discrimination in the interpretation of ethical laws. The Prussian takes his ethical principles literally, and goes to extremes at all times in *living* them instead of taking his general direction from them. This identification of principle and life is one of the most marked features of German life. The German official who stands for order, right, or any regulations which are to be carried out is penetrated by these principles to the depths of his existence. He does not only speak the law, he *is* the Law. One of the discoveries of a more liberal era in Germany was that a policeman need not be absolutely a bully in order to carry out his duties and that in the last analysis he was there indeed for the benefit and protection of the people. When that was understood the kindness of the English "Bobby" was praised and imitated, and policemen were taught to be polite and even kind. Somehow every German has imbibed as a basic notion of life the idea of the identity of life and principle.

The following incident happened to an American of my acquaintance who visited his relatives in Berlin at the beginning of the Nazi regime. The young man went at the invitation of a relative who happened to be a Prussian general and who wanted his nephew to come and see how nice in reality Nazi Germany was. The young man spent a few weeks in Berlin and got a very rosy impression of conditions. One evening after the theater he went with his cousin into a fashionable restaurant to dine. While they were sitting at a table two officers came in, strolled over to the table, and told the party to leave because the table belonged to them. The young American called the waiter and asked whether the table had been ordered

for the two officers, which was denied. They insisted, however, that they always had this table whenever they came and others had to leave it. The American refused to comply, whereupon one of the officers took the chair away from underneath the girl so that she fell to the floor. The American slapped him in the face, and was at once arrested. The most interesting part of the story is that even the general, the father of the insulted girl, did not blame the officers, but considered it their right to behave as they did and considered it impossible that a civilian should have slapped them because they represented in every case a higher and absolute authority. The young man was told that either he must apologize or leave the country at once.

These observations apply to the Germans, particularly the Prussians, at any time. The Nazis represent only a particularly distorted form of the potentialities of thought and action which are general German qualities. The special Nazi mentality is only a distorted outgrowth of quite general trends in German reasoning and feeling. A woman acquaintance once said that the thing which is most wonderful in Hitler is that he will sacrifice himself, and ruthlessly carry out any evil, in the interest of the higher ideals which he follows. The counterparts to such self-torture are the distorted, opposite, self-imposed duties of happiness as they are manifested in the "strength through joy" ("Kraft durch Freude") assignments, and in the women's consent to have children for the sake of Mr. Hitler and the State. In German song books for children, with collections of songs and melodies, the songs are classified in chapters under various titles. Each chapter begins with a picture. The picture for patriotism, introducing patriotic songs, is invariably a dying soldier and a fighting soldier with a flag. That is to say, patriotism, even in older German schoolbooks, is always represented by the idea of dying for the country, not living for it.

Modern psychology has taught us to look with distrust on all sorts of perfectionisms because they may lead up to a neurosis. The German perfectionism has, through its combination with certain capacities and temperamental characteristics of the Germans, a quality which makes it dangerous to the rest of the world.

In the first place, there are the German efficiency, conscientiousness, and perseverance, which make them excel in many things and which are great assets for anyone who strives to perfection. There is, secondly, that identification of person and objective, of

person and accomplishment, already discussed. That lends an element of passion to the objective which is commonly absent in Anglo-Saxon work and striving of any kind, and it also reflects on the person the glory of his objective. The person, as a person, is credited with the values he produces. And this has the other effect, that a person wishes to proclaim everything he has as his own product. In this strange way, manners, character, even parentage, inheritance, "race," become one's accomplishment. And since one's accomplishment is one's worth, the German reasons that he should be appreciated because of it. It never occurs to him that sympathy may not be won or lost with the accomplishment. The very distinct separation between values produced and the person who produces them, as the Anglo-Saxon makes it, is completely incomprehensible to the German mind. It is pathetic how Germans fail to understand why other nations dislike them. Their reasoning is that their unpopularity must be due to jealousy because they are so efficient and so accomplished. If it were not for jealousy, everyone, they believe, would appreciate them "because" of this efficiency.

Nothing could be more opposed to this objectivation of personal values than the English attitude which represents the other extreme (and which, also, is not without perils). The Englishman, if he can afford it, likes to look at his most accomplished achievements as at his hobbies, that is to say, as at accompaniments of his personal life. Of course, his understatements may become dangerous because they eventually lead to an underestimation of that accomplishment factor which the Germans overestimate so excessively.

While the emphasis on their accomplishments makes the Germans merely unpopular, there is, however, another temperamental disposition which creates that menace which should be fully understood to be properly handled. This disposition is the German's capacity for complete, self-effacing absorption. The German is at all times capable and willing to lose completely his identity in an absorbed followership toward an overwhelming ideal. I have sometimes heard Germans say that their hatred of the Jews was hatred of their always self-identified and critical mind. The German likes to be absorbed, not incorporated on a collaborative basis, which is the democratic ideal, but self-effacingly absorbed in followership to something ideal and absolute. This, then, becomes with him as well a matter of passion as of *conscience*. And this, his interpretation of conscience, he follows, if he considers it necessary, over corpses.

This is why it is so essentially wrong to think of a system like the present one in Germany as of something which is imposed on the people. Autocratic leadership is not in the least against German feeling as long as it seems to be there for the pursuit of ideals in which the German believes.

This German inclination, even passion, to be self-effacingly absorbed by something which he feels to be bigger than himself makes him easily a prey to wrong prophets. He is quickly swept off his feet by enthusiasm, he has never learned to argue, he looks at criticism as something always purely destructive, and he not only allows himself a degree of unconsciousness such as nobody can afford to allow himself in a civilized and complicated world, but he also even praises this simplicity as a high value. Here two things converge: the above-described perfectionism, the overemphasis of objective values instead of human considerations, and, secondly, the age-old German loyalty, the "Niebelungen Treue" (fidelity) of the vassals toward their lord. It is a matter of passion as well as of conviction to be loyal to the accredited masters. Other nations' descriptions of the Germans' following like sheep, of their predilection to be regimented, of their obedience and belief in authority remain on the surface of the matter and do not do justice to the element of passion and deep-rooted conviction in these attitudes. Even highly educated Germans appraise such devotion without reservation as noble. Criticism, then, is not a sign of a desirable independence of mind, but something mean and minimizing. The Nazis in a very clever way have understood how to dwell on this capacity of devotion and they have linked it with a rational argument which made it acceptable even to their most critical youth. Life, they say, is nowadays so complicated, science and full information about everything so far beyond reach of the ordinary man that it is a help for everyone if there are leaders who advise the masses about what is best for them. Such arguments were taught in S. S. and S. A. courses and were found sound even by many brilliant youths.

Hence we arrive at our main point, namely, that Nazi Germany, because of these fundamentals of character, has forfeited freedom in the name of something which seems to be a noble cause and is represented as such by leaders. Personal freedom is easily forfeited by Germans for something which seems higher to them than personal integrity of existence. In that strange combination of their passion for devotion, together with their overemphasis of objective

values and principles, they believe themselves in the possession of the highest type of morality. They believe that the despising and the transcending of life in their morality and morale are what makes them superior to other nations whose hesitation to sacrifice their lives and whose high evaluation of the happiness of life are things they look down upon. They fail completely to see that what they consider as superhuman is frequently just inhuman, and results from an insufficiency, not from superiority. While they put highest esteem on devotion to ideals, at the same time they underrate the necessity to select one's ideals, to be discriminative of what one wants to live and to die for. They take it for granted that one knows these things or else that an authority will let one know. They underrate the importance of developing an independent and capable spirit which can weigh values and principles, and which knows how to choose. Here lies their fundamental weakness.

However devoted and faithful, noble and sacrificing, one may be, his goodness is of purely potential value as long as he has not yet found his objective. And the sacrifice and devotion may even lead to evil action if the objective has been chosen wrongly. That is precisely the tragedy which we now see happening in Germany. The German youth has never been educated to develop criticism and independence of spirit and to choose its moral objectives freely. Quite on the contrary, obedience was fostered, and noncriticism mistaken for constructiveness. Thus even that idealistic and worthy representative of the German that many people admired and cherished was and is incapable of coping with situations in which he sacrifices life and personal freedom to an ideal which in its abstract characterization is something glorious in his imagination and theory, but the concrete substratum of which may be not in the very least what he thinks it is.

SUMMARY

This article brings an analysis of certain traits of the German character that would explain a development which puzzles everyone, traits that should be kept in mind when dealing with them in the future and when planning post-war work to educate Central Europe to democratic thinking.

The most puzzling fact in the Germans is how easily they forfeit freedom. The question is raised for what they do it. The answer

is seen in the first instance in the way in which they follow certain general *abstract ideals* to which they feel obliged to sacrifice everything, even freedom and life. Some other traits come in here which make the way in which the Germans try to materialize their ideals dangerous for the rest of the world. These traits are their inclination to be swept away by their enthusiasm for somebody whom they follow, their complete and restless absorption by something in which they believe, and their incapacity to evaluate critically and to choose the objectives for their idealism in the right way. No matter how high an idealism may be and how noble and sacrificing somebody may be this potential goodness may lead to the most evil action if the objective has been chosen wrongly; and that is precisely what happens all the time in Germany.

Some other traits fit into this picture, namely, the overemphasis of objective values and principles which they consider the highest type of morality and which makes them overlook human values at stake and makes them incapable of tolerance. They have no discriminative understanding of tolerance born out of strength, humor, and an ultimate belief in all human beings' potential goodness, and they consider all tolerance a weakness. The democratic idea to allow for free development so long as possible and not to interfere with anybody so long as not absolutely necessary is completely foreign to all German thinking in education as well as in all affairs of civilian or public life.

AMERICAN CONSCIENCE AND THE COMING PEACE *

BY NEVITT SANFORD

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PROBLEMS of post-war reconstruction are so numerous and so complex that one can avoid defeatism at the start only by setting himself a relatively small task. I shall not, therefore, attempt to envision the post-war world nor to point out the directions in which we ought to move forward. The clinical psychologist is not at his best when it comes to telling people what they ought to think; his capacities seem better adapted for pointing out some of the obstacles to straight thinking and for exposing irrationality when it occurs.

Thinking about war and peace seems particularly susceptible to influence by emotion, for the problems here involved touch the deepest human feelings. Sumner Wells has recently stated that consideration of world organization ought to be postponed until passions have cooled and men are again able to be rational. It might be suggested here that men will be but little less irrational after the war than they are now; more likely, their irrationality will merely take a different turn. If it is dangerous to make peace with Germany and Japan while hostile feeling is running high; it may be just as dangerous to plan for peace in a spirit of self-abnegation, such as might follow the war.

My paper, then, is an attempt to reveal some of the emotional trends which might be expected to affect post-war plans and actions, and I shall take the advantage to be gained from approaching these problems from the point of view of clinical psychology. There is presumptuousness even in this, for in wartime the psychologist is but slightly less free from emotional bias than anybody else.

Many observers agree that the type of social and political organization toward which we are heading will be something that has no counterpart in world history. In this complexity, the clinical psychologist seems to have at least one advantage. He may deal with psychological processes within the individual, processes which

* This paper was read at the 22nd Annual Meeting of the Western Psychological Association, Seattle, Wash., June 26, 1942. It was part of a symposium entitled "Psychological problems involved in the establishment of permanent peace"

operate according to the same laws in wartime as in peace time, in one period of history as in another. Thus, I believe we do know something about human conscience and aggression, and about the interactions of the two. And there is considerable evidence that individuals in our Western culture struggle with the same kinds of moral problems as people did at the beginning of the Christian era. War and its aftermath, though they touch every aspect of human existence, still present, with the greatest intensity for many people, problems of how to justify or control—and how to atone for—aggression. The leaders of belligerent countries must find moral justification for war, and they show the greatest concern to avoid war guilt. This is particularly true of those countries which have been under the influence of Christianity; and even the Japanese leaders, it seems, have been at pains to convince their people that their war is a benevolent mission.

In the area of aggression and conscience, then, we may expect to find some of the sources of emotionally determined thinking about the war and the peace. And if we are to consider the operation of these psychological factors in the United States—which is here the major concern—we must take as our point of departure, it seems, the fact that this is predominantly a Protestant Christian country, in which Puritanism, in its various forms, is still a potent force. Puritanism certainly helps to determine the way in which we go to war, and we may expect it to exert considerable influence upon the kind of peace we make.

The salient feature of Puritanism seems to be the notion that man is by nature evil and can avoid damnation only through the grace of God. Though it is by no means a sure thing, his best chance to attain salvation is through striving continually to inhibit base instincts and to attain perfection. In this tradition is the tendency to view moral problems in terms of blacks and whites, to consider human behavior as either very, very good or horrid, as either God-like or completely devilish. Though the Puritan has the lowest regard for human nature, this does not prevent him from setting the highest standards for human conduct, and when men fail to achieve perfection this is taken as new proof of their essential evilness. Our conceptions about aggression seem to have been profoundly influenced by the Puritan tradition. John Calvin, Charles Darwin, and Sigmund Freud all have contributed to the notion that every individual possesses a basic store of aggression which, unless

the strictest vigilance is maintained, will, on the slightest provocation, burst out in the most horrible excesses. This notion has determined in large measure our practices with respect to child training. Since aggression is so powerful and so threatening, it must be inhibited entirely; if a little escapes, this gives proof, as it were, of how much still lies below the surface. The result has been the widespread repression of infantile aggression. Since repressed aggression cannot be modified, directed, or controlled, it remains in the unconscious as a source of fear, of self-abasement, and of misjudgments about the nature of men. One result is that people with the best intentions cannot act when a little aggression is called for. They must wait until the object has been made to appear sufficiently low or sufficiently fearful, and then the aggression, in the guise of righteous indignation, is overdone, to be followed by guilt and a turning-against the self.

There can be little question but that this type of morality influenced profoundly the behavior of many Americans during and after World War I. Whatever the causes for our entry into the war, psychologically it was, for many, a moral crusade. When the enemy had been made to appear sufficiently low so that he might justly be attacked, we went after him with burning zeal. Aggression could be justified so long as it was in the service of ideals, and when the ideals were not carried through—then we had to deal with an enormous burden of guilt. There followed the “era of pacifism” or, rather, an era in which the existence of war and aggression was denied. Many Germans, it seemed, were inclined to accept the burden of war guilt in 1918, but in this they could not match the self-abnegation of the American and British Puritans. By and large, Germans in the years since World War I have been able to enjoy a wronged sense of justice—which found a mouthpiece and a redeemer in Adolf Hitler—while Americans have been prevented by their guilt feelings from condemning, in what are now their enemies, the most flagrant violations of their own moral code.

I should, of course, emphasize that this view of the matter is only partial. What has been described might best be regarded as one trend of opinion in the United States. If the self-condemnation I have mentioned had been universal, we would never have mustered the moral courage again to go to war with Germany. It could be argued, however, that this moral aspect was a necessary condition for isolationism, that happy mixture of opportunism and Christian

humility. Though pacifism could hardly have gained the ground that it did without evidence that it was a paying proposition, it is doubtful that Americans could have been so selfish were there not the conviction that what they did accorded with Christian conscience.

It seems generally agreed that our actions with respect to the present war are now on a relatively sound and realistic moral basis. The great majority of Americans, long before Pearl Harbor, had been able to throw off the cynicism, the disillusionment, the pacifism, the moral inertness, and to realize that there might be some things worse than aggression. To be sure, there are people who find it impossible to be angry with the enemy and who seem more concerned first to remove the beam in our own eye. Though they sometimes act as a drag upon morale by arousing guilt feelings in those who want to fight the war they are at present relatively quiescent. The question is: how might things be after the war—particularly after a long war?

Are we likely again to reject any share in the control of world affairs? At the moment, it seems there is little chance that isolationism will again become national policy. But we must grant that this is a possibility and that we must be on guard to prevent it. Its chances for success would increase, it seems, with the length of the war. For after a long war there might well be a tendency to withdrawal from sheer emotional weariness. Or, as the struggle increases in bitterness and civilians are led to cry more insistently for enemy blood, the likelihood of withdrawal because of guilt and self-condemnation might be expected to increase. And, finally, if tendencies toward idealism in post-war planning are not sufficiently tempered by realism, there could again be disillusionment and cynicism. However, to be forewarned in these matters—as I believe we are today—is to be forearmed, and one hopes that we will not allow our present awareness to fade.

The consensus of opinion among those who are now speaking about the post-war world—statesmen, journalists, and social scientists alike—seems to be that whatever the plan for political and social reorganization in Europe or in Asia, the United States will be required actively to participate, and to use force, or to stand ready and willing to use force, in order to maintain whatever form of order emerges from the peace conferences. The United States will be called upon to do police work—in the broadest sense of this word.

Among the psychological problems we may expect to encounter, therefore, will be problems very similar to those which have always been the concern of the policeman, the probation officer, the judge, and the social worker. We may expect that these problems, broadly conceived, will be of two kinds: (1) those arising from the nature of the policing attitude itself and (2) those arising out of the nature of the offenders or problem cases—in this case Germany and Japan, chiefly. In other words, there will be problems of self-understanding as well as problems of how to understand the other fellow.

After the war we may expect to face first of all the problem of punishment for the aggressors. Here—to consider the psychology of the policeman first—the emotional attitudes deriving from Puritanism will almost certainly express themselves. Whatever might be the true nature of the German and Japanese people and leaders they will be criminals in the eyes of many Americans, and we may expect to encounter the same kind of irrationality that appears whenever crime breaks out in our midst. There will be outraged demands for vengeful punishment—desires to pay them back 10 or 100 fold for what they have done to others—the situation in which a man uses the occasion of punishment to vent his own inhibited aggression—and there will be inclinations toward complete forgiveness in the spirit of “Father forgive them for they know not what they do.” Both of these attitudes, indeed, are already being expressed every day in the newspapers. Some people are making proposals for dealing with the Germans and the Japanese that seem to go far beyond the demands of just or prudent punishment. Others have already begun to think of ways and means for protecting the conquered Axis partners from the imagined vengefulness of their present victims. Surely we must find a course somewhere between these two extremes. A realistic procedure might well include considerable punishment for the offenders. Demands for punishment seem to me healthier in a psychological sense than do inclinations toward complete charity, and it seems to me these demands can be met without the world’s being plunged into a blood-bath through vengeful executions. The notion that Europe—hungry and weary as it is—is filled with outraged people who are waiting for a chance to kill every German down to the last dog and cat probably is very largely fanciful—another reflection of the puritanical tendency to see everything that is not white as completely black. Be it noted that those who sigh plaintively about

there being so much hatred in the world often are the very people who find themselves unable to be angry with the enemy. And be it noted further that they are civilians, not soldiers. The latter have the opportunity to explore their own aggression and they learn not to fear it. Civilians are left largely to their own imaginings and their ideas about war derive much from their infantile fantasies. In many such cases, repressed infantile aggression is projected onto the external world, which is then apperceived as a welter of hostile forces.

Thus, if we put aside the fanciful notions about blood-baths, it becomes possible to see how the demands for punishment may be met without completely devastating effects. What most people want, after all, is not to kill somebody, but to get assurance that justice will be done. The Czech government in exile did not ask permission to wipe out one or more German village for every one of their own that the Nazis destroyed, but only to execute a few Nazi leaders. It seems fair to say therefore that they are not asking to exact an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, but only to see that crime does not go unpunished. There might be wisdom in this, for the evidence is that when crime does go unpunished—even when it is forgiven—the effects upon society are likely to be extremely disrupting. Every citizen is then thrown into a conflict between his conscience and his own suppressed criminal impulses, and there are two outstanding results: increasing crime and increasing neurosis. Those with the less strong conscience give way to crime, on the basis that when everybody does it, it is all right; those with the strongest conscience turn aggressively against themselves and looking at the criminals say, "There, but for the grace of God, go I."

Where human needs require that the punishment fit the crime, the demands of scientific penology are that the punishment also fit the criminal. Whereas the leaders of both Germany and Japan are, in the eyes of most Americans, criminals deserving equal punishment, it is doubtful that the same punishment or the same treatment can be adapted to both offenders. We are faced with the task, therefore, of understanding the characters of these peoples so that the effects of different kinds of punishments may be predicted. Studies of these peoples have not as yet progressed very far and one cannot speak with conviction. Yet something may be very tentatively ventured.

Both the Germans and the Japanese are going to require very forceful treatment. But for different reasons. I would suppose that in Germany Christian ethics are sufficiently alive in large sections of the civilian population so that the psychology of punishment which holds for the United States and Britain will hold also for them. On this basis they might expect to be punished, and many of them will require to be punished for their own mental health. Even the Nazis, I believe, have not got entirely away from conscience as we know it. What they do is not so much without conscience as in defiance of conscience. Like our own adolescent criminals who have rebelled against brutal fathers, they must be treated with strength and with understanding. What they cannot understand is pure forgiveness and they certainly know how to oppose mere force with more force.

As for the Japanese, we cannot of course judge their behavior by our own moral standards. Behavior which seems most shocking to us they perform in all conscience. Whereas we have been taught to protect the weak against the strong, the Japanese, it seems, have been taught to despise the weak and to admire the strong. Whatever our practice toward them, we cannot allow ourselves again to appear to them as weak and decadent.

In neither case, therefore, can we avoid the use of force. In neither case will forgiveness be understood.

Irrational attitudes may be expected to express themselves not only in connection with punishing the aggressors immediately after the war, but also in the more distant future when we may be called upon to do probation work and to take an active part in the affairs of the whole world. Here we shall be concerned not only with our present enemies but with many nations, including our present allies. Then we shall probably hear from those who say, "All right, we didn't want to get into this at all, but if we must, we are going to dominate completely." There again one may detect the workings of the Puritan tendency to see only the extreme alternatives. The situation is like that of a boy who in his relations with his brother must be either completely cowed or completely oppressive.

That many people will see America's participation in world affairs as primarily an opportunity for economic gain, that many people will see a chance to act out their fantasies of racial or cultural superiority, seems beyond doubt. Among social scientists and political liberals, these tendencies are well recognized and we can

be sure they will be called to everyone's attention. More likely to be overlooked are the dangers arising from the other side, from the humble Christians who say with respect to other cultures—even warlike ones—"We are no better than they are; what right have we to impose our standards, degenerate and materialistic as they are, upon other peoples." This attitude seems to many of us so right, that it is only with difficulty that we are able to cast a critical eye upon it. But I believe we must be critical of it. Though it may serve as an important curb upon our own Fascist and imperialist tendencies, taken by itself it is not conducive to effective work toward world peace. It leads us to exaggerate the meanness of people with whom we must work in the closest collaboration, to lose heart when those whom we have idealized manifest human frailties, and to become incapable of action at times when a little force would do so much good.

In concluding, I may say that it is not a pleasant task to question idealism at a time when idealistic aims supply for many people the only reasons for fighting the war. I can only insist upon the difference between a war for ideals and an idealistic war. Decency, justice, humanity, and freedom—both political and economic—are ideals upon which Puritanism has not the sole claim; they are ideals for which the most hard-bitten realist may fight. And if a man is a realist, he will fight for them in the knowledge that they are not to be gained all at once; unlike the Puritan who demands perfection or nothing and who sees the future world as either completely ordered or completely chaotic, the realist may keep his eye focused upon these values while admitting his own and others' shortcomings. He will recognize, with the psychologist, that people are neither as bad nor as good as they think they are; but he will not lose the conviction that it is worthwhile to be as good as one can possibly afford to be.

CULTURAL RECONSTRUCTION

BY KURT LEWIN

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BUILDING a world of peace—if and when we have won—which will be worth at least the name “better than before” includes many problems: political, economic, and cultural. Each of them is loaded with difficulties. Yet all of them have to be considered together and attacked together as interdependent aspects of one dynamic field if any successful step forward is to be achieved.

The implications of the cultural aspect seem to be particularly unclear. Has the culture of the German, the Japanese, the British, or Chinese anything to do with their likelihood or unlikelihood of going to war as an aggressor or fighting in a certain way when hard pressed? Are these cultural differences of any importance for intercultural cooperation?

The discussion of this question seems to have been retarded by philosophical and political sentiments. The difference between peoples has either been overemphasized and treated as innate racial characteristics, or underemphasized and treated as unessential, frequently by misinterpreting the democratic doctrine of equal rights of men. A realistic, scientific approach will have to consider differences between modern cultures as facts of the same nature as differences between “primitive” cultures. Such a scientific approach will refuse to consider cultural characteristics unalterable in principle. Instead, it will ask in an empirical fashion: How easily and with what methods can a certain degree of cultural change be accomplished and how permanent does such a change promise to be?

Definite answers to such questions can be supplied only by an “experimental cultural anthropology” which will study cultural changes systematically under specially created conditions. Unfortunately, cultural anthropology is still in its “descriptive” stage; it has its hands full with finding methods of observing and describing modern cultures adequately and reliably. There have been but inklings of experiments about how cultures can actively be changed

in a desired direction. Nevertheless, we will have to try to do the best we can.

A certain amount of cultural reconstruction will be necessary in most countries after the war; these countries will have to switch from a wartime to a peacetime "culture." Most nations will have to be able to do this without help from the outside. This shift from wartime to peacetime culture should be less difficult than it might appear in view of the present hatred, particularly if peace should bring about a decent political world organization. After the last war sizable proportions of the population in most countries turned quickly to a radical pacifism. This experience should warn us not to confuse the violence of a cultural sentiment with its depths and permanency. In this country, the let-down after the last war quickly turned into isolationism thus setting the stage for this war. (The danger of a similar reaction after this war is again probably greater than that of a permanent imperialistic militarism in this country.) Even in Germany right after the last war the proportion of the population which turned to pacifism was probably larger than the group which started immediately to build for revenge and as a first step invented the *Dolchstoßlegende*. (The home front was said to have stabbed the army in the back; in this way the prestige of the Germany army was maintained.)

The fact that superficial although violent cultural sentiments might change quickly in a nation does not, however, disprove those historians who claim that nothing can be changed so little as the deeper cultural characteristics of a people. It is these deeper cultural traits which we have to consider when thinking of the cultural aspects of permanent peace. In Germany, in spite of the pacifistic sentiment after the war and long before Hitler, every child was again playing war with toy soldiers. And soon, in line with long-standing tradition, militarists were again winning out. On the other hand, Mussolini has tried for more than a decade to build up in the Italians those soldierly characteristics which were obviously lacking in the first World War. In spite of a very thorough attempt which reached every age level down to early childhood he seems to have failed to alter these cultural characteristics. Similarly, certain peculiarities of the Russian or the British character seem to change very little. That these permanent characteristics are cultural rather than racial is shown by the fact that children taken from

one country to the other will quickly and thoroughly adopt the characteristics of the people in the new country.

A democratic world order does not require or even favor cultural uniformity all over the world. The parallel to democratic freedom for the individual is cultural pluralism for groups. But any democratic society has to safeguard against misuse of individual freedom by the gangster or—politically speaking—the “intolerant.” Without establishing to some degree the principle of tolerance, of equality of rights, in every culture the “intolerant” culture will always be endangering a democratic world organization. Intolerance against intolerant cultures is therefore a prerequisite to any organization of permanent peace.

To encourage change toward democracy a change of values in a vast realm would have to be accomplished. This change would include, for instance, increased emphasis on human values as against superhuman values, such as the state, politics, science. It would emphasize what the German “Iron Chancellor” Bismarck has called far back in 1880 *Civilcourage* (morale courage of the civilians) and what he deplored as lacking in the German character (as against the courage and the blind obedience of the soldier). It would stress the value of manipulating difficulties rather than complaining about them. It would stress education for independence rather than for obedience.

In any attempt to influence cultural patterns it cannot be emphasized too much that the problem of changing single persons or small groups which are uprooted and transplanted into a new cultural background is rather different from the problem of changing the culture of a compact group remaining on native soil. The technique which seems to offer itself as the natural means to reach such a compact group for the purpose of changing the cultural backgrounds is “propaganda” in its various forms, such as radio, newspaper, etc.

However, even if such propaganda from outside or inside the country were successful it would not be likely to do much more than change the “verbal sentiments” of a people. When speaking about “democracy” the German is likely to mean individualistic freedom. If an American defines democracy he too very frequently stresses individualistic freedom and forgets that leadership is fully as important in a democracy as in an autocracy. But the American happens to live in a country where the efficiency of the process of

group decisions is relatively highly developed, at least in small groups, and where democratic leadership is thoroughly accepted as a cultural pattern and taught in practice to children in school. One cannot expect people living in a country without such traditions to understand a term like democracy in any other way than in those conceptual dimensions in which they are accustomed to think. One cannot expect the member of a different culture to accept a never-experienced cultural pattern which even the people who have experienced that pattern are seldom able to describe adequately. It has been one of the tragedies of the German Republic that the democratically minded people who were in power immediately after the war confused democracy with "being unpolitical" and under this slogan permitted the old reactionaries to keep their official positions as "experts." It was a tragedy that they did not know that "intolerance against the intolerant" is as essential for maintaining and particularly for establishing a democracy as "tolerance for the tolerant"; above all, it was a tragedy that they did not know that strong leadership and an efficient positive use of the political power by the majority is an essential aspect of democracy. Instead, Germany congratulated herself on having "the freest Constitution in the world" because technically even a small minority got its proportional representation in the parliament. Actually, this set-up led to dozens of political parties and to the permanent domination of the majority by a minority group in the center.

A second main obstacle against changing cultures is the fact that a pattern like democracy is not limited to political problems but is interwoven with every aspect of the culture. How the mother handles her child of one, two, or three years of age; how business is conducted; what group has status; how status differences are reacted to—all of these habitudes are essential elements of the cultural pattern. Every major change, therefore, has to be carried through against such a highly interwoven background. It cannot be limited to a change in officially recognized values; it has to be a change in actual group life.

While it is correct that change of values will finally lead to a change of social conduct, it is equally correct that changes of action patterns and of actual group life will change cultural values. This indirect change of cultural values probably reaches deeper and is more permanent than direct changes of values by propaganda.

There is no need to point out how thoroughly Hitler has understood this fact. Is there any hope of influencing Fascist group life in a direction toward democracy?

The scientific research in this field, although very meager, seems to warrant at least a few general statements:

1. It is a fallacy to assume that people, if left alone, follow a democratic pattern in their group life. That holds not even for people living in a democratic society (2). (The development of certain countries, like the United States, toward democracy was a result of very unique historical-geographical conditions.) In democracy, as in any culture, the individual acquires the cultural pattern by some type of "learning." Normally, such learning occurs by way of growing up in that culture.

2. In regard to changing from one cultural pattern to another experiments indicate that autocracy can be "imposed upon a person." That means the individual might "learn" autocracy by adapting himself to a situation forced upon him from outside. Democracy cannot be imposed upon a person; it has to be learned by a process of voluntary and responsible participation. Changing from autocracy to democracy is a process which takes more time than changing in the opposite direction.

3. The "learning" of democracy in case of a change from another pattern contains, therefore, a kind of paradox which is similar to the problem of leadership in democracy. The democratic leader does not impose his goals on the group as does the autocratic leader: the policy determination in democracy is done by the group as a whole. Still the democratic leader should "lead."

In regard to a change toward democracy this paradox of democratic leadership is still more pointed. In an experimental change (2), for instance, from individualistic freedom (*laissez-faire*) to democracy, the incoming democratic leader could not tell the group members exactly what they should do because that would lead to autocracy. Still some manipulations of the situation had to be made to lead the group into the direction of democracy. A similarly difficult problem arose when the autocratic group was to be transformed into a democratic one. Relaxing the rules frequently led first to a period of aggressive anarchy.

To instigate changes toward democracy a situation has to be created for a certain period where the leader is sufficiently in control to rule out influences he does not want and to manipulate the

situation to a sufficient degree. The goal of the democratic leader in this transition period will have to be the same as that of any good teacher, namely, to make himself superfluous, to be replaced by indigenous leaders from the group.

4. The experiments in training of democratic leaders, for instance, of foremen in a factory, indicate strongly that it does not suffice to have the subleaders who deal with the small face-to-face groups trained in democratic procedures. If the power above them, such as the management of the factory, does not understand and does not apply democratic procedures, either a revolution occurs or the effect of democratic leadership in the lower brackets will quickly fade. This is not surprising because cultural patterns are social atmospheres which cannot be handed out bit by bit.

5. For reconstruction in European countries this means that it is a fallacy to believe that we can go on helping the Hapsburgs to set up an Austrian legion with the idea that "what government France, Germany, or the Balkan states will have will be decided not by us but by the people themselves after the war." Obviously, if we permit anti-democratic powers to establish themselves, people will have no chance to make a decision toward democracy.

Our task is to create that minimum degree of democracy which is necessary for an international organization of the type we wish to realize, that minimum which would permit us within a shrunken, interdependent world, to develop the democracy we want at home. For this purpose a political setting has to be provided which is powerful and enduring enough to give people at least a chance for "learning democracy."

To attack this problem realistically we will have to avoid an American imperialism which will police the world, as well as an American isolationism which will shy away from the responsibility required of any member of a democratic group of nations. We will have to avoid the naïve belief that people "left alone" will choose democracy. We have to avoid building our plans on "hatred of the enemy," but we also have to avoid building our plans on wishful thinking and blindness against reality. We should know, for instance, that we will have to deal in Germany with a set-up where month after month, day after day, six to seven thousand unwanted women and children are killed in central slaughter houses in occupied territories, and where thousands of people must have grown accustomed to doing such jobs. American

newspapers seem to play down such unpleasant truths probably because they wish to prevent a peace based on hatred. Actually, this procedure defies its purpose because in politics as in education a successful action has to be based on a full knowledge of reality.

Considering the technical aspect of the change, one can state:

1. It is obviously hopeless to change the cultural patterns of millions of people by treating them individually. Fortunately, the methods generally called "group work" permit reaching whole groups of individuals at once and, at the same time, seem actually to be more efficient in bringing about deep changes than the individual approach is.

2. It seems to be possible by training democratic leaders (1) and leaders of leaders to build up a pyramid which could reach large masses relatively quickly.

3. It will be essential to have a set-up which avoids creating resentment and hostility and instead will build up cooperation. If one conceives the task of democratizing realistically as a process which has to reach deep into family action and everyday group life it seems to be somewhat hopeless to attempt such a change mainly through schools. Hundreds of thousands of American teachers would have to be sent over. These Americans, even hyphenated Americans and certainly refugees, are likely to create nothing but resentment in such a position.

There is, however, an historical precedent, at least in Germany, for Americans coming into the country with the purpose of helping on a wide scale and receiving enthusiastic support and acceptance by the Germans. The feeding of children throughout Germany after the last war, known in Germany as "*Quackerspeisung*" (Quaker feeding), has left a deep impression in every German village and is remembered gratefully by millions of parents even now. It seems feasible and natural to build up group work around the feeding of Europe after this war in such a way that the cooperative work for reconstruction would offer a real experience in democratic group life. It would be possible to reach a large number and a variety of age levels in this and other works of reconstruction.

It is particularly important that in this way the adolescent could be reached. It is this age level which supports Hitler most uncritically and most unscrupulously. (For instance, the Super-Gestapo called Waffen-SS whose function it would be to suppress any uprising in the army is built from such young people.) In addition,

the adolescent is at that age level which determines what the cultural pattern will be in the immediately following generation. The frontal attack on the task of transforming this very age level—which is full of enthusiasm and, in many respects, accustomed to cooperation—into cooperative groups for productive reconstruction in a radical democratic spirit might be one of the few chances for bringing about a change toward democracy which promises permanency.

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EDUCATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN MAKING AND KEEPING THE PEACE *

BY O. H. MOWRER

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THOUGHTFUL men and women are becoming increasingly aware of the seriousness of the educational blunders which were made following World War I. Bruce Bliven, writing in the *Readers' Digest* for November (1942), voices the judgment of many others when he says:

The men who made the peace treaties of 1918 made the worst possible mistake. They tried to control the banks and the munitions factories in the defeated countries, but they left the schools alone. They would have done much better to concentrate on the schools.

Through the official pronouncements of both the President¹ and the Vice-President² and through various indices of enlightened public opinion, an urgent mandate has been given American educators to play an active and responsible role in preparing for and preserving the peace which will follow the present war. The old errors of indifference and shortsightedness must not be repeated, we are told.

We must de-educate and re-educate [the German and Japanese] people for Democracy. . . . The one hope for Europe remains as a change of mentality on the part of the German. He must be taught to give up the century-old conception that his is the master race³

The German people must learn to un-learn all that they have been taught, not only by Hitler, but by his predecessors in the last hundred years, by so many of their philosophers and teachers, the disciples of blood and iron⁴

The United Nations must back up military disarmament with psychological disarmament—supervision, or at least inspection, of the school systems of Germany

* The writer is grateful to the members of a seminar on Education and World Problems for many suggestions incorporated in this paper. He wishes particularly to acknowledge the assistance of Mrs. Charlotte Oppler.

¹ Radio address on the seventh anniversary of the Philippines Commonwealth government *New York Herald Tribune*, Nov. 16, 1942.

² Radio address on Post-War Policy at Home and Abroad *New York Herald Tribune*, Dec. 29, 1942.

³ Capt. L. D. Gammas, M.P. Interview *New York Times*, Dec. 2, 1942.

⁴ Peter Matthews. The German people must learn to un-learn *Free Europe (Fortnightly Rev. internat. Affairs)*, 1941, 4, No. 46, 125.

and Japan, to undo so far as possible the diabolical work of Hitler and the Japanese war lords in poisoning the minds of the young⁵

These and numerous other statements which might be quoted constitute an exciting challenge to all who are connected with the educational profession, but a review of the complexities which immediately arise when practical action is contemplated will have a sobering effect on even the most sanguine. The most serious of these obstacles are the following:

1. Education is that process whereby the culture, *i.e.*, the accumulated discoveries, knowledge, and values, of a people, is transmitted from each generation to the succeeding one. Therefore, any attempt to change a nation's culture strikes threateningly at the very life line along which the "spirit" of a people flows and grows. Since a social group achieves its integration, distinctive organizational pattern, and unity of objectives slowly and laboriously, it understandably resents and fears any change which is imposed from without. A group seems to prefer to work out its own destiny, however painfully, to having its fate determined by outsiders; hence the great emphasis on "liberty," "freedom," "sovereignty," and similar concepts.

It is true that the cultures of most modern literate peoples have large common segments. Fosdick⁶ has called attention to the remarkable extent to which science and medicine are always internationalized, and widespread uniformities may also be noted in commerce, industry, and government. But distinctive national traits nevertheless remain, and any attempt to change these by fiat is certain to be interpreted, especially in such countries as Germany, Italy, and Japan, as a kind of cultural emasculation.

2. The difficulty which has just been indicated may be waved aside by some on the grounds that, however old and rich the culture of our enemies, they have nevertheless disturbed the peace and orderly development of the world and must be drastically altered by a new educational program. Granting the possible justice of this view, a disturbing practical consideration remains: education, including the training that goes on in the home, the school, and other social institutions, is a tremendous enterprise, and it would probably not be feasible for the United States to attempt to take over the education of even one, much less all, of the enemy nations in any

⁵ Vice-President Henry A. Wallace—see footnote 2

⁶ Raymond B. Fosdick *Annual Report of the Rockefeller Foundation*. New York, 1941

comprehensive sense. The mere mechanics of teaching the Japanese language to enough Americans to staff the schools of Japan would of itself be a stupendous undertaking; and we know that schools alone can do comparatively little to change the basic cultural traits of a people without the support of the parents of the children who attend them and of the community of which the children are a part.⁷

Louis Adamic⁸ has called attention to the fact that there are in America relatively large emigrant populations from all the Axis nations and has suggested that many of these people might be able and willing to return to their native lands as leaders in both the material and educational reconstruction which must begin with the peace. This possibility calls for careful consideration, but there is a possibility that emigrants and refugees would be welcomed after the war by their former countrymen even less enthusiastically than would rank foreigners.

3. It is probably still too early for anyone to foretell what the balance of power will be between the United Nations at the end of the war, but this much seems assured: Neither Great Britain nor Russia will willingly leave the blueprinting of the future of Western Europe to the United States, nor will China look with disinterest upon proposed educational and social changes in Japan. The indications are that England is already anticipating an active part in European reconstruction, and it would be strange indeed if Russia were not also planning energetic measures to insure more congenial post-war neighbors both to the west and to the east. A working compromise might, of course, emerge between Great Britain and the United States, but Russia will almost certainly have objectives which are harder to reconcile with those of her erstwhile allies. More agreement in this area may already have been reached through official diplomatic channels than is at present known to the public; but unless this is the case, any American plan for "de-educating and re-educating" the populations of enemy countries which is not thoroughly coordinated with the interests and plans of all, or at least the leading, members of the United Nations will surely prove a precarious undertaking.

⁷ Allison Davis and John Dollard. *Children of bondage*. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1940. Compare also the experiences of the U. S. Indian Service and of American and European missionaries (D. J. Fleming *Contacts with non-Christian cultures*. New York: Doran, 1923).

⁸ *Two-way passage*. New York: Harper, 1941. See also a bulletin issued monthly by the same author, entitled *In re: Two-way passage*.

INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL PLANNING NEEDED

Educators are aware of the recent crescendo of interest in the role which they may play in shaping the post-war world, but they also recognize the difficulties that are involved. On two basic points they seem agreed: (1) that educational reconstruction is a task which must be carried out cooperatively by all or at least by the principal members of the United Nations and (2) that preparation for this work should not be delayed until the end of the war but should start at once. Pursuant to these ends, Dean Grayson N. Kefauver, of Stanford University, and Sir Ernest Simon, President of the English Association for Education for Citizenship, have proposed the immediate establishment of a Joint Commission on Education for Democratic Societies⁹. And Professor Walter M. Kotschnig, of Smith College, has suggested that:

We shall be most effective in the work of educational reconstruction if we rid ourselves of all messianic complexes. We shall do our best work if we learn to work with other countries rather than to impose our ideas upon them. It is none too early to establish an educational reconstruction agency of the United Nations, which later on might develop into a permanent International Office of Education.¹⁰

Such a proposal neatly solves the first and second difficulties listed above. An international commission, in the beginning composed only of representatives of the United Nations, would presumably invite qualified representatives from conquered countries to join in the work of the commission as soon as the cessation of military operations permitted. Although Vice-President Wallace's suggestion of supervision would undoubtedly be necessary for a time,¹¹ education would go forward in each country mainly in the hands of the

⁹ A Proposal for the Establishment of a Joint Commission on Education for Democratic Societies. (Privately distributed)

¹⁰ *New York Times*, Dec 13, 1942 Cf also the Ann Arbor Resolutions (*Christian Science Monitor*, Sept 16, 1941) and the proposal of an "international education league" (*Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 24, 1942) As forerunners of such proposals are the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (Paris), the International Bureau of Education (Geneva), and the International Institute of Teachers College (Columbia University), all of which are discussed by I L Kandel in "International Cooperation in Education," *Educ. Forum*, 1942, 7, 23-29 [Since the present paper was written, an article by Alexander Meiklejohn, entitled "Education as a factor in post-war reconstruction," has appeared (*Free World*, January, 1943), in which this author concurs with those already cited in saying: "I venture to suggest how a beginning might be made in the establishment of a system of world education adequate for our economic and political needs I have in mind the creating of an International Institute of Education, somewhat analogous in kind, though differing in function, to the International Labor Office . . . of the League of Nations"]

¹¹ Cf. C. J. Hambro's proposed "peace patrol" to keep watch over the post-war psychology of all nations (*How to win the peace* Philadelphia Lippincott, 1942.)

citizens of that country.¹² This arrangement would not only obviate the resentments and apprehensions which would otherwise be aroused, but would also eliminate the need for training large numbers of foreign teachers for this work. As to the third difficulty previously mentioned, there is, indeed, no guarantee that planning and cooperation on the part of educational representatives from the United Nations would be able to avert post-war ideological conflicts, but a commission of the kind contemplated should have real value in this connection and might go far to prevent otherwise disastrous consequences.

The machinery whereby such a proposal might be put into operation has apparently not as yet been worked out, but study and research centers in various parts of the world, staffed by representatives of the educational profession from all cooperating countries, would seem indicated as a first step. Exchange scholarships (on a scale far greater than anything tried heretofore), extensive opportunities for teachers to travel and live abroad, international youth organizations, suitably prepared motion pictures, radio broadcasts, phonograph records, books, newspapers, and similar devices, would almost certainly prove valuable. Because of the politically vital nature and magnitude of this work, it would have to be sanctioned and supported as an agency of World Government, but such a venture might repay many times over the effort and expense that would be involved.

QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED AND ANSWERED

As a preliminary to the establishment of some plan such as here outlined, a period of weeks or perhaps months is needed in which relevant ideas and activities on the part of individuals and organi-

¹² The concept of supervision carries with it the implication that teachers, educational administrators, and textbook writers would for a time have to be selected and authorized by representatives of whatever world-wide educational organization might emerge from the war. Ralph B. Spence ("Psychological problems in winning the peace," *Teach. Col. Rec.*, Nov., 1942) has made some useful suggestions concerning the training of those persons who might be stationed in conquered countries for purposes of educational supervision and personnel selection. But it should be explicitly kept in mind that international educational planning has as its objective the improvement and progressive modification of the educational programs of the members of the United Nations, as well as the establishment of new educational regimes in the enemy countries. As Meiklejohn (footnote 10) has pointed out, "The greatest danger to the United States is that as its power and success grow greater, there will come upon it the same blindness [as that which Great Britain has previously shown] to its own need of education. The lessons of freedom and equality are not easy for nations accustomed to superiority and domination. It is the victors who must be educated. It is upon them that an International Institute of Education must lavish its efforts. It is idle to plan a free world and, at the same time, to plan that we shall be masters of it . . . All men, all nations must be educated."

zations in this country and abroad may be surveyed and brought together in orderly fashion. This would be a research task of considerable proportions and importance, but even now, without any such thoroughgoing inquiry, it is possible to list a number of questions which would presumably have to be analyzed and perhaps acted upon by the international planning commission as eventually constituted. These are as follows:

1. Should foreign relief and educational reconstruction be carried out conjointly or independently? (Social case-work experience should be illuminating in this connection.)

2. To what extent must the ideal of "freedom" be correlated with responsibility and restraint? (Clinical studies of individual character structure are relevant here, especially as related to the pleasure-principle and the reality-principle.)

3. Should education be conceived as a purely rational, verbal process or should it include the formation of basic habits and emotional attitudes?

4. Can formal education effectively compete with unfavorable economic and political conditions? (An examination of the conditions prevailing in Germany under the Weimar Republic should be instructive on this score.)

5. Can education for international cooperation usefully precede political developments, must political developments come first, or must both proceed abreast?

6. To what extent should the citizens of all nations be made aware of the use of displacement (the scapegoat mechanism) as a means of diverting attention from direct to less direct causes of frustration and failure? (This question will be especially relevant in the assignment of "war guilt.")

7. Is it true that "personal security" is a product of the way in which an individual is socialized, as well as of such environmental factors as are subsumed under the Four Freedoms? (In other words, what is the relation between realistic and unrealistic fears?)¹⁸

8. To what extent are private and parochial schools compatible with the objectives of Democratic education? (It has been suggested by some that religious, social class, and caste barriers within a nation must be reduced as a condition for overcoming international distrust and prejudice.)

¹⁸ Erich Fromm *Escape from freedom* New York Farrar & Rinehart, 1941; Harold Laswell, *World politics and personal insecurity*. New York McGraw-Hill, 1935

9. Do literacy and other indices of educational achievement correlate with political wisdom and self-governing capacity? (Vice-President Wallace¹⁴ and others have assumed this to be the case.)

10. Can it be said that Democracy is to questions of value what science is to questions of fact, or must questions of value be settled on authoritarian and metaphysical grounds? (Is it empirically true that science and Democracy tend to flourish or fall together?)

11. What do diplomats, politicians, and military administrators need to know about psychological and educational principles? (International diplomacy during the past two decades certainly includes many acts which would be declared unsound on the basis of such principles.)

12. How can the conception of administration as "service" rather than as "control" be extended not only in the political sphere but also in the schools? (Temple,¹⁵ Simpson,¹⁶ and others have recently stressed the importance of citizen participation in various administrative functions as a means of more fully realizing the ideals of Democracy.)

13. How can unrealistic schemes for international disarmament and overdetermined pacifism be prevented in the post-war world? (The revulsion against and mental flight away from everything pertaining to World War I seems to have hastened rather than delayed the present conflict.)

14. Is there danger that the educational machinery of this and other countries will become so completely re-adapted to the needs of war that its peace-time efficiency and value will be lastingly impaired?

15. How can the vivifying psychological and social effects of Fascism and war (full employment, reduced in-group competition, etc.) be achieved in a Democratic peace-time economy?

16. Do the "fittest" survive only through competition or is cooperation perhaps an even more potent means of insuring security, productivity, and a meaningful life?

17. Does history reveal a monotonous succession of chaotic struggles and wars or has there been a trend toward ever larger "peace groups" and toward greater use of the principle of "collective security"?

¹⁴ See footnote 2

¹⁵ William Temple. *Christianity and social order*. New York: Penguin Books, 1942.

¹⁶ Alfred D. Simpson, et al. *Schools of the people Report of the Barrington cooperative survey*. Harvard Graduate School of Education. (In press.)

18. How can educators work most effectively with psychiatrists, social workers, journalists, lawyers, and other professional groups for purposes of reconstruction? (For a penetrating discussion of the relation between education and mass psychotherapy, see Gustav Bychowski.)¹⁷

19. Should students be indoctrinated in Democratic ideals or is Democratic indoctrination a contradiction in terms? (Successful Democracy is said to depend upon an informed, thinking citizenry; any attempt to teach individuals *what* to think may be regarded, psychologically, as equivalent to teaching them not to think at all.)

20. In what new ways may educational techniques and objectives be adapted to special opportunities created by the war? (The United States Government has already provided for furthering the educational aspiration of men in the armed services; other countries have even set up educational programs for prisoners.)¹⁸

TOWARD A WORLD CULTURE

Various writers have commented on the shrinkage in the effective size of the world as a result of modern means of transportation and communication. In the language of anthropology, this has resulted in unprecedentedly rapid "diffusion." Margaret Mead¹⁹ has recently pointed out that this borrowing and spreading of inventions and knowledge is likely to continue until something approaching a world-wide culture has been achieved. And the United Nations Committee²⁰ is explicitly dedicated to furthering this process by attempting to acquaint the citizens of each country with the accomplishments and best features of other countries. The Nazi attempt to impose a Germanic "New Order" upon the rest of the world now seems unlikely to succeed, but in stemming this attempt care must be taken to discriminate between a world-wide culture that is established by force and one that evolves peacefully and functionally.

Although the war has undoubtedly hastened the contraction of world space and facilitated the process of diffusion, it has, however, also produced a foreshortening of psychological time which must be noted equally clearly. Samuel Butler once defined virtue as a

¹⁷ Psychological reconstruction in post-war Europe. *New Europe*, 1942, 2, 268-269.

¹⁸ Cf. Clarence Leuba. Psychological aspects of international reconstruction. *J. appl. Psychol.*, 1942, 26, 439-447.

¹⁹ *And keep your powder dry*. New York: Morrow, 1942.

²⁰ 8 West 40th Street, New York City.

way of life in which one experiences first pain and pleasure later, with vice involving the reverse relationship. In wartime, the future always becomes uncertain and indefinite, with the result that individuals have a tendency to shift from the economy of virtue to that of vice. In other words, war tends to be *demoralizing*, and the attempt to build up *morale* may be said to represent simply an effort to establish a special wartime *morality*.²¹ One reason that morale seemed to develop so slowly in this country (prior to Pearl Harbor) was that our outlook was essentially conservative: our only objective was to keep what we had (which for many had not seemed like very much). But now there is a growing vision of something new and uniquely worthwhile that may be gained by this war; and this vision serves to recreate the future, to make planning and moral endeavor again meaningful.

But if this vision is to prove anything more than a temporarily useful hoax and if the war is not to be followed by bitter disillusionment, every effort must be made not only to make the current image of World Order and World Culture more vivid and widespread, but also to increase the likelihood that the ideal will be at least approximated when the war ends. There is, however, little hope that this goal will be realized unless all the resources of education, both formal and informal, are fully mobilized and effectively utilized to this end.

²¹ Recognition of the relation between *morale* and *morality* is implicit in the French language, as is indicated by the fact that both of these English terms may be translated by the single French word *morale*. For more extended treatment of this theme, see Henry W. Holmes, *The road to courage*. New York: Knopf, 1943. See also H. S. Leiper, *Effects of occupation on morals and morale*. *New Europe*, 1943, 3, 3-5.

PEACE-PLANNING AS A PROBLEM IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING

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IT is the essence of the psychological approach to social problems that the individual human being must always be taken as the unit of analysis. But not enough attention has been paid to certain corollaries of that basic postulate. The item upon which I should like to focus attention is an obvious, yet important one: that the behavior of groups depends upon the learning process of individuals.

Traditional social behavior is implanted in the growing child through devices which are just beginning to be studied intensively by psychologists and anthropologists. The details which are being revealed here, however, are details of the stimulus situation, the incentives, rewards, and punishments used by the agents of the culture to direct the learning of the child. The basic principles of learning have long been objects of careful research in psychological laboratories, and a considerable number have acquired the status of scientific laws. Without being ritualistic regarding the verbal statement of these principles [for precise formulations the recent volume by McGeoch (5) may be consulted], I should like to treat rather generally of their applicability to the problem of peace-planning.

If we reject the hypothesis of an instinct of pugnacity, as Gundlach (3) has shown it to be rejected by an overwhelming majority of American psychologists, then we may start with the fundamental thesis that war-making behaviors are learned. Further, since wars have been fought by all major nations existing within the area of Western civilization, not once but many times, and not with the same opponents, but with constant switching of allies and enemies, it seems plausible to assert that war-making behaviors are acquired under the auspices of the culture.

It is equally apparent that, if peace-making behaviors can be identified, and if they can be suitably disseminated among the populations of the world, individuals could be expected to learn and practice them with as much facility as inheres in present culture patterns.

This paper proposes to illustrate the implications of a few principles of learning, using as examples the items of an eight-point program drawn up after extensive study of peace-planning literature. The real starting point is the SPSSI survey of expert opinion on war prevention (6), but ideas have been gleaned from the volumes by Carr (1), Wright (7), and others. While the psychology of learning applies no more to these than to a wide variety of other proposals, these seem to meet the requirements of psychologists, economists, and political scientists for a minimum program. They include the following specific points:

1. The Great Powers¹ must join together in an international organization after this war.
2. This organization must be granted powers which represent a real limitation on national sovereignty.
3. The Axis Nations (suitably democratized) must be in this union.
4. The United Nations must avoid vindictive attitudes toward Axis populations, attempting to restrict punitive policies to responsible leaders.
5. Suitable rewards must be bestowed upon Axis citizens as they act along lines beneficial to world peace.
6. Friendly attitudes between the component populations of the United Nations must be cultivated and every effort made to build an enduring confidence which will survive the inevitable frictions of the post-war settlement period.
7. All Great Powers must give up policies of territorial aggrandizement.
8. All Great Powers must give up policies of economic nationalism. (This need not be interpreted as an immediate switch to free trade; it does mean continued efforts to lower barriers and help all nations, including the Axis, to durable prosperity.)

Speaking briefly, we may say that this program calls for breaking existent habits—functionally autonomous and powerful—of nationalism, political and economic, insofar as these take the form of isolation, economic self-sufficiency, national aggrandizement, and hostility toward other nations. In their stead must be built up habits of internationalism, friendship, and cooperation with other

¹ The phrase "Great Powers" should not be interpreted as excluding small nations, but merely as setting a minimum standard for a program with any hope of success.

nations. In what ways can the psychology of learning aid in breaking the one set of habits, establishing the other?

1. *Reward and Punishment.* The debacle of the "long armistice" may plausibly be charged in some degree to the failure of the Allies to apply the principle of reward and punishment. In 1919 the German people, with every evidence of sincerity, set up a democratic regime. Officials were installed who, if not "collaborationists," were at least reasonable men, willing to cooperate. The requests of these officials for concessions to strengthen their position—e.g., the customs union with Austria, theoretical equality of armaments for Germany, etc.—were rejected by Allied diplomats. When a militarist-fascist regime was established in Germany, the Allies made these concessions. Thus the system punished the Germans for behaving as peaceful cooperators, and rewarded them for selfish belligerency. Obviously such a mistake must not be made again. Rewards must be made available for cooperation, punishment for manifestations of noisy militarism. In this way the people of the Axis nations can be expected to develop socially desirable behavior.

There are many types of reward and punishment which will be within the power of the victorious United Nations (if they are not victorious, this discussion is of course pointless). In the immediate post-war period, food, medical supplies and similar biological necessities will have high value. Later, ego and symbolic gratifications will be more important. The settlement (armistice terms and peace treaty) will undoubtedly impose certain restraints upon the Axis peoples. The removal of these, suitably celebrated, will constitute rewards. All such measures should, of course, be planned carefully in advance by experts of various fields, so that rewards to the Axis peoples shall not boomerang as punishments at home, and that punishment of the intransigent enemy will not have disastrous domestic consequences.

If the thesis that nationalistic behaviors lead to war is correct, then they inevitably carry their own punishments in their train. There are grounds for feeling this to be true: the self-seeking nationalisms of the Germans and Italians have already led them into extreme hardships, and in the course of military action it is to be anticipated that the Japanese likewise will suffer. But is it not also

true that the nationalism of Americans²—e.g., at the rejection of the League of Nations in 1920—is now being punished, along with the intransigent attitude of the British and French during the post-Versailles period? This being the case, nationalist patterns should be weakening. Some slight confirmation of this deduction comes from public opinion polls, which show a marked increase in approval of international organization in the last five years.

2. *Limitations on Punishment.* By and large, learning data indicate that reward is more effective than punishment. It is particularly clear that prolonged punishment has repercussions of great strength. The educational data on the effects of repeated scolding and criticism, and level of aspiration studies on effects of continued failure, are relevant here. This suggests the importance of short-time punishments, as opposed to the tradition in international law that treaty settlements have some kind of eternal standing.

We need to be on guard especially against treaty provisions which are rationalized as punishments but actually constitute measures for revenge. If there is anything to be learned from modern work in penology, it is that criminals are not reformed when vengeful and vindictive "justice" is meted out. Revenge is undoubtedly emotionally satisfying to the avenger, and the people of the United Nations may put up a vigorous demand for a Carthaginian peace. This does not mean that believers in democracy must automatically accede to such popular pressure. Intelligent leadership can help the citizen, first of all, to think carefully before deciding what he wants, and, secondly, to choose wisely among the possible pathways to his goal. Most Americans, surely, will want security more than they want vengeance. But their emotions may mislead them into identifying the two, and thus jeopardizing their hope of future security. Extreme reparations payments, boycott of German goods, and similar policies of 1920 may be expected to do more harm than good.

3. *Structuring the Situation.* Whether a given reward or punishment is effective will depend on the correctness with which it is perceived. The difference in speed of acquiring laboratory conditioned responses and "real life" conditioned reactions seems to be chiefly a function of the gestalt-quality of the situations. Studies of

² The cultural climate of the 1920's was nationalistic for the victorious Allied nations, internationalist in Germany, Austria, and Russia. Italian Fascism, sweeping along with current nationalist feeling, attained power in 1922; Fascism could not win in Germany until the tide of democratic internationalism had waned and the great depression led to the rejection of the symbols of the Weimar Republic.

rats and children agree that delayed rewards and punishments are less easily related to the learning situation than those given promptly. Guidance in learning is effective to the extent that it focuses the learner's attention upon significant relationships.

The English and American people are, in a very real sense, being punished today for their errors of one and two decades ago. The rampant nationalism which prevented American adherence to the League is one factor in the etiology of this war. Similarly, the ease with which the British allowed themselves to be tricked by reactionary elements into throwing out a Labor government which was charting a far-seeing course in international relations (1924) has its share in making all of us suffer today.

But how accurately are such relationships perceived by the citizens most deeply concerned? While sentiment for world organization is rising, policies of economic nationalism still receive majority support in this country. How many Germans correctly perceive the source of their present miseries in their tolerance or active support of Naziism? If the correct interpretation of the situation is not made, the whole learning process may be aborted.

This suggests the importance of active efforts to structure the field in such a way that group members perceive the significance of these benefits and penalties. In the immediate post-war period the most obvious of these problems would be the clarification of issues for the citizens of Axis powers. But long before the end of the war, and for some time after, vigorous attempts are needed to influence the thinking of the United Nations peoples. Unofficial groups (such as the Council for Democracy) have made small but significant steps in this direction. Later the government should be induced to lend its prestige to the planning program, as Vice-President Wallace already has.

At the end of the war the United Nations will have a monopoly of the means of communication. This control must be used carefully, not too blatantly, but persistently in behalf of a clear-cut program of interpretations of the war and the peace settlement.

4. *Relation of Individual to Group.* In accordance with the basic postulate that learning is an individual function, we emphasize that punishments and rewards must be experienced by individuals to be effective. An important extension of this is that we must be selective about the individuals rewarded or punished. Large segments of the Axis populations are pro-democratic. To inflict punishments

indiscriminately upon them would be both unfair and unwise. Prestige values imputed *discreetly* to them (we want no "Quisling" problem) may aid them to become leaders of mass democratic movements. This will be facilitated by military defeat and the negative affect associated with their former leaders by virtue of the hardships already experienced.

No national group is homogeneous or nearly so. Nazi race theory has no scientific backing. Neither does its inverted form, the "Vansittart" interpretation of the Germans as inherently militaristic, brutal, and barbaric. Individual differences within the group must be given careful attention. Punishments inflicted at random upon all citizens will increase solidarity against us; punishment directed against the leadership, discredited by events, will have a much less serious aftermath. The recent assertion by President Roosevelt that mistreatment of conquered civilians will be punished after criminal trials of the responsible officials offers a hopeful precedent in this direction.

5. *The Role of Emotion.* The learned patterns with which we are concerned here (nationalism, imperialism, isolationism) do not have the quality of cold intellectual learning ascribed to most educational outcomes. They are affectively "hot" responses. They represent identifications of individual egos with national symbols, displacement of parental affection and hostility, ego defense through projection and rationalization. They partake of the forms of hate, fear, prejudice, loyalty, and devotion. In a large proportion of citizens they are autonomously powerful enough to drive the individual along appropriate pathways regardless of hunger, pain, and other biological frustrations.

This means that purely academic forms of education are not likely to be effective, at least in the initial stages of the relearning process. If we seek to set up situations in which Germans indoctrinated by Naziism are to learn democratic habits of thinking, we must anticipate the resistance of ego-involved frames of reference, feelings of power through national identification, outlets for inhibited aggression in anti-Semitism and hatred of the democracies. Adequate substitutes must be provided for these dynamic forces in hatred of the leaders who betrayed them, identification with new power groups (international in scope), new symbols, and new slogans. Obviously, emphasis on stimulus equivalents will facilitate this transfer of response from one symbol to another.

The breaking-down of these established patterns of emotion and behavior cannot be effective unless it is accompanied by reformulation of many political and economic institutions. The role of culture in determining these loyalties and hostilities must be kept in mind. It is unfortunate that there appear to be, among United Nations leaders, some who fear the powerful forces that would be involved in this process of social re-structuring of the Axis nations. The welfare of the majority should unquestionably decide this issue.

Our attention should not be drawn too much away from home while thinking along this line. Many inhabitants of the United Nations need a similar education directed toward replacing many established emotional patterns. Latent hostility against our Russian, British, and Chinese allies is still high, even if under cover. The Russians have strong and undesirable (however well-founded) suspicions of the capitalist powers. The Chinese fear revivals of White imperialism in the post-war period. In the United States (and probably elsewhere) nationalistic newspapers have fostered these feelings by unjustly ascribing credit to our forces ("Yanks Raid Dieppe") and cowardice or lethargy to our allies.³ Suspicious ruminations regarding potential peace settlements are also numerous. The failure of the United Nations leaders to clarify their post-war aims has facilitated this sort of divisive propaganda.

A clear statement of post-war plans would greatly assist the groups who are willing now to initiate educational work to prepare the citizens of the United Nations for post-war cooperation. It would also aid the task of underground groups within Axis countries who are trying to wean loyalties away from the present rulers. The constitution of a Supreme Command, or some central council speaking authoritatively for all the United Nations, would furnish a focus of attention. The framework of a post-war international organization, even if deliberately left in skeleton form, would make possible ego-identifications with a power group stronger than any of the nations singly.

In many respects the problem is not so clearly one of education as it is one of psychotherapy—the freeing of intelligence from the bonds of emotional complexes and prejudices. It is to be hoped that recent progress in the technique of group therapy will mold a

³ This group-centered thinking is of course not confined to nationalism. Groups within nations also show it, as illustrated by recent conflicts between our Army and Navy public relations officers over who accomplished most in certain Pacific engagements. Reeducation is urgently needed here, too.

workable instrument for carrying on this program. Students in this field might well consider the problem of neutralizing the emotional affect attached to Nazi beliefs by indoctrinated Germans. Individual therapy is obviously hopeless for such an enormous task.

FIRST STEPS

The program discussed above plainly calls for some kind of centralized international set-up speaking for the United Nations. Rewards to the Axis citizens, punishment of leaders, educational campaigns after the war, must not be identified with any particular nation. England and France ceased cooperation and almost came to blows in the early 1920's because the Versailles Treaty had no unified interpretation and administration. At the time of the invasion of the Ruhr in 1923, hostile sentiments were freely voiced on both sides of the Channel. If there had been a central executive, acting perhaps under pressure from different directions but at least working out a policy and enforcing it as a unified process, much of the confusion and frustration of the German people would have been avoided. (And some of Hitler's potential strength destroyed.)

A suitable forerunner of such a unified administration of the peace treaty, and one which could hurdle the barriers of nationalistic prejudice because of military necessity, would be a Supreme Command for the United Nations forces. The creation of such a command would involve cessions of sovereignty and enable a step-by-step approach to political and economic integration.

The establishment of a Supreme Command should be followed by the creation of a framework of international organization. This should not be left until the end of the war. During hostilities the fear of the enemy serves to suppress jealousy and suspicion between allies to some extent. After victory has effectively been achieved, this outer pressure is removed, and people will feel free to revive old animosities.

Symbols of internationalism (flag, capital, publicized leaders) should be popularized. Tales of heroism need to be more of "United Nations" heroes, less frequently of American, Russian, etc., heroes. Far from increasing emphasis on purely American history, as some historians would have us do, we should develop through education a feeling of interdependence of nations and cultures, particularly those making up the United Nations.

The establishment of an international treasury has some interesting possibilities as a device for setting up learning situations. Carr (1), for example, has suggested that the bonds of many governments, particularly Axis regimes, will be practically valueless at the end of the war. To give many citizens of these countries a stake in the new international order, owners of very small lots (workers, farmers, small tradesmen) might be allowed to exchange them on a favored basis for bonds of the international government.

Extensive study of Swiss history to exemplify the possibility of integrating diverse ethnic and religious groups in a harmonious political unit has been urged by Lerner (4). The collection of material exemplifying other cases of successful cooperation between groups is most important. Our educational system (in common with all the Western world) has taught and practiced techniques of competition, but gives little attention to habit patterns suited to the building of a cooperative world.

The creation of special situations fitted to the needs of particular minority groups is a matter calling for much thought. Demobilized soldiers have been subjected to years of education for war, will have many habit conflicts in a peaceful society. Dexter (2) offers a few ingenious suggestions for helping them to learn new, more appropriate patterns.

Psychologists can help in many ways. As teachers, they can aid students in practicing habits of cooperation rather than competition. They can reveal some of the irrational bases of nationalistic prejudice and hostility. College students, the national leaders of tomorrow, can be led to a more purely rational view of world problems. As citizens, psychologists can urge upon elected officials, newspaper editors, and radio commentators the necessity of post-war planning. They can insist upon some of the minimum requirements of a scientific approach to these problems. And as experts in influencing human behavior, they can furnish advice and suggestions for the more efficient education of citizens of the United Nations along lines needed to forestall potential isolationist tendencies at the end of the war.

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ACCEPTANCE OF DEFEAT IN GERMANY

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WARS need not end in peace treaties. The victors can eradicate the organized political existence of the vanquished. Victors and vanquished, or vanquished and victors, can be engulfed in a common revolutionary upheaval that leads to entirely new political units encompassing both of them. In these cases, there is no room for the "High Contracting Parties" to negotiate, or to impose and to accept a peace. In these cases, there also would be little scope for psychological peace preparations.

It is not impossible that the European part of the present war may issue in such a peace without a peace treaty.¹ But the probabilities at the present moment point in the other direction. The Governments of the United States and of Great Britain have made definite commitments to the European Governments in exile, who in their own way contribute their utmost to the general war effort. They all have certain ideas about post-war Europe which include neither the complete eradication of the Axis nations, nor, on the other hand, the unification of Europe by direct action of the European populace. Hence, the normal idea of a peace conference, a peace treaty, and a peace enforcement, can still be taken for granted. In this case, a good peace does require a good loser as well as a good winner.

The Nazis, of course, will have to be destroyed. Their top-flight leaders and immediate hangers-on will probably commit suicide. Those of them who do not, and many of the lower members of the brown hierarchy, will lose their lives at the hands of wrathful people all over Europe. The remainder may be dealt with according to the criminal codes of Germany and of the respective countries in which they have looted and tortured.

It would be too much to expect the German military leaders to accept defeat with good grace, and once and for all to renounce the idea of another war. To these men, so admirable in many respects

¹ See Albert Guérard, *The unity of Europe*, *Menorah* J, 1942, 29, 249-265.

(few of them Nazis, many of them not even "Prussians"), defeat comes close to ending the meaning of life. This probably goes for military men everywhere. In the case of Germany, the difficulty is aggravated by the long tradition of military honor, by the great victories won in the first part of the present and of the last war, and by the inelastic professional structure of the social groups from which the officers normally are recruited. The content of the peace terms and even the form of their presentation could not substantially alter the feelings of these men. The memory of the defeat as such and not the experience of the consequences of defeat is the wound that burns forever. Nothing can be done, therefore, but to let the present generation of officers pass away, and to strengthen the anti-militaristic groups in Germany to such an extent that no clandestine circumvention of the prospective complete demilitarization of Germany will be possible.

In a certain sense, therefore, neither the Nazis nor the "Generals" present a psychological problem for the future peace. In quite a different sense this also holds for the workers. Before the seizure of power by the Nazis, the German workers, by and large, were Socialists and Communists. In the Reichstag election of November, 1932, the Socialdemocratic Party received 7.25 million votes, the Communist Party 5.98 million votes out of a total number of votes cast of 35.7 million and from an electorate of 44.2 million men and women of more than 20 years of age.² It is safe to assume, therefore, that in 1932 there were in Germany more than 15 million Socialists and Communists, most of them industrial workers and their wives.

The Nazi regime has done a great many things in order to gain the sympathies or at least the cooperation of these and other workers. The abolition of unemployment made a considerable impression. The extension of vacations with pay and the activities of "Strength through Joy" in peace time, the increase in social insurance benefits and the granting of tax privileges during the war, have afforded a certain compensation for the early freezing of money wages. Price and dividend stops have prevented the discontent which arises in connection with war profiteering. The pronounced anti-bourgeois attitude of many Nazi leaders, the class-free selection of future

² The Nazi Party received 11.74 million votes. In the preceding election of August, 1932, the figures were: Nazi Party, 13.78 million, Socialdemocratic Party, 8.58 million, Communist Party, 5.37 million.

leaders, the great amount of genuine and faked socialist terminology, the bold promises of future rewards in terms of people's cars and people's cottages, must have softened the attitude of a great number of workers. Before the attack on Russia, "socialist" speeches by Hitler probably did not sound phony to all his listeners.

For the first time in German History we have a state which has absolutely abolished all social prejudices in regard to political appointments as well as in private life . . . We have Reichsstatthalters who were formerly agricultural laborers or locksmiths. Yes, we have even succeeded in breaking down prejudice in a place where it was most deep-seated—in the fighting forces . . . We have generals who were ordinary soldiers and non-commissioned officers twenty-two and twenty-three years ago.³

In spite of all this, it is very likely that up to five million German workers are hoping for the downfall of the regime by military defeat. Many of them had lived with Socialist ideas all their adult lives, had adhered to Socialism as a creed and as a way of life for decades before the Nazi upstarts worked themselves into prominence and power. These men do believe that "The worker has nothing to lose but his chains." They do not care about nationalistic aspirations. They are immune to the propaganda that traces all evils to peace treaties concluded after lost wars. They are the one major group of Germans who probably do not share "the conviction that it is sink or swim with one another and with the Nazis."

A German defeat to them means, first of all, freedom from Naziism. This, together with the "Four Freedoms," would constitute a change in their lives of such a magnitude that the sacrifices they might be called upon to make in the interest of permanent peace would be of the second order of smalls. Peace, peaceful reconstruction of the social order, and peaceful cooperation with all nations would be their aims, just as they were laid down in 1919 in the Preamble to the Constitution of Weimar.⁴ If they should give socialism a fuller opportunity than they did in 1918, few men would consider that incompatible with a People's Peace and the forward march of common men.⁵ On the contrary, a German Government permanently under the influence of the workers would be the best guarantee that labor, capital, and natural resources would not be

³ Speech, Boesig Munitions Plant, Berlin, December 10, 1940; printed in Raoul de Roussy de Sales, *My new order*, New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1941, pp. 887-888.

⁴ "Das Deutsche Volk, einzig in seinen Stämmen, und von dem Willen beseelt, sein Reich in Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit zu erneuern, dem gesellschaftlichen Fortschritt und dem internationalen Frieden zu dienen, hat sich diese Verfassung gegeben."

⁵ See the address of Vice-President Wallace before the Free World Association, May, 1942.

wasted to nurse any resentment of defeat. The German labor movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was one of the main originating and carrying forces of the International Organizations of labor. It was a German who wrote: "Workers of all Lands, unite!"

Considerable difficulties of morale adjustment will be experienced by the middle classes, including most of the intellectual groups. National pride is a real feeling with them, and any defeat must hurt this pride. They are sensitive, however, to appropriate peace terms both as to content and as to form of presentation. There is no guarantee, of course, that they will not again develop a Versailles complex. The relative freedom from this complex of the democratic parties during the period of the First Republic justifies, however, the expectation that a peace treaty less severe than that of Versailles may be more durable than one that is more severe.

Perhaps as important as the degree of severity will be the time structure of the provisions of the treaty. If it imposes obligations that will give occasion to ever-renewed debate, the irritation will be perpetual and the treaty will always provide talking-points and votes for the nationalist groups. Long-drawn-out reparations are psychologically worse than a very heavy sacrifice made once and for all. (For similar reasons it is better not to allow any military forces at all than to limit them severely.) Furthermore, the concentration of sacrifices into the period immediately succeeding the war would put the burden of public responsibility more nearly where it belongs. If it were feasible, there would be considerable advantage in having the "Generals" sign the peace treaty themselves and let them retire thereafter rather than before.

It is often suggested that the coming peace treaty should give Germany equality in the economic but not in the political field. If this is meant as an idea to make the peace more acceptable to the Germans it is utterly fallacious. What self-respecting man would want to see his country sell its birthright for a mess of porridge? Such treatment would be regarded as an insult. Inferiority in both fields would be deemed preferable to equality in the one field, because it would then not be felt that the victors assumed that the Germans prefer comfort to honor. A defeated nation often appreciates small symbols of recognition and common courtesy more than income and wealth.

Moral factors, too, will enter into the picture of German peace morale.

Observers say that the mass of the German people today are mentally ill. Why should they not be ill? There will be memories to stalk the Reich, ghosts that cannot be appeased; memories of slaughtered women and children, of soldiers dead by the hundred thousand, of word of honor broken, of cruelty unspeakable, memories to sicken the toughest mind ⁶

If the German middle classes were given proper access to the knowledge of the moral debt which the Nazis have contracted, the revulsion of all decent men would include a desire to atone for these evils. Voluntary restitution could be an element as strong as compulsory reparation.⁷ *Erfüllungspolitik* (the policy of fulfilling treaty obligations) would come as a matter of course and would not be the object of constant internal attack as it was after 1920.

The difficulty lies in the right selection of the transmitting agency. Propaganda departments of the belligerent governments would, of course, be a bad choice. Independent organizations and individuals of former enemy countries would also meet with little success. German refugees would fare even worse. Painful knowledge will not be accepted from people whose position, although above reproach, cannot by the nature of things be above suspicion. Neutral countries and agencies are scarce. But they are not too scarce either for undertaking investigations of their own, or for assisting international or German authorities in such investigations and reports. (If such objective research could be extended to all belligerents, so much the better.) It is difficult to imagine that a report on Nazi rule in Poland issued by the Pope and transmitted by the German bishops would *not* arouse the German Catholics to a desire to make good. It is equally difficult to imagine that a similar report on Nazi rule in Norway worked out by the authorities of the Swedish Church and transmitted by the German Protestant clergy could fail to arouse German Protestants to indignation and a deep feeling of shame.

The most difficult problems of morale adjustment to peace will probably be presented by an age group rather than a social group, namely, by the generation that was brought up during the decade of Nazi rule. Here the very capacity for receiving objective knowl-

⁶ Editorial in *New York Times*, July 27, 1941.

⁷ See Kurt Reinhardt, *The commonwealth of nations and the Papacy*. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1942, pp 15-16

edge and for acting upon it cannot be taken for granted. On the other hand, it is precisely this generation which carries the major burden of the actual fighting. The revulsion against the war will be correspondingly strong and will make for an acceptance of defeat at least in the form of a preference for peace to continued or renewed slaughter. The danger of cynicism will, of course, be great, and only the older groups inside Germany can restore some faith to the disillusioned remnants of this lost generation.

Out of great destruction can come great good, but only little happiness. "The Germans seem fated to be the unhappiest people on earth for years after the war ends. The world will have to reckon with that, and so will Germany."⁸ But "along with the rest of the world, the German people themselves will be happier for the defeat of Hitler. . . . The are praying for deliverance from the most un-German German that ever held sway over them."⁹

There may be men and women in the countries of the United Nations who are tempted to feel along the line of the dictum that "there are seventy million malignant Huns, some of which are killable, others curable." If there be such men and women, they should reflect on the life history of German democrats: suffering during the War of 1914-1918, suffering during the post-war years from 1918-1928, suffering under Hitler from 1933 to 1939, suffering during the present war, and anticipating to suffer after this war. Suffering in silence also is an element of the historical process that gravitates towards "the union and agreement of the democratic parties of all countries"—a goal that a German proclaimed a century ago.

⁸ Editorial in *New York Times*, July 27, 1941

⁹ Louis P. Lochner, Radio Address (NBC), June 10, 1942

TOWARD A REASONABLE PEACE

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A LITTLE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE PSYCHOLOGIST

THERE is something presumptuous about the efforts of anyone not in a position of high governmental authority to win acceptance for certain controlling principles of attaining a just peace (the "and durable" usually accompanying this phrase is a superfluous corollary). Some dissatisfied scholars appear to have acquired a passion for playing imaginative games like "If I were King" or "What I would do if I were World Dictator"—forgetful that their own private utopias forbid, and the hard physical and social realities of their own subordinate role in community affairs exclude, such fanciful assumptions of God-like status.

Nevertheless, recognition of one's humble place is compatible with an awareness that in 1943 psychology as a profession is relatively much more influential in America than it was in 1918. Indeed, the populations of all countries, and especially their leading figures, seem to be more psychologically minded than they were a brief generation ago. The general level of understanding may be none too adequate, but there is an encouraging receptivity to technically ambitious interpretations of individual and group behavior appropriate to a scientific age. Where is the honest psychologist who has not been embarrassed by having better-than-average persons attribute to him an astuteness about the vagaries of human conduct he knows he does not possess?

Even if the psychologist did not have an occupational competence peculiarly required in dealing with certain features of the forthcoming international settlement, he would still be able to use whatever influence he wields as a man and a private citizen. Clearly he is not all-powerful in shaping the purposes of his fellow-men; but neither is he utterly without power in this realm as his more skeptical moods declare. On many, if not most, matters of public policy, the social psychologist with all his scholarly talent in classifying and explaining phenomena has little more to offer in terms

of controlling action than a literate layman;¹ yet that little may well be decisive in speeding social reform since so much progress rests upon a cumulation of small margins of advantage.

It is not enough, however, for the psychologist to satisfy himself and others that he has something to contribute to the work of the statesman and the diplomat just as he has been of service to the educator, the industrial manager, and the judge of the juvenile court, to mention a few areas where his labors have usually been considered beneficent. In these latter instances, his activities have kept him close to individual personalities as these were being humanely accommodated to the values of a culture reflected in the operation of its domestic institutions. But as soon as he begins to dabble in affairs of state (as morale-builder, propaganda analyst, psychological warfarer, and other evolving functions) there is a real danger that he will succumb to *mass* thinking, in both senses of that phrase. The individuals he seeks to affect are then commonly dealt with in the gross, contrary to his own precepts of uniqueness and differentiation. Even worse is the grave risk that the psychologist may fail to rise above the prejudices and narrow group interests of his fatherland as interpreted by its contemporary executives, his immediate supervisors, and direct employers.²

We thus behold the sorry spectacle of Anglo-American and Russian psychologists, on one side, and German and Japanese practitioners, on the other, mutually canceling each others' energies as technologists. In this respect, of course, they are in the same predicament as all other teachers and scientists. I know of no case

¹ Thus, a large majority of the members of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues appear to have voted for Mr. Roosevelt in 1936 and 1940. So did most members of trade unions and relief recipients. Below the Mason and Dixon line most whites did the same as part of their regional ritual. Obviously both enlightened and "mechanical" reasons may be back of the same overt act. Plainly therefore one need not be a social psychologist to do what social psychologists themselves as a group do, or advise others to do, in times of critical choice. Operationally, blind party loyalty and presumably reflective attitudes produced the same result at the ballot box.

² A recent sample of this tendency may be found in "The German cultural paranoid trend," *Amer. J. Orthopsychiatry*, 1942, 12, 611-632, by Dr. Richard M. Brickner, examiner and consultant for various New York City draft boards. He holds that paranoid traits are an intrinsic part of all historic German life and that Hitler and Nazism are merely symptoms of a permanent underlying national disease. His thesis is plausibly supported with many shrewd observations, but the article violates every canon of sampling theory and is as pretty a piece of ethnocentrism as one can find. By the same method, a Berlin specialist in mental disorders could prepare a similar brief (with equivalent or richer documentation) demonstrating the schizoid trend in America or Britain, the manic-depressive quality of Russian life, etc. It seems a trifle more rational to hold that all nations at war are mad in varying degrees. Without falling into a bootless cynicism, one could wish there were asylums for the sane as a welcome temporary retreat for those who are unable to share the lethal aggressiveness of their neighbors.

where one psychologist has murdered another (figuratively, to be sure, they have often done so!), but during international conflicts they indirectly aid and abet the homicidal efforts of others. Will not the mental sets thus acquired persist hurtfully at a time when international reconciliation later demands a totally distinct orientation? Or, like that sword of ancient mythology, does the weapon that inflicted a terrible wound also serve to heal it?

LEARNING FROM PAST MISTAKES

The foregoing remarks may have conveyed the impression that psychologists' pretensions to assist in the establishment of an equitable world order ought to be regarded as no better than the idle bombast of amateur politicians unable to transcend their parochial prejudices. Yet we also insist that even after the water has been squeezed out of our professional stock some real marketable value remains. What is this solid residuum?

Surely not the status of expertness as such. Like their brethren in other callings, psychologists notoriously disagree at times on grave matters of diagnosis and therapy. Economists, historians, geographers, and other scholarly and technical specialists were present in droves when the clauses of the Versailles treaty were prepared—yet it is not too absurd to suggest that their uncoordinated recommendations in large measure made a bad matter much worse. Why? Many reasons could be offered, but a major one was that the social scientists of the defeated nations were not allowed a voice in the negotiations; they, like the formal political representatives of the beaten coalition, merely read or listened to the terms prepared by the victors and were told to sign on the dotted line . . . or else. This psychological blunder alone jeopardized the "contract."

It is fashionable now to say that the treaties framed unilaterally in the environs of Paris in 1919 were really quite decent, merely because Hitler used them as an excuse to smooth his way to power, and because the later crimes of the Nazis make their flaws seem like peccadilloes. Those who say that should read the full text again with the mind-set of a liberal cosmopolitan German university professor of that year. The forced confession of exclusive war guilt—a major premise on which many harsh provisions rested—was something no self-respecting person could or should accept.

To confess one was a German was akin to admitting one bore the brand of Cain.

The sinister personality of a Hitler did not drop from heaven or rise up from hell to torture and plague this world. He, and the Fascism associated with him, emerged out of a condition of despair, an overwhelming sense of humiliation and frustration that exceeded the limits of what human flesh can bear without striking blindly in all directions. It was no peculiar Teutonic malady. The Treaty of Versailles was not a *peace* treaty—it was a frightful engine of destruction with one-sided disarmament terms so conceived and economic handicaps so framed that few Germans felt them to have any moral validity. National prosperity was excluded so long as it endured; its revision was the first and constant concern of the Weimar Republic.

The Treaty of Vienna was devised by aristocrats and executed without the benefit of any academic counsel from the intellectuals of that day. Even so, its territorial and other clauses did not create a fraction of the sense of injustice produced by the Versailles document. Who ever heard of the Third Napoleon winning his throne by a “Down with the Vienna dictate” campaign? It would seem that the art of treaty-making had deteriorated from the eighteenth to the twentieth century; *e.g.*, none but an evil genius of the divide-and-rule species could have thought of the Polish corridor as a means of diverting German hostility eastward as well as westward. This is as though a psychologist had recommended that a child abused by a cruel father should also be abused by the mother, and then had acted surprised if the child were later found to be wanting in filial affection. Like unsystematic family discipline, that “settlement” was distinctly unsettling; it was neither crushing enough to deprive the economy of all hope nor generous enough to restore confidence and faith in the rest of the world. This is a platitude of the ABC variety, but its truth is as real as its stark simplicity.

A PRIMER OF REALPOLITIK

The plain fact which psychologists of good intentions must face is that traditional power politics has been built upon techniques of blocking the aspirations of other groups rather than helping them find reasonable and harmless outlets. Statesmen may deny that they are social workers on a grand scale, but their obsessions must

be unlearned just as teachers now recall with shame the dunce-cap era. During the late feudal period, a conquest-unified England vainly sought for several centuries to prevent a similar unification for France. After France had been unified, from Richelieu to Poincaré her aim was likewise devoted to thwarting a unification of all German-speaking dominions. Great Britain's balance-of-power policy on the Continent has been so uniform that one suspects each generation of Whitehall neophytes is drilled in some sacred Sibylline Book by its predecessors. In an even more grandiose way, this principle seems to be guiding America's participation in world affairs. It takes the form of declaring that the safety of the United States requires the permanent dismemberment of Europe with the maintenance of a precarious equipoise (hence our current commitment to the restoration of the French Empire) and that we cannot permit Asia to be dominated by any single great Oriental power.³

Every big state, therefore, appears to have as one of its major goals the enforced weakening of its neighbors. The strong do not feel comfortable in the presence of others who are strong, but only in the presence of the weak (cf. the United States *vs.* Mexico and Canada). Apparently the entelechy of nationalism has been that each state must strive to be the mightiest, that if others show signs of becoming too strong, comparatively, they must be forcibly diminished lest they rise and we fall. Thus Germany pounces upon Russia ere she wax too great and overshadow the Reich (the USSR presumably refraining therefrom only because the moment was not propitious), even as Japan could only feel happy with a weak China next door. This drift toward fewer and fewer great aggregations is roughly comparable to the familiar monopoly tendencies so strongly developed in highly industrialized economies. The imperialistic absorption of the weak by the powerful is both a business and a political practice. The ultimate causes in man's nature as it operates within the framework of an inherited cultural system are similar; so are the consequences, both of the beneficial and detrimental sort.

This process of expansion for some institutional entities and contraction for others has left the world of 1943 with no more than five Great Powers, *viz.*, the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Russia, and Japan. All these are colossal empires in fact if not in

³ Spykman of Yale advocates this view of America's destiny in his recent influential volume

name. As "powers" they may be called "great" largely because they have enormous military and economic capacity to injure each other. The present war may be construed as an alliance of three of them against the remaining two. Probably no *one* of these five empires could withstand a coalition of the other four against it; in this crude sense it is true that the "safety" of every nation is dependent upon maintaining disunity among its potential enemies. Small states now exist only on sufferance, preserving a precarious neutrality or accepting a satellite role to the highest bidder for their support.

The five empires themselves are not quite equal in "fire"-power; Russia and Britain, *e.g.*, might have succumbed without the heavy support of America, the mightiest single power-unit of all. One does not need to be a bumptious chauvinist to recognize that. When one empire can maintain its separate existence only by calling upon the resources of another to aid it against a third empire, it is clear that its separate viability is tragically contingent, if not pathetically mythical. Hence, major wars are always wars of interdependent alliances.

FORESTALLING PERENNIAL CONFLICTS

The emotions of psychologists are as strongly aroused as ordinary men's by war and other conflict situations. It is therefore all but certain that the above analysis will evoke sharp dissent. However, war would be even less meaningful than it is were not the world's imbalance roughly as here described and "structured." Why should the United Nations disdain any outcome short of "complete military triumph" if victory were not interpreted as an opportunity to impose one's will upon a now helpless adversary? The point of all war is to keep or make some groups primary, and to keep or place others in a secondary position. The individual psychologist as a patriotic or righteously indignant person may temporarily gain some delight from the feeling of ascendance armed success for his side might create; but then he must not forget that *what we are implicitly seeking is a solution to a problem in social organization, not the mere winning of supremacy on the battlefield.*

If this goal is kept primary, *viz.*, that the world yearns for *permanent* peace after the present misery, then the specifically psychological issues become clearer, although not necessarily easier. Here we encounter the disconcerting fact that most people apparently believe that there will be more wars after this one goes, as

usual, to the side with the heaviest battalions.⁴ Even the will to try some desperate remedy to insure that this becomes the *last* war appears to be lacking. Patently, psychologists are not miracle-men and, if they themselves hold that international war is a lasting accompaniment of the Human Adventure, then the present struggle is a trivial and not a cosmic episode. But if instead they believe war to be inevitable only so long as certain conditions persist, and that the modification of these conditions *may* abolish war, then there is at least a chance that the coming peace conference may be more than a truce before World War III begins.

What is needed to convert a chance into a high probability or even a certainty? As the copybook maxim says, "first a will, then a way." We can influence our own officials more readily than we can those of other nations, although in diplomacy we usually permit them to lead us by the nose. As the Nazis have said, the function of leaders is to lead. But whither *must* they lead if peace is to be genuine? There is only one way—in the direction of an all-inclusive nonmilitary World Federation.

The drift of the modern world is definitely toward greater planetary unity. Like eating, it seems natural, imperative, and desirable; also like eating, it can be done in different ways. This unity could be established by a series of bouts between successively fewer but larger contestants until eventually one all-conquering champion appears. The globe might then enjoy a Pax Britannica with a Pax Americana, Pax Germanica, Pax Japonica, etc., as alternatives. A single all-embracing tyranny (it would be called such, even when exercised by a democracy) would have little difficulty in preventing "internal" strife. Few people, however, crave the prospect of a despotically guaranteed peace, despite the praise Rome's civilizing influence has usually received from historians. So long as the irrational tribal spirit called nationalism possesses the driving power it undoubtedly has, such a solution, while not lacking in merit, is definitely not a preferred one. Every nation

⁴ The "next" war is assumed to be one between an expanded USSR and the English-speaking world or a color war between Asia and Africa and the white regions of the world. Note that both refer to chronically unresolved tensions that are perfectly familiar. Why are most folks so skeptical about preventive measures, so much so that they fully expect the friends of today to be the enemies of tomorrow and *vice versa*? One explanation holds that some social problems, such as war, are literally incapable of solution; as in medicine, when the patient has an incurable disease, all one can do is to make the sufferer as comfortable as possible until he dies. This outlook evidently reflects a certain widespread weariness of intellect.

would probably say that if it has to survive in a world dominated by *one* power, it wants to be that one.⁵

A far better method of securing world unity—as a precondition to providing that state of peace within which a constantly enlarging variety of freedoms could flourish—lies in the establishment of a comprehensive world structure with specific functions assigned to it by the voluntary consent of all participating countries. The creation of the necessary popular consensus preliminary to this step is the most useful single service social psychologists can offer for the “winning of the peace.” The minds of strong nationalists must be transformed into accepting the surrender of absolute sovereignty with all the dread prerogatives historically associated therewith. If the international government is to be created with an opportunity to rule constructively the two billions of human beings whose servant it is designed to be, it must have the power to enforce thorough disarmament for all states without exception (that includes us!), to forbid all forms of conscription, and to inspect and control threatening situations in such a fashion that the World Authority alone possesses an effective monopoly of the ultimate police force on earth. Nothing short of this will do the job men everywhere silently plead to have done. Large-scale military action against member nations need not occur; ordinary civilian police should suffice as they do in maintaining domestic order.

Plainly the Peace Conference, if it is to be psychologically adequate, must also be a World Constitutional Convention to sit so long as need be until a World Parliament is organized to succeed it. Without this result, the war would merely be another grim joke played on the human species. Idealistic piffle? Perhaps; but the hazards run by such a disparaging judgment are hideous to contemplate.

PROMOTING ADJUSTMENTS TO CATASTROPHE AND SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVES

So many unprecedented events are associated with this war that psychologists must be pardoned if their thinking limps as it turns to problems far vaster than the circumscribed limits of the classroom

⁵ This tribalism is largely what led Australia to join the mother-country in England's fight against the Boers and later against the Germans. Certainly the Boers were no threat to the Australians. German tribalism, as much as sheer economic need, was behind the understandable and wholly legitimate demand for *Anschluss* with Austria, but I recall that when I told a Nazi student abroad that I favored *Anschluss* with France also, he looked at me with amazement, saying, “But we don't want to be Frenchmen!” This fear of losing one's group identity is very real, even though American assimilationism shows how readily this can be overcome.

and much less familiar than the case records of the clinic. We assume, however, that their chief business in peace-making is to further the recovery of morale among the losers, to erase animosities, and to assist in the founding of attitudes and institutions which will make war forever impossible. These tasks will be hard enough at best, and the longer the war lasts, the harder they will be. This war may not end with a formal armistice: the Axis Powers may resist until every last bit of their home soil is occupied by foreign troops, just as all France is today garrisoned by Germans. Having won their presumptive triumph at an immeasurable price in blood and treasure, the United Nations will be confronted with the tragic and usually unresolved predicament of all conquerors, *viz.*, how to convert a military victory into a social blessing for all mankind.

Much of the world will then be in ruins. Chaos can be prevented only by the prompt and adequate supply of food, medical care, and other elemental necessities, regardless of status as friend or foe and without respect to the ability of the recipients to pay for this emergency relief in money or in kind. The dead must be buried and the wounded nursed back to health. Where one side has lost everything and is at the mercy of those who may be merciless, peace terms of any sort border on the irrelevant; but, assuming that most of the defeated populations—cold, hungry, and faint though they may be—are still alive, the one big question remains: What shall be done with them? How shall peoples who but yesterday were plotting each other's annihilation live helpfully side by side so that the Great Madness will not desolate them all again?

These are sober and embarrassing matters. Psychologists have barely begun to consider them. Apart from confiscating or destroying all weapons, releasing political prisoners, and creating a responsible native civilian police system under legal court control, it is doubtful if any further intervention could be justified by its fruits. Force after all is pathetically impotent to accomplish the really important ends of social life. Annexations and indemnities should be absolutely excluded unless one deliberately intends to sow the seeds of future conflict.⁶ Yet the clamor for them is sure to rise

⁶ Germany could be completely divided among its ring of pre-1938 neighbors. Northern Japan could be assigned to Russia and Southern Japan to China. This would undoubtedly be an effective method of preventing those states *qua* states from ever again "menacing" other states, just as a partition of Russia between Japan and Germany would end Russia's power value to them. Unfortunately, it would not prevent the dividing powers from supplanting the divided ones as threats to each other, and, unless associated with domestic regimes far more enlightened than any hitherto operative, it would mean a "minority" problem of terrifying dimensions. This method does not seem promising.

and the winners may—as all alliances of convenience have done in the past—proceed to quarrel over the division of the spoils. China may want not only Manchuria, but also Korea and Formosa, as well as French Indo-China, parts of Siam and Burma, and of course, Hong-Kong. Friction with Russia and Britain can thus readily develop. Russia is almost certain to wish to push her strategic defensive borders westward where she cannot fail but clash with Anglo-American ideas of suitable European boundaries for buffer or puppet states.

Even more forbidding is the magnitude of the task of reeducating millions to adopt the necessarily “liberal” values of the New World Order. All earlier missionary enterprises fade into insignificance by comparison with this indispensable undertaking. Not only must former Nazis, Blackshirts, and Shintoists go to school to learn better manners—Communists, British Tories, and their American counterparts must likewise acquire the ways of constructive world citizenship, preferably all under native or neutral tutelage rather than under representatives of their late foes, for this would be too insulting to bear. We shall be faced with the biggest teaching job in history, with a real shortage of qualified teachers, and with extraordinary vagueness in what is to be taught—but it is still less overwhelming and far more rewarding than the task of training and equipping an army of ten millions and manning a seven-ocean navy.

Perhaps the greatest menace to a reasonable peace settlement lies in the spirit of revenge which has grown to manic intensity as the cruelties of war have multiplied. One drugstore counter best-seller labeled *Germany must be destroyed* (author, Theodore Kaufman) seriously proposes that all German men and women be sterilized so that this “accursed race” shall finally disappear from the annals of mankind. Another proposal is that the Czechs and Poles be allowed three weeks of unrestrained fury to wreak retribution where they will.⁷ Perhaps it is better that men should think and talk this way *à la* catharsis than that they should actually behave thus; but absurd

⁷ Long before America entered the war I proposed in a letter to *Common Sense* that every German—man, woman, and child, wherever found—be killed; that the entire countryside from the Alps to the Baltic and from the Rhine to the Vistula be devastated by an all-consuming fire; that this “scorched earth” then be strewn with salt, a huge retaining wall built around this hell-hole, and the waters of the North Sea admitted to inundate the land like a final shroud. A happy world could then write “Finis” to an evolutionary monstrosity and proceed to enjoy Paradise. The editor, in printing this communication, felt constrained to ask for permission to caption it, “He means it humorously,” for fear his enlightened audience would interpret this modest suggestion otherwise.

schemes of this sort when relayed by Goebbels to the Home Front may explain why the German (as distinct from just the Nazi) drive to prevent defeat seems stronger than the Allies' drive to win.

The vexed question of the difference between the Germans and their overlords is probably not as important as many discussions take it to be. A Nazi is merely a more than ordinarily resentful German who favored a strong foreign policy and a tough attitude toward internal dissenters. The rest of his ideology is composed of mythical and unimportant trimmings—a kind of intellectual debris such as the majority of people everywhere who are not emancipated humanists and rationalists find congenial. In some of their less-frightening aspects, the Nazis strongly resemble our small-town, middle-class, "solid" Republican, American Legion enthusiasts. Unless our behavioral accounts are to revert to the doctrine of Original Sin, the large and small brutalities both groups have committed must be attributed to a common stupidity on social issues and not to any inherently cruel streak. Though it may be hard for some to believe at this time in the world's calendar, a Nazi Shylock(!) could well ask, "Hath not a Nazi eyes and hands like other men? Doth he not feel even as they when his wife is shattered to bits by an anti-Nazi bomb and his children starved by a blockade for their own good?"

Punishment of proved war criminals seems plausible, but it is almost certain to make them national martyrs. Hindenburg's name was on such a list in 1919, and the German voters in as democratic an election procedure as the world has ever seen, showed what they thought of him by twice making him their President. Imagine treating Robert E. Lee as a Southern war criminal! Hindenburg's elevation may have been a mistake, but so was that of some other non-German chiefs of state.

On the whole, the best psychologically grounded advice would seem to be to let bygones be bygones, and to seek jointly to build a fairer scheme of things upon the ashes of the past. Why not try the system of reward for good behavior in international relations rather than the doubtful pedagogical technique of added punishment for errors? Certainly whoever "loses" this war will have suffered enough, the innocent as well as the guilty. For the "victors" to try to heap up further artificial handicaps would be pure sadism and unmitigated dullness.

Instead of having the losers exclusively pay for the rebuilding of

devastated areas, it would be more suitable to have an International Rehabilitation Authority supervise the physical reconstruction of community life everywhere by drawing upon the resources of a World Treasury. Common projects like intercontinental highways, disease control, desert irrigation, and the schooling of backward peoples would permit the fusing of vast energies in useful outcomes for which all could claim some credit. To appreciate what this might mean in human advance, one has only to reflect how much further ahead the world would be today if Germany and America, *e.g.*, had devoted their limitless capacities to mutual benefit rather than to thwarting each other.

Therein lies the real challenge to all social psychologists: how to resolve the tension between any two parties by redirecting their efforts in a third direction in which both can heartily participate and from which both may derive similar increments of good. Nations, like individuals, grow in social maturity when they do things together—not just in rival teams that cooperate only for the sake of bigger and more deadly competition, but in a joint attack upon common human problems, where all are gainers and none losers. Pathogenic bacteria and many insects are more serious enemies of our welfare than ever the worst hater of mankind can be. What prevents this insight from being universalized among all adults? Admittedly there is a salience and visibility about a hostile person or group that is missing in dealing with nonhuman or impersonal forces, but that is like the primitive thinking of a thunderstorm in terms of noise rather than in terms of electric discharges.

As soon as psychologists sought to improve human beings and to minister to their needs they became educational, clinical, and applied psychologists; as soon as they concerned themselves with furthering societal changes to conform to the evolving nature of man or the better to meet old demands, they became social psychologists. They should be no more hesitant to press upon the public any reasonable conclusions they may reach in the latter realm than they have been in the former.

GERMAN AGGRESSIVENESS—ITS REASONS AND TYPES

BY FRITZ SCHREIER

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I

ONE of the most fundamental aims in making the peace will be to prevent a repetition of German aggressions. Two opposite views are pitted against each other at present as to which way should be taken to reach this end: "Germany should be treated severely"—"Germany should be treated mildly." To decide which view is right, we must know the nature of German aggressiveness.

A great effort is still needed to gain this knowledge and close cooperation is required between social psychology and the new science of "international relations" which has not yet been realized sufficiently.¹

It will hardly be denied that Germans—not necessarily "the Germans" as a whole, but a large number of them—are actually aggressive. Too many aggressive actions by too many German individuals have been committed during the last decades. If the criteria of a trait are permanence and lack of specificity, we may rightly call aggressiveness a trait of these individuals. Aggressive acts were exercised, ordered, encouraged, or tolerated or regarded favorably and no specific stimulus was at work, violence being exercised inside and outside Germany, against real enemies and helpless victims, against men, women, and children, in victory and in defeat.

Our goal is to eliminate this trait; this means that we must look for the adequate stimulus or means to reach this goal. Since means are nothing else than causes which produce a certain desired effect, our method is not to start from a certain given event or stimulus and search for its effects, but to search for causes of certain future events.

May we say, then, that we must ask why the Germans turned aggressive and that the problem would be solved if we knew the causes or reasons because we should have simply to eliminate or

¹ The International Studies Conference held a special congress on this science in Prague in 1938. The records of this eleventh session of the IStC were edited by A. Zimmern under the title *University teaching of international relations*. Paris. International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, League of Nations, 1939. See also P. B. Potter and P. Guggenheim in *Geneva studies*, Vol. XI, No. 2, Geneva Research Centre, 1940.

to destroy those causes in order to prevent successfully the appearance of the reaction, *i.e.*, aggressiveness, and to produce the desired effect, peaceableness?

It is true that we could prevent an undesired effect if we were able to eliminate all its possible causes, but what about the effects which have taken place before? Would it be sufficient to eliminate the causes which made for aggressiveness in Germans to make these same Germans peaceful individuals? We must be well aware of the fact that in many cases phenomena which are due to certain causes do not cease to exist if their causes are removed. We must distinguish generally between effects whose existence depends on and those independent of their causes. A rubber ball returns to its former shape after the pressure has ceased; the effect, the changed shape, is dependent on the continuity of the pressure—the crater produced by an explosion is permanent. Many habits acquired under certain circumstances continue after these circumstances have disappeared—this is the process called by Allport² “functional autonomy.” A man may have been corrupted by bad example, but his bad habits continue to exist though the bad example is removed. In other cases the cause of origin is different from the reason (cause) of existence: a man may have begun to work because his teachers told him to, but after he got married he continues to work for the support of his family. This phenomenon was called by Wundt “heterogeny of ends.” In all these cases the destruction of the cause does not affect the effects which have taken place and other means must be found to destroy them. German aggressiveness may be due to some causes, but may have become independent of them in the process of functional autonomy, or may rely on another basis, another reason of existence than its original cause. The explanation, the answer to the question “Why?” does not solve the whole problem of prevention.

II

Let us now briefly survey the theories put forward in order to base on them suggestions for the treatment of Germany.

Some authors are satisfied if they can establish the fact that Germany was “the aggressor throughout the ages.”³ They use the

² Allport, G. W. *Personality: a psychological interpretation* New York: Holt, 1937 Chap. VII.

³ Hearnshaw, F. C. J. *Germany the aggressor throughout the ages* London: Chambers, 1940.

"canon of agreement"; but the canon of difference also must be applied. Was only Germany aggressive in the old times or were all other states also aggressive? The argument may be more convincing if restricted to the statement: "Germans have made five wars in the last 75 years besides four near misses," as Lord Vansittart said and Mr. Eden repeated several times. Vansittart concludes that "a complete change of mind, heart and soul (of Germany), of taste and temperament and habit . . . a new, a brand new way of looking at life" is necessary.⁴ But it would probably be impossible to change all German habits. Social psychology must find out which of them are relevant for aggression.

Other authors collect a great number of aggressive utterances of prominent Germans.⁵ But again the canon of difference must be applied and it must be asked whether similar utterances can be found among other nations, whether they are not counterbalanced by expressions of peaceful mentality, and whether they are not mere boasting or "sublimations" and not reflections of or motivations to conform actions. The Germans assert also their faithfulness, "Deutsche Treue," whereas their actual behavior is the reverse.

Other theories attempt not only to describe but also to explain German aggressiveness. There is the "institutional theory" which traces German aggressiveness back to its autocratic government and holds that democracy prevents aggression. This theory will hardly be maintained since it became clear that institutions cannot be changed without also changing their "roots."

There are "*nostra culpa* theories": if the Allied Powers had made concessions to the pre-Hitler governments, they would have lessened the "indignation" and "the sense of humiliation and inferiority" in the German people.⁶ But would the politics of appeasement, applied earlier, have been successful? By assuming that a pre-Hitler government would have stayed in power and succeeded in calming the German indignation the question is begged. This theory confuses *post hoc* and *propter hoc*; the fact that no concessions were made and Naziism followed does not prove that there was a causal connection between them.

Carr holds another type of "*nostra culpa* theory": "the victors lost the peace and Soviet Russia and Germany won it, because the former

⁴ Vansittart, Lord R G *Black record* London Hamilton, 1941, p 15

⁵ *Thus spake Germany*, ed by W W Coole et al. London: Routledge, 1941.

⁶ Hoover, H., and Gibson, H. *The problems of lasting peace* New York: Doubleday, 1942, p. 168.

continued to preach and, in part, to apply the once valid, but now disruptive, ideals of the rights of nations and laissez-faire capitalism whereas the latter . . . were striving to build up the world into larger units under centralised planning and control."⁷ But would the course of events really have changed if the victorious nations had applied the same ideas as Germany or had turned to some kind of socialism?

Schuman developed the "neurosis theory": the German *Klein-burgertum* "suffered from acute paranoia."⁸ The result of its economic frustration was "the accumulation of explosive social tensions and aggressions, and the development of neuroses and psychoses which find collective expression." This theory was later expressed succinctly by Dollard: "The occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration, and, contrariwise, the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression."⁹

This theory, though based on psychoanalysis, diverges considerably from Freud's views. Freud did not try to explain any act of aggression by some frustration; he acknowledged the death instinct or instinct of destruction.

The theory admits that inhibition may prevent openly aggressive acts and that substitution, sublimation, displacement, etc., may take the place of direct aggression. The fundamental problem to be faced is which of these mechanisms will come into play, and again Freud saw clearly that the mere experience of frustration is not a necessary and sufficient condition of aggression, but that other conditions must be drawn upon. "Cause of neuroses = disposition determined by libido fixations + accidental experiences, the former in its turn consisting of sexual constitution and infantile experience."¹⁰

Application of the theory to the case of the Germans does not bring us any farther. Was the strength of the frustration of the Germans really so enormous as to explain the extent of German aggression? Why did the Germans not "sublimate" their aggressiveness? A century ago they were called the people of thinkers and poets, or a people of dreamers. Why did they not "regress"

⁷ Carr, E. H. *Conditions of peace*. New York: Macmillan, 1942, p. 8.

⁸ Schuman, F. L. *The Nazi dictatorship*. New York: Knopf, 1939, p. 106.

⁹ Dollard, J., et al. *Frustration and aggression*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939, p. 37.

¹⁰ A general introduction to psychoanalysis. New York: Boni & Liveright, 1920.

to this behavior? And, if it is true that "the expression of any act of aggression is a catharsis that reduces the instigation to all other acts of aggression,"¹¹ why was it that all the aggressions committed by the Nazis against their own people, against the other parties, and the "displacement" against the Jews were not sufficient and they went to war on top of all that? The formerly "frustrated" wishes of their leaders and their followers for power, for wealth, for honor, their sexual desires, all were amply satisfied—and still aggression followed aggression. If we must conclude that there was such a tremendous strength of instigation, the theory is reduced to the tautological statement that where there is much aggression, there was much instigation and, accordingly, much frustration. In this way the theory comes very near to the view of those who simply assert that Germans are aggressive without explaining this fact.

Verrina explains German aggressiveness as the success of the Nazi ideology. "Most Germans believe in the wrong doctrines explained to them, and these dominate the German mentality absolutely."¹² But was propaganda really so effective? It may be that other reporters are right in saying that the average German believes as little in Goebbels reports of facts as in his creed. Or perhaps propaganda was not necessary because the Germans were always willing to commit aggressions if a chance was given them.

Even if it were true that in propaganda lay the origin of German aggressiveness, the problem remains as to whether and to what extent the new creed depends on the continued existence of propaganda. It would be conceivable that once propaganda is stopped the whole building breaks down and, to quote "Faust," "Reason begins to speak again." No reeducation would be necessary.

Other authors adduce certain psychic traits to explain German behavior. Minshall, for instance, enumerates instability and fickleness, docility, paganism, and a mind without limits.¹³ It is obvious, however, that all these traits can be found among both aggressive and nonaggressive individuals. Instability may make a man timid and reserved, the mind without limits may cause the individual to strive for the stars and not for world domination. Subservience and docility do not explain why the Germans were not subservient to the Weimar Republic.

¹¹ *Loc cit.*, p 53

¹² Verrina (Pseud.) *The German mentality* London Allen & Unwin, 1941, p 241

¹³ Minshall, T H *What to do with Germany*. London Allen & Unwin, 1941

Abel gives a pluralistic explanation by showing that several combined factors must be taken into account. He announced in Germany in 1934 a prize contest to induce Hitler followers to submit their autobiographies and he really received as many as 600. He concludes that "four general factors had a bearing on the ultimate success of National Socialism: (1) the prevalence of discontent with the existing order; (2) the peculiar ideology and program for social transformation; (3) the national-socialistic organizational and promotional technique; (4) the presence of charismatic leadership."¹⁴ "The four factors were dependent upon and supported each other in such fashion that the absence or deficiency of any one factor would have fatally disabled the movement . . . the movement must be viewed as . . . a pattern in which none of the component parts was more significant than the others."¹⁵

But let us be very careful now! If this were correct it would be relatively easy to destroy and prevent Naziism with all its elements, particularly aggressiveness, by eliminating any of those four factors. If a certain effect is produced by the operation of two causes in common, and not by their mere "summation," we may choose which of them we wish to eliminate or to prevent in order to prevent the effect. We may remove either powder or fire if we wish no explosion to occur. But there are other cases where the elimination of one condition would not be enough; for one of the remaining conditions may produce the other condition and these two together may produce the undesired effect. One of the causes may be a "root." It could be, for instance, that discontent in Germany always would produce the peculiar ideology and organization, in which case elimination of the ideology by anti-propaganda, reeducation, or prohibition would be insufficient, or, conversely, that the ideology in its turn would always create, or at least foster, discontent. For the purpose of prevention the analysis must go deeper, therefore, and discover which "causal pattern" exists.

It is, however, not probable that the mental process motivating individuals to join the movement was the same in each case. Which of the factors was more attractive, which hit the weak spot in the personality where it found entrance, may be very different with respect to different characters.

The same objections must be raised against a similar pluralistic

¹⁴ Abel, Th *Why Hitler came into power*. New York: Prentice Hall, 1938, p. 166

¹⁵ *Loc. cit.*, p. 185.

theory advanced by Cantril, who mentions as factors the collapse of old norms, satisfaction of needs, appeals to the feeling of self-regard, meaning provided, and strategy.¹⁶

III

A theory which correctly explains German aggressiveness must therefore be pluralistic in various respects. It must recognize that several psychic processes lead to the mental decision and attitude positive to aggressiveness, it must recognize that in each of these processes various factors are involved, and it must try to work out the patterns or configurations in which aggressiveness finds its place. Only if these patterns and their structure are known can a successful attempt be made to eliminate German aggressiveness by breaking up the pattern with an attack against those spots which are weak and, at the same time, the cornerstones of the whole edifice or by replacing aggressiveness in the pattern by some other element. Though it is always dangerous to use the term "type," we may speak of several types of aggressors. These types which I am going now to develop are the result of direct observation; they do not, however, claim to be exhaustive and definitive.

The first type is the simple "direct aggressor," the lover of violence. He finds pleasure in exercising acts of aggression, aggressiveness being for him an end in itself. He may have other aims beside it, but he does decidedly not only use aggression as a means to reach other aims but as a means in itself. In his purest form he is not hampered by any scruples, restraints or inhibitions. He finds opportunity for aggressive actions always and everywhere—against family, comrades, acquaintances, and strangers alike. He needs no internal justification or rationalization of his actions. He is always in conflict with his social environment, but these conflicts are not "genuine," they arise from his desire to create opportunities for aggressive acts.

This type is frequent among gangsters. Gangsters were attracted to the Hitler movement; it is well known that many convicts swelled its ranks. If it is true that criminality decreased in Nazi Germany, it is due to the fact that the gangsters had the possibility for carrying out their aggressions without the risk of the interference of the law. We need not decide whether or not this trait originated in some experience of frustration; even if it were true,

¹⁶ Cantril, H. *The psychology of social movements*. New York: Wiley, 1941, p. 267

the trait may have become independent from its cause in the process of functional autonomy.

Very similar to this type is the sadistic type. But whereas the aim of the direct aggressor is the aggressive action in itself, the sadist finds his pleasure in seeing another creature suffering from his act. If he cannot exercise aggressive acts himself, he finds pleasure in looking at them, at least, when they are committed by others. If the victim falls unconscious, he is not interested any longer, whereas the direct aggressor continues.

A third type, more involved than the two previous ones, is the "inhibited aggressor." He also wishes to commit directly aggressive actions or to reach his aims by means of aggression, but, different from the direct aggressor, he has scruples or inhibitions which he cannot overcome by himself. He needs some cover, some cloak which makes his own action legally and morally free from objection. If he is allowed by the legal authority to carry out aggressive acts, then everything is all right. In my opinion this type is very frequent among the Nazis. The sense of strict discipline in which German youth was educated generally has succeeded in imbuing them with the sense of duty, and refraining from aggression was a duty. But the desire for aggression continued and Nazism, which gave the desired justification and made aggression a duty, was easily embraced for this reason. For these individuals it is not enough to have an opportunity to be aggressive without the risk of being punished, they ask for more, for moral and legal justification, for a mission, for the order to these acts. It was not without reason that Hitler always declared he would come to power legally. And at this mentality was aimed the unique German law by which the "measures of June 30, 1934, taken for the suppression of acts of treason are legalized as necessary measures for the defense of the state"—subsequently.

Aggression may be not the goal, but a means to an end. But the attitude to this means and, accordingly, the readiness to employ it, can be different. Aggression may be the preferred means to whatever goal. What was not gained by aggression is not a real gain in the eyes of those individuals. This is the type of the "ex-soldier." He wants social honor, power, wealth, but he does not enjoy them if he cannot acquire them by the sword. Life which has no use for the virtue of personal bravery against an enemy is of no worth. There were many people in Germany in firm social positions; it was

not difficult for the former member of a "free corps" to find them. These individuals were not unable to "adjust" themselves to peaceful life, they did not want to. There were particularly provincial businessmen and lawyers, successful and secure, but they had the feeling that this was not their "real world." A certain amount of infantilism or "puerilism" is, of course, involved in these cases.

Frequently these people felt themselves to be very strong and called upon to be leaders and superior to their fellow-men, and they derived from this feeling the view that they were justified to resort to means other than those of the merely normal people. Nietzsche's philosophy in a vulgarized shape was sometimes applied. This feeling of strongness, however, was not due to their successes in peaceful occupation but to their conviction of their "aggressive ability." "What a good general I would have made!" Many psychologists would be inclined today to classify this phenomenon as a case of overcompensation due to an inferiority complex. But it can hardly be denied that this explanation is not all-comprehensive and that there are also cases of quite original feeling of high self-regard, be this feeling right or wrong. And even if in some cases overcompensation would be the correct causal explanation, the acquired trait may have become independent in functional autonomy or may rely on the knowledge of the acquired real superiority. Some of these individuals may have a real ability for aggression and also the virtues which sometimes are connected with it, energy and sometimes even personal courage.

A fifth type is the cynic. He too does not see any reason why aggression should not be exercised; he has, however, no personal preference for it, but his feeling is based on the belief that any human being acts aggressively to reach his aims if he has the chance to succeed. He does not believe in the "fairy tales" of ethics and morals, he is proud to know that man is a predatory animal and he ridicules those who try to disguise this fact. "If everybody is like me, why should I be ashamed?" An aggressive action is only the symptom that the actor has shaken off the chains of conventionality and cant. He is attracted to Naziism because it uncovers the "truth." If the crimes of Naziism are shown to him, he answers: "The others do the same, they only talk otherwise." This is the mentality prevailing in the inner circles of Nazis, particularly among the young S.S. (élite guards).

Entirely different is the sixth type, he is "aggressive out of

despair." There are people who have tried everything in life and yet they failed. Nothing is left to them other than taking by force what they could not get in socially approved ways. This is aggressiveness *faute de mieux*. It remains as the means after the exhaustion of all others. Before being swallowed up by the abyss, the man will try this last chance. People who joined Naziism from this attitude were not attracted by the specificity of the ideology. What mattered was only that it was the only thing left and had not been tried out. "Let us try this, maybe they are right." "Others may afford to be moralistic, we in our desperate situation cannot help it." "Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral," was the refrain of a much-favored song from the "Beggars Opera" in the last few years of the Weimar Republic.

A seventh type is the "defensive aggressor." He believes himself threatened by aggression and therefore justified to defend himself in time, before the threat of aggression has become actual. His behavior, aggression in reality, is considered by him as permitted use of violence against violence. In many cases, of course, his belief in threat is not genuine, it is a mere pretext, used consciously or subconsciously. There may have been a few people who were genuinely scared by the specter of communism which Naziism employed so successfully.

The "insecure individuals" form an eighth group. They are not attracted by the specific content and the aims of the ideology, but only by the strength with which it is put forward. These internally insecure people have a certain tendency to look for guidance and to subject themselves willingly if only the strong leader deigns to appeal to them. They do not want to be aggressive, they do not want to make the risky jump from insecurity to violence in order to end their insecurity; rather they know that they will always remain insecure and their fate will be, therefore, to follow. These sheep follow wherever the strong leader leads them. There is no original aggressiveness in them, but only a derived, indirect one.

Very near to them is the group of masochists who are not insecure but are quite secure in the conviction that they want to be treated aggressively.

Type nine we may characterize as the "patriot" or fanatic. He genuinely believes in the supreme value of the cause, the country, the idea. The value of the realization, of the victory of the cause, is so great that it justifies all means, including aggressiveness,

because nothing—no sacrifice, no other value—counts as compared with the cause. It is a question in itself how it came to be that the value of the cause was put so high and whether it itself depends on some reason.

Another type may be called the “anti-progressive.” There are people who live and think in very rigid patterns, fixed in traditions. These individuals resent any attempt to induce them to change their ways of living. But any progress implies change and there is no doubt that progress was rapid during the last decades. These people feel progress to be a disturbance. They simply want to go on as before. They do not want social mobility or competition or the constant necessity to adjust themselves to ever-changing circumstances and they become aggressive against what they think to be the disturbing and intruding forces. Rigidity is the characteristic pattern of thinking of imbeciles and imbeciles are frequently inclined to aggressiveness if disturbed in their ways.¹⁷ This seems to be the peasant type among the turbulences of a new world.

The last type may be called the “believer in success.” He considers the success of the aggressive movement as inevitable or at least probable and he wants to have an “alibi” for this case. He joins the movement therefore openly or secretly in its initial phase. The ideology and all other specific features are immaterial to him, but, if aggressiveness is involved, it cannot be helped. Again his aggressiveness is not original, but indirect and derived, as in the case of the insecure, but he goes along with it. One does not know sufficiently what it means in Europe in a period of constantly changing governments to “cover” oneself and one’s position against the danger of being accused as a follower of a fallen government.

It is important to note that the causal relevance of the various factors is very different in the patterns of the various types. In some cases the ideology and the situation are of small importance; gangsters and sadists, for instance, do not act so much from motivation by these causes as they act “spontaneously” and use the opportunity, whereas the desperate act aggressively due to their particular desperate situation. For the inhibited aggressors and the patriots the ideology is relevant, whereas the insecure are attracted by the outward “make-up” and not the purposive elements of the ideology. In other cases the causal basis is a certain belief; this is true of the

¹⁷ Lewin, K. *A dynamic theory of personality* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935 Chap. VII.

believers in success and in threat and of the cynics who believe in the universality of aggression and, finally, of those who believe in their own aggressive strength.

To be sure, the original cause may have changed and the trait of aggressiveness may have become independent and habitual or it may have become dependent on a basis other than the original one. Where a trait is dependent on another psychic phenomenon, the direct attack against the trait may fail if the basis is also a "root" and there must frequently be applied what Dewey so aptly called a "flank movement." Transformation of a trait which is rooted in another phenomenon can be accomplished only by the destruction of the root. Thus knowledge of the pattern and type of aggression is a condition indispensable for proper treatment.

IV

Knowledge of the types, however, would not be sufficient in itself. We must know also the frequency and distribution of the aggressive types among the Germans. Frequently it is asserted¹⁸ that it was the Prussians who corrupted the Germans. Schuman, as we have seen, makes the German *Kleinbürger* responsible. Abel declares that the average Nazi "is male, in his early thirties, a town resident of lower middle class origin, without high school education, married and Protestant, etc."¹⁹

We can verify or disprove some of these views from the election statistics. The Nazis reached their peak in votes, before they came into power, in the elections of July 31, 1932; they polled 37.3 per cent of all votes.²⁰ It is true that the figures increased, by and large, toward the north and the east, that is, toward Prussia. But the only district where the Nazis had a majority of 51 per cent was not Prussia proper, but Schleswig, which was conquered by Prussia in 1864. Pomerania had 48 per cent, but Hanover, conquered by Prussia in 1866, had 49.5 per cent. Lower Bavaria had 20 per cent, but Franconia 39.9 per cent.

Rural districts were more infested by Naziism by far than the urban areas. This disproves Schuman's thesis: It was the German peasant who formed the strongest contingent of Nazis. Königsberg, for instance, in Eastern Prussia, had 35 per cent Nazi votes, whereas

¹⁸ Ludwig, E. *The Germans double history of a nation*. Boston: Little Brown, 1941

¹⁹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 6.

²⁰ *Statistik des Deutschen Reiches*, Vol. 434

the rural district of Stallupönen in the same region had 46 per cent. Frankfort a.O. had 41 per cent, but the near rural district of Züllichau had 48 per cent. Stettin had 32 per cent, the islands of Usedom, Wollin, and Rugen had 42 per cent. The highest percentages of Nazi votes are to be found in the rural districts of Oldenburg and Schleswig, where some districts reach more than 60 per cent. Even in Württemberg most rural districts had higher percentages than the cities. Only the Bavarian peasants were less strongly affected than the Bavarian cities. In absolute figures the main problem, therefore, consists in the treatment of the German peasant.²¹

That Abel received more replies from town people is easily explained by the fact that town people are more likely to write than peasants. He is, however, right that there are more male than female Nazis. The differences in percentages are significant in some regions. In Westphalia-North Nazi male votes were 8.4 per cent, female, 4 per cent; in Coblenz-Trier 33.2 and 19.1 per cent; in Badonia 27.6 and 15.9; in Upper Bavaria 16.3 and 11.6 per cent.²²

VII

The result of the foregoing considerations as to the question of how to treat Germany may be summed up in two words: *non liquet*. We are far from knowing enough to answer the question as to if or how the "Germans" can be reformed. This result may mean for the statesman not to take any risks and, accordingly, guard himself against Germany with the utmost caution.

But science must steadily continue its work. Extensive studies will have to be made before a final judgment can be passed on the possibilities for reforming the Germans and the ways and means to accomplish this end. The program for these investigations should be carefully prepared. The various local regions and the strata of population must be investigated as well as the spirit dominating the political and nonpolitical institutions and organizations. "Reeducation" remains an empty slogan as long as we do not know

²¹ The same conclusion, that "farmers and peasants are the real backbone of emotional nationalism in contemporary Germany," was reached by C. J. Friedrich in an interesting study in *Pub. Opinion Quart.*, 1937, 2, p. 54. He based his view on the figures of the popular referendum on the "law against the enslavement of the German people," held in 1929, published in Vol. 372, of the *Statistik des Deutschen Reiches*, whereas we used more detailed figures of later elections.

²² These figures refer to elections of 1930, later statistics do not indicate the distribution of votes among sexes.

the various and different methods to be applied in various sectors and to different types. The educational methods of the democracies cannot simply be transferred to a heterogeneous situation which has an entirely different background.

We shall not be able, of course, to investigate the problems on the spot, that is, within the German environment, before the war ends. However, there are sources which deserve to be used as preparatory work: there are the prisoners of war, the interned alien civilians, and Nazis of American citizenship many of whom are known and some of whom are serving prison sentences. These persons could and should be interviewed and investigated thoroughly and immediately.

YOUNG CHILDREN IN AN INSECURE SITUATION *

BY JEAN M ARSENIAN

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THERE is no need to remark the importance of the concept¹ of security in contemporary psychology. Writings in the fields of child, social, personality, and abnormal psychology have invoked the concept of security almost as often as that of adjustment, conceiving security as a necessary condition for "good adjustment" and correlating insecurity with a state of high tension that gives rise to some form of tension-reducing activity. Here the concept of security is the core of a theory of action: security becomes a motive whether one chooses to regard the organism as striving to attain security or struggling to allay the tensions attached to insecurity, environmental or intrapersonal. In addition, the concept seems integral to theories of affective states: happiness is related to security, unhappiness to insecurity.

Plainly the problem of the origin of individual differences in security can be investigated constructively only after child psychologists have agreed on the behavioral evidences of security and insecurity in young children. Ideally such data would be gathered under experimental conditions. In experimenting with young children there is, of course, the disadvantage of not being able to gather introspections. But the fact that a child will often show you how he feels—sometimes quite obtrusively—though he cannot tell you, seems all to the good, especially when his behavior can be causally related to the conditions which evoke it with a discreet amount of inference.

It is the premise of this paper that security and insecurity are denoted by the child's relationship to the situation. In any situation *the specific evidence of security is assumed to be the appearance of positively adaptive patterns of behavior; conversely, negatively adaptive or emotional forms of behavior will indicate insecurity.* Adaptive behavior is defined as behavior directed with reference to goal-regions in the situation, while emotional behavior is defined as

* From the Harvard Psychological Laboratory. The writer is separately indebted to G W Allport and Kurt Lewin for their helpful criticisms.

activity that is not thus goal-directed and presumably concurs with a state of excess tension.

METHOD

This paper is a report of a set of experiments on children in which insecurity is sought as an experimental "given." Concrete patterns of insecure behavior displayed by children in "framed" situations are analyzed and an attempt is made to reconstruct the immediate determinants of the behavior.

The situation selected to produce insecurity was a strange room. Strangeness is listed frequently in classifications of stimuli which evoke fear in early childhood and is cited specifically as one of the conditions of insecurity by Blatz, Horowitz, L. B. Murphy, and others. If strangeness of the environment may be regarded as a determinant of insecurity and familiarity, of security, the child's reactions to the strange room will, with repeated replacements in that room, reveal a transition from insecure to secure patterns of behavior.¹

A strange situation has additional merit as a *locus experimenti* in that its psychological character for children is readily alterable by the introduction or removal of a familiar adult—preferably the mother. Experts agree in finding the security of the young child frequently dependent upon the mother's presence. This suggests that by introducing the mother into the strange room with the child an otherwise insecure situation can be made initially secure, or that it could be altered later in the direction of greater security if, after a series of solitary sessions in the strange situation, the mother is placed in the room along with the child. Similarly removal of the mother would presumably alter the situation again in the direction of less security. Such variations are employed in the present study in order to check the first valuations of secure and insecure patterns of behavior as well as the above-mentioned expectations.

The procedure was an observational assessment of the behaviors of the four experimental groups thus suggested:

¹ Although fear of the strange has been recognized widely, only one study reports a detailed description of behavioral patterns in which the fear is manifested. This is an unpublished study by F. Wiehe who observed the reactions of children to a strange person. Wiehe's paper, *Die Grenzen des Ichs*, was made available to the writer by Professor Kurt Lewin. For a summary of Wiehe's findings, see Lewin, K., *A dynamic theory of personality*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935. Pp. 261-264.

1. Children entering the strange situation alone (Alone-group);
2. Children accompanied by their mothers when placed in the strange room (Mother-group);
3. Some children from the alone-group were accompanied by their mothers on later trials (Alone-Mother group);
4. Some children from the mother-accompanied group were on later trials left alone in the experimental room (Mother-Alone group).

The subjects were 24 children from the nursery of the Massachusetts State Reformatory for Women. Resident in the institution in some cases since birth, they had less experience in strange environments than generally falls the lot of children in families. Moreover, possible sources of frustration in the institutional environment were numerous. Not only were physical space and play equipment limited, but also and more noteworthy was the limited and intermittent character of the children's contacts with their mothers. In exactly half of the cases, the mothers of the subjects worked in the nursery as "helpers" of the trained staff. The many demands upon these helpers made it impossible for any mother to undertake the exclusive care of her own child. Mothers of the remaining children who were subjects worked in distant parts of the institution and were permitted to see their children only during the daily visiting period. In both cases, the result tended to be the same in this respect: in their relations with their own children, the mothers were characteristically overattentive and overemotional, and their intermittent absences were likely sources of frustration. If a history of frustration predisposes the individual to feelings of insecurity, as psychoanalysts have urged, it is probable that the reactions of the institutional subjects to the strange room were more intense than would have been the reactions of a noninstitutional group of the same ages. The study, however, undertakes to investigate the ranges of secure and insecure behavior rather than to establish age-norms for the process of adaptation to a strange room.

The subjects ranged in age from 11.2 months to 30.1 months, a range within which marked differences in developmental level, particularly in locomotor skill, are to be expected. Actually, all of the children walked, but the youngest were able to take only a few steps alone, while the older ones had at least a year's experience in walking. Performances of the children on the Cattell Baby Test, which refers the individual's behavioral development to Gesell's

norms, yielded IQ's ranging from 70 to 120, with medians at 94 and 100 in the two main experimental groups. Specific behavioral reactions in any situation would vary within a group involving such differences in development. Yet the range is not great enough to lead one to expect developmentally determined individual differences in the fear-value of a strange situation. Jersild and Holmes² found no perceptible decrease in the frequency of fear-responses to strange situations before the third year. All 24 subjects were within the age-range for which strange situations usually provide an effective fear-stimulus.

The Alone Group

Sixteen children constituted the Alone or A-group. They ranged in age from 11.2 to 21.4 months. The median age for the group was 16.1 months, while the median IQ was 94.5. Each child in this group was conducted to and left alone in the strange room for five-minute intervals on alternate days. The room was one newly constructed in the attic of the nursery building. Furnished with new toys and pictures, it was designed to be attractive rather than repelling. The experimenter observed the child's behavior from a one-way screen and protocolled it upon an electrically timed recording device.

Mother Group

The eight remaining subjects were placed in a Mother or M-group. Children in this M-group ranged in age from 13.3 to 30.1 months. Both the median age of 20.8 months and the median IQ of 100 are slightly higher than the medians for the A-group. But these differences are of little import in view of the fact that individual differences in the rate of adaptation to the strange room showed no significant relationship to age or IQ. The correlation coefficients will be cited later.

The procedure followed in the M-group paralleled that in the A-group except for the fact that a familiar adult stayed with the child during each observation period. In three cases the adult was the child's own mother. Because mothers of the remaining five children worked elsewhere in the institution and were not available, these children were accompanied by "substitute" mothers, or nursery

² Cf. Jersild, A., & Holmes, F. *Children's fears*. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1935. Pp. 46-48

helpers. The adult sat near the entrance to the strange room and was instructed to remain as impassive as possible.

Subgroups

In the latter half of the series of 11 observation periods, some of the children from each of the two primary groups were placed in subgroups which were intended to reveal the effects of the belated introduction or removal of adults upon the children's behavior³ in the situation.

Six children from the A-group were accompanied by their mothers or "substitute" mothers after the fifth trial (A-M group), while five children from the M-group were left alone in the last half of the series of trials (M-A group).

Placement of children in subgroups resulted in a large reduction of the number of subjects in the two primary groups. Illness and departures from the institution depleted the number of available subjects in all groups towards the end of the study.

RESULTS

Assuming that security is denoted by positively directed adaptive behavior, the first task of analysis is the separation and specification of adaptive and emotional activities. All behavior displayed by the children in the strange room was nonresidually classifiable under five categories. Three categories represented more *adaptive forms of behavior*, viz., play, locomotion, and talking. The remaining two categories represented more *emotional forms of activity*, viz., crying and autistic gestures. Play, invariably, and locomotion and talking, in general, were directed with reference to goal-regions of the situation (*i.e.*, the toys, the gate, or the mother, if she were present). In contrast to these adaptive activities, crying and autistic gestures showed little or no goal-directedness and appeared to be determined by a condition of excess tension. The category of autistic gestures, a term used by Krout³ to designate a range of somewhat similar behavior in adults, includes such movements and postures as thumb-sucking, fingering parts of the body, waving the arms, stamping the feet, etc.

Clear-cut differences in the relative amounts of emotional and adaptive forms of behavior marked the adaptation of the children in the A-group to the strange situation. The average duration of

³ Cf. Krout, M. H. Autistic gestures: an experimental study in symbolic movement *Psychol. Monogr.*, 1935, No. 208

each type of behavior⁴ on every trial was found. The intercorrelations of the averages for the five different categories of behavior in the series of 10 trials are listed below:

Intercorrelations between Adaptive and Emotional Forms of Behavior

Crying and Autistic Gestures	+ .71 ($\pm .11$)
Play and Locomotion	+ .69 ($\pm .11$)
Play and Vocalization	+ .86 ($\pm .11$)
Vocalization and Locomotion	+ .71 ($\pm .11$)
Crying and Play	— .76 ($\pm .09$)
Crying and Locomotion	— .91 ($\pm .03$)
Crying and Vocalization	— .75 ($\pm .09$)
Autistic Gestures and Play	— .85 ($\pm .06$)
Autistic Gestures and Locomotion	— .72 ($\pm .11$)
Autistic Gestures and Vocalization	— .72 ($\pm .10$)

The correlation coefficients secured by the rank-differences method are all significantly greater than their probable errors. High positive correlations appear between each of the two emotional forms of behavior and between each of the three adaptive forms, while the cross correlations between emotional and adaptive categories are highly negative. In view of the fact that only the categories of crying and talking represent mutually exclusive forms of behavior, the negative correlations between emotional and adaptive types of behavior cannot be regarded as a statistical artifact.

The 16 children who were left alone in the strange room spent most of the first four trials, or five-minute periods, in crying and autistic behavior. In the following trials, crying disappeared almost entirely and autistic gestures diminished greatly, while playing, locomotion, and occasional talking became the dominant forms of behavior. The adaptation process, however, was not a linear function of time in the situation. There was a general increase in the amount of emotional behavior on the second and third trials.⁵ There was also a slight increase in autistic gestures, the less extreme type of emotional behavior, in the final trials, which may have been a function of a general satiation apparent in the case of one of the

⁴ In the case of locomotion, the distance which the child moved was measured approximately and the average distance per minute-interval for the trial was found.

⁵ Cf. Shirley, M. M. Children's adjustments to a strange situation. *This JOURNAL*, 1942, 37, 201-217.

Shirley reports that children from two to three years of age tended to be less well adjusted to a strange clinical situation on the second and third visits than in the first visit. She attributes the increased emotionality of the children to anticipatory dread.

A direct comparison of Shirley's findings with those of the present study is impossible because the complete list of categories in terms of which she evaluated the adjustment of the children is not reported. Additionally, the setting of the two studies differs: Shirley's subjects visited in the clinical situation at six-month intervals and the total number of adults and other children present in the "strange situation" apparently varied from visit to visit.

children who remained in the situation through the eleventh trial.

Quite different proportions of emotional and adaptive activities were displayed by the eight children who were accompanied in the strange situation by their mothers or "substitute" mothers. In the M-group as a whole, adaptive forms of behavior predominated at all times. The amount of adaptive behavior on the first trial was over three times as great and the amount of emotional behavior was less than one-third as great as that which occurred in the A-group. After the fourth trial, emotional behavior practically disappeared from the M-group, and, coincidentally, the amount of play, locomotion, and talking increased. While the behavior of the A-group shifted in this direction also, the total amount of adaptive behavior was greater at all times in the group of children who were accompanied by adults.

Patterns of Behavior

It is evident from the preceding account that the children were engaging in several or more different types of emotional and adaptive activities simultaneously. The patterns may be characterized as positively directed (*i.e.*, attempts to obtain more of the situation) or negatively directed (*i.e.*, attempts to obtain less of the situation). Within specific approach and withdrawal patterns the proportions of emotional and adaptive activities differed. One pattern of withdrawal, for example, was characterized almost exclusively by emotional activity, while in one of the approach patterns no symptom of emotionality appeared. Six primary patterns were displayed by children in the A-group. They are presented in an order that denotes increasing adaptivity, first, of negative patterns and, then, of positive patterns.

Nonmotile withdrawal, a pattern of prolonged nonmotility together with symptoms of intense negative emotionality, was displayed by six of the youngest children. In each case the child stood, sat, or stretched out on the floor where the experimenter had left him, screamed violently, and made many autistic gestures of a self-manipulative type. Head movements in the direction of the region of escape (*i.e.*, the gate) occurred with diminishing frequency as time passed and the situation became "hopeless." The duration of the pattern varied from a brief part of one trial to the greatest part of five trials. The six children who reacted in this manner ranged in age from 11.9 months to 17.8 months.

A pattern of *agitated movement* was displayed by two children. This was a pattern of disoriented, circling locomotions accompanied by intense crying and many autistic gestures. The locomotions were not consistently directed either toward or away from the situation. To the onlooker the behavior suggested a state of great agitation, within which no awareness of direction penetrated. The pattern lasted slightly less than one trial. The two children who exhibited it were 15 months old.

A third pattern of *attack* appeared in just one instance. The pattern was characterized by a systematically destructive approach to the situation, by intermittent angry cries, and by occasional autistic gestures of a vigorous, out-going type. The child's mode of attack consisted in fetching toys and the smaller articles of furniture one at a time and hurling them over the gate. While there seems to be adequate evidence of aggression against the situation in this behavior, it is possible also to regard the forceful removal of the toys as substitute activities for removal of the self from the unpleasant situation. Hurling toys over the gate may represent an attempt to establish a line of contact with the inaccessible region of escape and freedom beyond the gate.⁶ The total pattern is evaluated as a negative one which is directed toward the attainment of less of the situation.

The fourth pattern of *encapsulation* is characterized by the fact that the child remains within the situation but abstracts himself from immediate contact with the situation-as-a-whole by entrenching himself within one region of it. Evidence of the entrenchment was marked decrease in crying which occurred as soon as the child entered the encapsulation region. The mode of encapsulation differed in individual cases. Several children encapsulated themselves in a prone or approximately fetal position on a small rug near the center of the room; another child moved to the same rug and cradle-rocked (*i.e.*, assumed a creeping position and pushed his trunk and hips rhythmically back and forth); still another encapsulated himself in prolonged manipulative activities with a can which

⁶ Cf. Barker, R, Dumbo, T, & Lewin, K. *Frustration and regression, an experiment with young children*. Iowa City University of Iowa Press, 1941

Similar behavior was observed in the regression experiments. Children who were separated by a wire screen from a group of very attractive toys occasionally hurled their own less attractive toys at the screen. The authors regard the behavior not only as an aggression against the barrier but also as an attempt to establish a communication with the unobtainable toys

he had brought with him from the nursery. The last-mentioned instance of an encapsulation built around a familiar object becomes of particular interest in the light of the behavior which preceded and followed it. The child in question had displayed a highly emotional pattern of reaction on the preceding trials and subsequently returned to that behavior. On the occasion when he was permitted to bring the familiar toy he sat in quiet preoccupation with the plaything throughout the entire trial. Apparently the presence of a familiar object made possible a partial restructuring of the situation and the appearance of a restricted type of adaptive behavior. The four children in the A-group who exhibited one or another pattern of encapsulation ranged in age from 15.1 to 19.8 months.

By far the most typical pattern was the pattern of *retreat*, or locomotion in the direction of escape and safety. In view of the fact that escape from the strange room was barred by the presence of a gate, the child's retreat was only approximate: he moved to the gate and remained in the gate-region. Half of the children in the A-group displayed the pattern immediately and most of the others exhibited it at some time during the series of trials. Usually the pattern was repeated over many trials, and its specific characteristics changed with time. The early retreats were marked by intense but less continuous crying than were the patterns of nonmotile withdrawal and agitated movement, by frequent autistic gestures, and by nonmotility in the gate-region. When the retreat pattern reoccurred on later trials, emotional behavior decreased and play in the gate-region appeared. In the last trials, the pattern was interrupted by intermittent approaches to the toys.

The sixth pattern is the positively adaptive pattern of *approach*, or locomotion toward the toys. Typically the pattern first appeared on the fourth or fifth trial and thereafter alternated with retreat in gradually lengthening intervals of approach. The first approaches to the toys were characterized generally by symptoms of conflict. Locomotion to the toys was followed by passive observation or by hesitant gestures of reaching and withdrawing or by self-manipulative gestures. In later approaches, active play with the toys appeared, locomotion from one group of toys to another increased, talking and singing occurred, and autistic gestures disappeared except for occasional boisterous movements.

Before any attempt was made to evaluate differences in security denoted in these patterns, four of the patterns were subdivided in order to take account of marked variations which appeared in individual cases or in time. A pattern of nonmotile withdrawal which occasionally occurred without crying was distinguished from the pattern of nonmotile withdrawal with intense crying; the patterns of retreat and crying and retreat and play were differentiated; encapsulation of a regressive type was distinguished from encapsulation in play and patterns of approach with symptoms of conflict were separated from patterns of free approach. The resulting 10 patterns accurately represent the observed changes in the adjustment of the 16 subjects to the strange situation.

A Scale of Security

The greater the number of related phenomena upon which an evaluation is based, the more reliable should be the evaluation in defining the individual case and the more generally applicable it should be to other similar cases. In evaluating the security of young children, therefore, total patterns provide a better starting-point than any isolated item of behavior. A measurement of security, for example, in terms of one type of adaptive behavior such as the amount of directed locomotion would fail to differentiate between the security of children who were attacking the situation and those who were exhibiting a free approach to it. An evaluation based upon crying, a single type of emotional behavior, would fail to differentiate the security of children who were displaying patterns of retreat and play, encapsulation in play, and free approach—all patterns within which no crying appeared. That these patterns *do* represent different degrees of security remains to be established, although the expectation follows from the definition of security stated earlier.

The degrees of security symptomized in individual patterns were rated on a hypothetical security continuum ranging from -5 insecurity to $+5$ security. The ratings of the writer were checked against the ratings of four child psychologists who were given descriptions of the 10 patterns and were requested to rate the degree of security indicated in each pattern in terms of their own criteria of security.

In view of the limited data in the hands of the raters, the amount of agreement is surprisingly great. The experts unanimously rated

TABLE 1

RATINGS OF PATTERNS ON A -5 TO +5 SECURITY-CONTINUUM

PATTERNS	RATINGS OF 4 EXPERTS				Av	AD	RATINGS OF EXPERIMENTER
	A	B	C	D			
1. Nonmotile Withdrawal (cry)	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	0	-5
2. Ag Movement	-4	-4.5	-4	-3.5	-4	0.25	-4.5
3. Retreat (cry)	-2.5	-4	-3	-3.5	-3.3	0.50	-4
4. Attack	-3	-2.5	-2	-2	-2.4	0.37	-3.5
5. Encapsulation (regress)	-1	-3.5	-1	-2.5	-2.5	1.5	-3
6. Nonmotile Withdrawal (no cry)	-0.5	-2	-0.5	-1.8	-1.8	1.2	-2.5
7. Retreat (play)	+4	-0.5	+3	+1	+1	2.5	-2
8. Encapsulation (play)	+3	-3	+1	-0.5	-0.5	2.5	-1.5
9. Approach (conflict)	+1	-1	+2	-0.3	-0.3	1.1	+2
10. Approach (free)	+5	+5	+5	+4.7	+4.7	0.4	+5

the pattern of nonmotile withdrawal with crying as an index of maximal insecurity. With one exception, they rated free approach as a pattern of maximal security. Disagreement is greatest in the ratings assigned to patterns which involve little overt activity of any kind, namely, regressive encapsulation and nonmotile withdrawal without crying, and to the ambiguous patterns of retreat and play, encapsulation in play, and approach with conflict. The latter three patterns are ambiguous in that the direction of each pattern stands in contrast to the type of behavior which appeared in it. The positively directed pattern (approach with conflict) involved little adaptive behavior and a large amount of emotional activity, while the two negative patterns were characterized by little or no emotional behavior and a large amount of adaptive behavior. None of the experts was consistent in evaluating all three patterns either primarily in terms of the direction of the pattern or primarily in terms of the quality of the actions. The ratings neither confirm nor invalidate, therefore, the assumption that positively directed patterns indicate always a greater security than negatively directed patterns.

The averages of the five sets of ratings are used to define numerical values of the 10 patterns of behavior on an *a priori* security scale.

Scale-Values of the Patterns (i.e., Averages for Five Sets of Ratings)

1	Nonmotile withdrawal ..	—5
2	Agitated movement . . .	—4.1
3	Retreat (crying)	—3.4
4	Attack	—2.6
5	Encapsulation (regressive)	—2.6
6	Nonmotile withdrawal (no crying)	—1.9
7	Encapsulation (play).	+0.7
8	Retreat (play)	+0.4
9	Approach (conflict)...	+0.7
10	Approach (free)	+4.8

The main difference between the scale-values of the patterns and the initial ratings of the writer is the positive value assigned to the pattern of retreat and play in the scale. This pattern of locomotion to the gate, followed by play, may be reinterpreted as an approach to a single preferred toy, the gate, and so a positive pattern. The scale remains a continuum which differentiates degrees of security in terms of the direction of the child's reactions to the situation




FIG. 1. AVERAGE SECURITY-SCORES OF CHILDREN WHO WERE ALONE IN THE STRANGE ROOM (A-GROUP) AND OF CHILDREN WHO WERE ACCOMPANIED BY THEIR MOTHERS OR "SUBSTITUTE" MOTHERS (M-GROUP)

The averages are based on the scale-values of the patterns of behavior displayed by children in the two groups.

and the proportion of emotional and adaptive behavior expressed in them.

Security as a Function of the Familiarity of the Situation

Application of the scale to the behavior of children in the A-group reveals the relationship of security to the familiarity of the situation. The security of any child on a given trial was found by multiplying the scale-value of each pattern which he displayed by the percentage of time during which he exhibited it. The average scores of the A-group on successive trials are represented by the unbroken line in Figure 1. (The patterns of behavior thus evaluated are summarized in Table 2 which gives the average per-

TABLE 2

AVRAGE PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT IN PARTICULAR PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR
IN THE ALONE-GROUP

TRIAL	LATENCY *	N-MOTILE W (CRY)	AG MOVEMENT	RETREAT (CRY)	ATTACK	ENCAP (REGRESS)	N-MOTILE W (NO CRY)	ENCAP (PLAY)	RETREAT (PLAY)	APPROACH (CONFLICT)	APPROACH (FREE)
1	5 (9)†	12.3 (4)	8.4 (2)	47.1 (10)		4.9 (1)	5.4 (1)		1 (2)	1 (1)	13.9 (3)
2	1 (3)	15.5 (3)	1 (1)	50.7 (10)	6.2 (1)	11 (3)	2.5 (1)	1.1 (1)		2 (1)	8.3 (2)
3	0.2 (1)	13.9 (3)		56.3 (11)		14.4 (3)	4.8 (1)	1.5 (1)	3.4 (3)	3 (5)	2.5 (1)
4	1.7 (3)	22.9 (4)		49.2 (10)		6.5 (2)	1.8 (1)		1.6 (3)	0.9 (4)	15.1 (3)
5	0.6 (1)	8.5 (3)		45.1 (11)		9.4 (3)	3.3 (1)	3 (1)	6.2 (7)	6.7 (3)	17.3 (5)
6	2 (3)			38.1 (7)		1 (1)		12.1 (2)	12.7 (5)		33.8 (3)
7	0.6 (1)			45.5 (7)					13.3 (7)	10.2 (3)	30.3 (3)
8	0.8 (1)			38.2 (7)					27.2 (7)	4.6 (2)	29.1 (4)
9				44.3 (5)					6.2 (5)		49.5 (4)
10				50.2 (2)					34.2 (2)		17.4 (2)
11				35.1 (2)					28.2 (2)		36.6 (2)

* The latency category represents an initial period in which no overt response was made to the situation

† All figures in parentheses indicate number of cases

centage of time during which particular patterns were displayed by the group on each trial.) The graph indicates that the A-group as a whole was initially insecure in the situation and that the average degree of insecurity decreased as the situation became familiar. Degree of security was not, however, a linear function of time in the situation. Observe that the average degree of insecurity in the group increased on the second and third trials when extreme negative patterns occurred over longer periods of time. It is impossible to determine from the data whether the children returned with remembrances and expectations which increased the unpleasantness of the situation or whether the intensified negative reactions more nearly parallel sensitization phenomena.⁷ On the tenth trial one of the few children who remained in the group exhibited an increased amount of emotional behavior that appeared to coincide with the onset of satiation (see the encircled point in the graph, Figure 1). None of the children in the A-group evidenced great security even in the final trials. They continued to exhibit over long periods of time a pattern of retreat and play in the circumscribed region of the gate, a pattern evaluated as indicative of low security because of the restricted area in which the child manifested play behavior.

There are large individual differences in the rate at which insecurity in the strange situation decreased. A survey of the behavior of the children on the fifth trial, before the total number of subjects in the group diminished, shows that one child was still maximally insecure, while another child was almost maximally secure. These individual differences show no significant relationship either to age or to intelligence. The rank-difference correlation coefficient between age and degree of security on the fifth trial is $+.21 (\pm .17)$, and the coefficient for security scores and IQ's on the Cattell Baby Test is $-.02 (\pm .18)$ for the 16 subjects. From daily observation of all the children over a period of months it appeared that the children who became secure in the situation most rapidly were children who were characteristically more independent in a variety of nursery-school situations. This consistency of behavior in the nursery and in the strange room indicates that

⁷ The increase in the average insecurity of the group as a whole on the second and third trials is exaggerated by the deviant behavior of three children who were engrossed in play with a few toys during all or a part of the first two trials. During this period they appeared not to notice the rest of the situation. But after their interest in the toys diminished, extreme negative patterns of reaction occurred.

traits of "independence" or of "self-reliance" may develop at a distinctly early age.

Security as a Function of the Presence of the Mother

In an attempt to make the strange situation initially secure, the eight children in the M-group were accompanied by their own mothers or a nursery helper, who sat at one end of the room during each trial. A majority of the children displayed immediately the patterns of behavior evaluated on the scale as symptomatic of security. The average security scores for the group on each trial are represented in Figure 1, while the behavioral patterns which the children exhibited are listed in Table 3. The average security of

TABLE 3

AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT IN PARTICULAR PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR
IN THE MOTHER-GROUP

TRIAL	LATENCY*	N-MOTILE W (CRY)	AG MOVEMENT	RETREAT (CRY)	ATTACK	ENCAP (REGRESS)	N-MOTILE W (NO CRY)	ENCAP (PLAY)	RETREAT (PLAY)	APPROACH (CONFLICT)	APPROACH (FREE)
1		1 8 (2)†		12 5 (2)						1 2 (1)	84 4 (7)
2				25 0 (2)						12 5 (1)	62 5 (5)
3	0 1 (1)			2 2 (1)		10 3 (1)				1 2 (1)	86 2 (7)
4	0 9 (1)			6 8 (1)						5 7 (1)	86 6 (7)
5											100 (8)
6											100 (4)
7											100 (2)
8											100 (2)
9											100 (2)
10											100 (2)
11											100 (2)

* The latency category represents an initial period in which no overt response was made to the situation.

† All figures in parentheses indicate number of cases

the M-group was greater on the first trial than the security of the A-group on the final trials. If the possibility of a selection of children with a "greater tendency to secure behavior in strange situations" is ruled out—and the probability of such a selection is remote in view of the fact that none of the 16 children in the A-group failed to exhibit patterns of marked insecurity in the situation—the immediate security of these eight children must be attributed to the presence of the familiar adult.

The problem is complicated, however, by the individual differences within the group. Not all of the children were immediately secure in the situation. Three children at first displayed patterns of insecurity similar to those which appeared in the A-group and the remaining five children who were secure in the situation at all times differed in their reactions to the adult. In all, three types of reactions to the adults were observed.

No Contacts with the Adult. The three children who were initially insecure in the situation were accompanied by nursery helpers, or "substitute" mothers. In each case, the child cried and retreated at once or very soon to the chair where the adult sat. The adult, instructed to remain impassive, paid no attention to the child's distress. None of the three children made any physical contact with the adult who, by her passivity, was rejecting him. Later, in fact, when they began to display patterns of approach to the toys, they avoided the adult: they failed to speak to her, gesticulate in her direction, or approach her playfully with toys. It is interesting that these children never exhibited a large amount of freedom in the situation. They either locomoted or played much less than the other five children.

Few Contacts with the Adult Two other children in the M-group were accompanied by nursery helpers but, unlike the preceding children, they were maximally secure in the situation. While they made occasional friendly advances to the adult, their attention was occupied primarily with the toys. The adult's passivity did not appear to disturb them or to function as a rebuff. This may be related to the fact that playful importunities of the children frequently were ignored by busy helpers in the nursery, although actual distress customarily received immediate notice.

No child in the M-group had manifested a prior antagonism for the particular nursery helper who accompanied him. The fact that some children were secure in the situation with the "substitute" mother and others were insecure appears to be related to individual differences in the dependence of the children. The three children for whom the situation was insecure were children who characteristically sought adult intervention in all playroom battles, who fled from visitors in the nursery, and in other ways showed signs of a strong need for protection. The two children, on the contrary, who were maximally secure in the situation and who exhibited

little dependence upon the "substitute" mother were children who exhibited a similar independence in nursery-school situations. The nursery helpers were, in the past experience of all of the children, a source of some protection, but unlike the own mothers they had not been constantly solicitous. In the experimental situation they provided an adequate protection only in those cases where the child's dependent need for protection was slight.

Many Contacts with the Adult. In the three cases where the own mother of the child was present, the children were maximally secure and the mothers were focal attractions in the situation. These children seemed to be unable to sustain any activity without referring it to the adult: they talked to her, showed her the new toys, and played in proximity to her. It is noteworthy that the mothers themselves were less consistently passive than were the nursery helpers. At times they departed from their instructions and caressed or reprimanded the children.

It should be stressed that overdependence of children upon the mothers was typical of the mother-child relationships throughout the institution where the experiments were conducted. The children were the only love-objects in the immediate environment of the women. Moreover high social status in the institution was acquired through displays of maternalism, so that mothers sometimes fostered and boasted of the dependence of their progeny. Any need for protection which these overdependent children might have experienced in the experimental situation was immediately satisfied by the presence of the own mother.

The extent to which the strange situation was made secure by the presence of the adult evidently varied with the dependence of the child and with the history of his previous relationship with the adult. For independent children, the "substitute" mothers were adequate sources of protection in the situation. Dependent children, on the contrary, were secure only in those instances where the adult who accompanied them was the own mother, whose affection and solicitude had been experienced constantly in the past.

Removal of the Adult

Five children in the M-group were left alone in the situation after the fifth trial in order to determine what effect the removal of the adult would have upon the security of the child (M-A group). The average security of the group as a whole decreased greatly after the adults left. Their average security score on the last five trials is lower than the average score for any other group on the same trials.

Group	Average Security Index
	(Trials 6-10)
A	+0.11
M	+4.8
A-M	+0.99
M-A	-1.5

In view of the different roles which the adults played when they were present, it might be expected that individual children would react differently to their absence from the situation. The results for the M-A group reveal such individual differences. The two children who had been accompanied by their own mothers and for whom the adults had functioned as focal attractions in the situation displayed the greatest insecurity in the alone trials. Both children exhibited the pattern of nonmotile withdrawal, which is rated on the scale as indicative of maximal insecurity. Two other children who had been accompanied by nursery helpers and had experienced rejection when they sought the protection of the adults displayed only a temporary insecurity in the alone situation. They, also, were dependent children, but their need for protection in the situation had never been satisfied by the passive nursery helpers. In contrast, the one child in the M-A group who was characteristically independent and who had made few contacts with the nursery helper when she was present showed no symptom of insecurity when the adult was removed. In brief, the results indicate that the greater the child's dependence and the more his dependent need for protection was satisfied by the particular adult who accompanied him, the greater was his insecurity when the adult was absent.

Delayed Introduction of the Adult

In the expectation of increasing the security of children who had been alone in the situation, mothers or "substitute" mothers were introduced after the fifth trial in six cases (A-M group). The average increase in security, however, was not perceptibly greater than the average increase in security displayed by the children who remained alone in the situation. The security index for the A-group increased 2.5 points in the last five trials and that of the A-M group increased 3.1 points.

Individual differences in the extent to which the security of the children increased after the entrance of the adult are related to the degrees of security which they had attained before the adults

arrived. The more insecure the child in the alone situation, the less readily did the presence of the adult, even the own mother, alter the situation for him. The three children who had been least insecure in the alone situation were characteristically independent children. They rapidly became maximally secure after the entrance of the adult. The three children, on the contrary, who were most insecure in the alone situation were typically dependent children, and they continued to display patterns indicative of a high degree of insecurity. The adults, one of whom was an own mother, remained impassive and made no attempt to console the children. The child whose own mother thus, in effect, rejected him stood in the center of the room where the experimenter had left him and screamed throughout four successive trials (*i.e.*, a pattern of nonmotile withdrawal). It seems likely that the passivity of the adults functioned as a barrier to protection and that this frustration enhanced or prolonged the negative reactions of the children to the situation. It may be noteworthy, also, that all three children who remained insecure after the entrance of the adults were developmentally retarded. Their IQ's on the Cattell Baby Test ranged from 71 to 86. Not only were they more insecure than the other children when the adult appeared, but they also were less adequate to the task of restructuring the situation in relation to the adult.

The behavior of the A-M group as a whole points to the difficulty of increasing the security of the child in a situation where he has been permitted to become highly insecure. Children who were accompanied by an adult from the outset were immediately or rapidly secure in the strange situation, but children who were allowed to become insecure before an adult arrived did not respond readily to the new source of protection.

INTERPRETATIONS

Apart from the problems of individual differences in degree of security which have already been discussed, there are general questions that must be answered. Why were children insecure in the strange situation? How does familiarity alter the situation for the child? And in what way does the presence of the mother make the situation secure for the child? The answer to these questions requires some type of field-analysis, or inquiry into situational determinants.

What, then, are the dynamic characteristics of the strange situation in which children exhibited such marked insecurity? It is evident from the behavior of children in the A-group that the situation was highly unpleasant, or negatively valent. There is every indication that they wished to escape. The fact that a number of the children did not move towards the gate but remained nonmotile or made restless locomotions suggests that the regions intermediate to the gate were not distinguished as paths to it. The situation may be represented as one of unstructured and negatively valent regions.⁸

A topological representation of the situation in which the extremely emotional pattern of nonmotile withdrawal appeared is




FIG. 2. NONMOTILE WITHDRAWAL: ${}^fP, -A, -{}^dA, oB$

given in Figure 2. The child (P) is surrounded by an unstructured and negatively valent region (U) which overspreads his entire life space. As a result of the negative valence of this region there exists a force ${}^fP, -A$, or a force away from the present state of the child, which is symbolized by the letter A . Theoretically, in the situation depicted in Figure 2, the "present state" would be the same whatever region the child is in at the moment, since the unstructured region fills the life space. The direction of the force ${}^fP, -A$ has only one solution, *viz.*, ${}^dA, oB$, or manipulation of the own body (oB). In this situation children remained nonmotile, and their gestures were oriented away from the dangerous external regions towards their own bodies.

⁸ This is probably the most parsimonious assumption that can be made. An alternative possibility is that the situation was frustrating rather than dangerous. It is conceivable that the experimenter was at all times a part of the child's life space and that the situation represented, dynamically, a frustration of the goal "playing with the toys in the presence of the experimenter." While aloneness undoubtedly determined, in part, the dynamic character of the situation, the assumption that it functioned as a barrier to a goal and was therefore frustrating seems far fetched. To the observer the extremely traumatic and undifferentiated reactions of the children strongly suggested the primary reaction of fear rather than second-order responses to a frustrating situation.


The concept of unstructured regions is a cognitive concept denoting "lack of clarity." It is evident that not all unstructured situations which individuals face are, like the strange room, negatively valent. Intellectual puzzles and problems may constitute a positive lure throughout periods when they are unstructured. But unstructuredness in the broader social world of the adult again possesses negative valence and may produce a basic insecurity. Perhaps the negative valence of unstructured regions is related to the amount of the total life space which they fill and to the feeling of power or impotence in the individual who faces them. Some results of the present study, notably the secure behavior of children accompanied by their mothers, suggest that *the negative valence of the situation was a function not only of unstructured regions but also of the child's feeling of power*, or lack of it.

In the majority of cases where adults were present, and in all cases where the adult was the child's own mother, the valence character of the situation was altered. To account for this fact, it may be assumed that the danger and negative valence of the strange room were determined by the strength of the child's powerfield as well as by the unstructuredness of the situation. *An individual's powerfield is his ability to overcome restraining forces.* It may be represented topologically as the sphere of influence of the person in the life space if it is recognized that, actually, this regional representation indicates a field of forces. It is a region within which the valences that obtain may be thought of as depending in part upon the person's feeling of strength. Not only may such regions be represented for the child himself, but they may be represented also for other persons who enter his life space, influencing its valence-character and the accessibility of goals—the term "induced" being applied to such valences. The powerfield of the other person may function as a constraint and may limit the child's own powerfield if the induced valences which it represents are negative.⁹ Where the induced valences are positive, as they were in the present study, the powerfield of the other person will supplement and increase the child's own powerfield. Typical differences in the powerfields of children and adults in the strange situation are represented in

⁹ Cf. Wiehe, F. *Op cit*. Wiehe found that the powerfield of a strange person usually functions as a constraint upon the child's own powerfield.

Figure 3. The adult's powerfield, or the region within which positive valences were induced by the power of the adult in the child's life space, was large only where the adult was the child's own mother. The mother was a known source of protection. She could be used as a tool to extend the limited power of the child, as nursery helpers could not be used. When dependent children whose own powerfields were small were accompanied by nursery helpers, negative valences obtained in the unstructured regions of the situation and insecure behavior resulted.

FIG 3



P symbolizes the child and *Ad*, the adult. The broken lines represent the child's powerfield. The unbroken lines indicate the extent of the adult's powerfield.

Fig. 3a shows the powerfields of a dependent child and his own mother. In Fig 3b the powerfields of an independent child and a nursery helper are represented. Fig 3c shows the powerfields of a dependent child and a nursery helper.

A simple descriptive formula which summarizes the foregoing interpretations and states the functional dependencies of security as they emerge from the experiment was suggested by Professor Lewin. The factors upon which security was found to depend were the familiarity or structuredness of the situation, the independence of the child and the influence of the adult, in cases where adults were present. The relation of these three factors to the security of the child may be expressed in the formula:

$$\text{Insecurity} = f \frac{\text{Unfamiliarity of } E}{\text{Power of } P}$$

where "Unfamiliarity of *E*" represents an environment characterized by unstructured regions and "Power of *P*" symbolizes the

child's feeling of power as it is inferred from his sphere of influence in the situation. Characteristic differences in the independence of the children may be regarded as one determinant of differences in their feelings of strength in the situation at any given time. The enhancement of the child's feeling of power which the presence of an adult produced is also symbolized in Power of *P*. This formulation of insecurity as a function of the unfamiliarity of the situation in relation to the child's feeling of power brings together the following findings: (1) insecurity decreases with increasing familiarity of the situation; (2) insecurity diminishes more rapidly, the greater is the child's feeling of power; (3) security obtains initially, notwithstanding the unfamiliarity of the environment, if the child's feeling of power is increased sufficiently by the presence of a familiar adult; (4) insecurity occurs when the child's feeling of power is diminished greatly by the removal of an adult upon whom he has felt that his power mainly depended.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

An observational assessment of the reactions of young children to a strange playroom with and without a familiar adult present revealed 10 different patterns of behavior: nonmotile withdrawal and crying; agitated movement; retreat and crying; attack; regressive encapsulation; nonmotile withdrawal without crying; encapsulation in play; retreat and play; approach with conflict; and free approach.

The patterns served to define positions on a security scale which evaluates the degree of security of the child by the positive or negative direction of his adjustment to the situation and the relative amounts of emotional and adaptive behavior which he exhibits. Application of the scale to the protocolled behavior of the children yielded the following findings:

1. Children who were left alone in the strange room displayed patterns of behavior indicative of a high degree of insecurity.
2. Insecurity of children decreased as the situation became familiar, a reasonably good adjustment being achieved by the fifth or sixth solitary visit to the new environment.
3. Individual differences in the rate at which insecurity decreased showed no correlation with age or intelligence but appeared to be related to characteristic differences in the independence of the children.

4. When mothers or "substitute" mothers were present children usually were secure, notwithstanding the unfamiliarity of the situation. Individual differences in security were related to differences in the extent to which mothers and "substitute" mothers had come to represent a known source of protection to the more dependent children.

5. Children's security in the situation decreased with the removal of the adult in a degree directly proportional to the extent of their preceding dependence upon the adult.

6. Insecurity of children alone in the strange situation diminished when a familiar adult was introduced only in cases where the child's insecurity in the alone situation was not extreme. Children who were highly insecure at the time of the adult's appearance remained insecure, even when the adult was the own mother. (It is possible that the continued emotionality of these children was related to the frustrating effect of the adult's passivity upon their need for comforting and protection and to the comparatively low intelligence of these subjects.)

In the light of these findings, insecurity is formulated as a function of the unfamiliarity, or unstructuredness, of the environment in relation to the child's feeling of power in it. The striking effect of familiarity upon the security of the child is attributed to a cognitive structuring of the situation into goal-regions and path-regions which occurs with time, while the smaller degree of insecurity evidenced by independent children and the security of children accompanied by their mothers in a strange situation are attributed to a greater feeling of power on the part of these children.

In passing, the following implications of the findings for practical application may warrant statement. Because black-outs have become a recurrent phenomenon on one coast and authorities contemplate the possibility of future large-scale evacuations of children from coastal areas, the assemblage of methods for immunizing the insecurity of children in unstructured environments has particular urgency. One generalization derivable from the present study—and long known to nursery-school workers—is that the happiness of the child in a new situation is not guaranteed by an abundant supply of bright new toys. *The most certain provision that can be made for the security of young children faced with unstructured environments appears to be the presence of a familiar adult whose protective power is known.* Even a familiar object

may lessen in some degree the insecurity of children in strange situations.

Although dependent children, or children whose feeling of power depends upon a powerful adult, will be at a disadvantage in a variety of situations where the adult is not present, the problem of increasing their areas of security is not met by enforcing independence upon them in a traumatic situation. When dependent children experience rejection by an adult, their insecurity may be prolonged and an avoidance reaction towards the adult may be set up. Independence, defined as the ability to discriminate and respond to goals that are not specifically protective, may be furthered by the development of skills which may increase the child's power and independence and consequently his security both alone and with other children, where the possession of skills may attract prestige and help to structure the social situation.

There has been no attempt here to deal with data on the reactions of older children and adults to strange situations, yet it would be surprising if adult patterns of reaction bore no resemblance to those of children. War with its flux of social fields, its breakdown of social organization, and especially the device of transporting and dumping conquered peoples in strange environments attest that cognitively unstructured situations of the kind which produce insecurity are the lot of man in our times. Some case-history data on adult patterns of reaction to a cognitively unstructured field have been published and certain of the patterns depicted are roughly analogous to the patterns of insecure behavior described here.¹⁰ From the formula, Insecurity is a function of

$$\frac{\text{Unfamiliarity of Environment}}{\text{Power of Person}},$$
 it is plain that this Nazi strategy

is productive of maximum insecurity since it throws its victims into unfamiliar environments and simultaneously deprives them of all sources of power. Nothing could be better calculated to produce insecurity.

¹⁰ Allport, G. W., Bruner, J. S., & Jandorf, E. M. Personality under social catastrophe: an analysis of 90 German refugee life histories. *Char & Pers*, 1941, 10, 1-22.

SMILE AND HAND DOMINANCE IN RELATION TO BASIC MODES OF ADAPTATION*

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THE 1937 STUDY

IN 1937 a preliminary investigation was conducted¹ in which the relationship between the prevailing form of hand-smile laterality and certain aspects of behavior and mode of adjustment was studied. The subjects consisted of 84 normal individuals (mostly summer campers) who had been selected from 398 adults and children on the basis of marked or easily observable laterality of the face while spontaneously smiling or laughing. These 84 well-defined or extreme cases of smile dominance were further subdivided into two contrasting groups: (1) 49 "homolateral" subjects (right-smiledness with right-handedness or left-smiledness with left-handedness) and (2) 35 "contralateral" or crossed subjects (left-smiledness with right-handedness or right-smiledness with left-handedness). Two to three personality sketches were obtained from counselors and supervisors on each of these 84 cases. These personality sketches were then rated by two independent judges on the basis of the presence or absence of 15 paired "A" or "Z"² traits, which preliminary investigations had indicated to be significant. These A and Z traits are tabulated as follows:

A TRAITS

1. *Fight reaction*

In an actually or potentially dangerous situation does the subject generally react by trying to face and overcome the danger,

Z TRAITS

vs. Flight reaction

or by avoiding or running away from it?

* A preliminary report of the 1938-39 phase of the investigation was read at the 29th annual meeting of the American Psychopathological Association, Atlantic City, June 6, 1939.

¹ For a complete report on the 1937 study, see John G and Doris R Lynn. Face-hand laterality in relation to personality. This JOURNAL, 1938, 33, 291-322.

² The terms "positive" and "negative" were used in the earlier 1937 report to represent these contrasting reaction patterns. However, they have been discarded because of their ambiguity and evaluational connotations and have been replaced by the terms "A" and "Z," respectively.

A TRAITS

Z TRAITS

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>2. <i>Self-confident</i>
 With his contemporaries, does the subject usually seem to be self-assured,</p> | <p><i>vs. Shy (socially)</i>
 or does he generally shrink back and seem to be timorous?</p> |
| <p>3. <i>Courageous</i>
 Does the subject meet physical dangers or opposition with apparent calmness and self-assurance,</p> | <p><i>vs. Timid (physically)</i>
 or does he appear to be easily frightened, generally shrinking from possible physical dangers?</p> |
| <p>4. <i>Initiative</i>
 Does the subject often originate and start new activities which deviate from standard practice,</p> | <p><i>vs. No initiative</i>
 or does he rarely originate such deviations?</p> |
| <p>5. <i>Independent of authority</i>
 Does the subject generally attempt to exercise his own will or judgment without the support or guidance of authorities,</p> | <p><i>vs. Dependent on authority</i>
 or does he rely on authorities for support and guidance?</p> |
| <p>6. <i>Hard to mold</i>
 Does the subject generally show strong resistance to attempts on the part of others to change his activities or ideas,</p> | <p><i>vs. Easy to mold</i>
 or does he usually display lack of resistance and comply with such attempts?</p> |
| <p>7. <i>Prefers new and unfamiliar</i>
 Does the subject seek and seem to prefer the stimulus and challenge of new and unfamiliar activities, individuals, etc.,</p> | <p><i>vs. Old and familiar</i>
 or does he display a strong preference for that which is already familiar to him?</p> |
| <p>8. <i>Quick reaction</i>
 Is the subject "quick on the trigger,"</p> | <p><i>vs. Slow reaction</i>
 or is he slow to react?</p> |
| <p>9. <i>Adventurous</i>
 Is the subject disposed to seek adventure and welcome hazardous and exciting physical occurrences,</p> | <p><i>vs. Cautious (physically)</i>
 or does he exercise careful consideration of the outcome of any course of action and try to avoid potentially dangerous physical situations?</p> |
| <p>10. <i>Aggressive</i>
 Socially, is the subject a "pusher," self-assertive, and disposed to work actively in behalf of his own interests,</p> | <p><i>vs. Retiring (socially)</i>
 or is he primarily disposed to retire from notice and remain unobtrusive?</p> |
| <p>11. <i>Individual standards</i>
 Does the subject often try to develop independently and to follow his own orientations and standards of conduct,</p> | <p><i>vs. Conventional standards</i>
 or does he generally accept and follow without question the established customary ways and beliefs?</p> |

A TRAITS

Z TRAITS

- | | |
|--|--|
| 12. <i>Creative or original</i>
Does the subject often produce new combinations out of existing materials, methods and ideas, | <i>vs. Imitative</i>
or does he generally follow the example of others in opinions and actions? |
| 13. <i>Dominating</i>
Does the subject often <i>try</i> to exercise control and authority over others, | <i>vs. Subservient</i>
or is he more inclined to subordinate himself to the wishes and control of others? |
| 14. <i>Secure</i>
Does the subject generally appear free from fear, apprehension and care in his social relations, | <i>vs. Insecure (socially)</i>
or does he usually seem apprehensive concerning his relations with others? |
| 15. <i>Leader</i>
Does the subject often direct and control his contemporaries in their actions, | <i>vs. Follower</i>
or is he more inclined to follow the leadership of others? |

An index, the A-Z₁₅ Q, of each subject's general mode of adjustment, insofar as it relates to the two contrasting A and Z patterns of response, was then computed.³ When these A-Z₁₅ Q's were correlated with the homolateral and contralateral groups, an approximate *r* of +.76 was obtained.⁴ This coefficient indicates, on the one hand, a significant correlation between well-defined cases of homolateral hand-smile dominance and a prevailing A pattern of adjustment. On the other hand, it also shows a significant relation between clear-cut contralateral hand-smile dominance and a prevailing Z pattern of adjustment.

A-Z Personality Quotients as Related to Age

During a recent review of the 1937 data it was discovered that age has a definite determining effect on the degree of correlation between the A-Z behavior pattern and the form of hand-smile relationship. This is shown when the 84 subjects are divided into two groups, one consisting of 42 adolescents and adults of 14 or

³ The formula used was $A-Z_{15} Q = \frac{A-Z}{15}$ Here *A* represents the number of traits rated as "well-defined A," and *Z*, the number rated as "well-defined Z" 15 represents the greatest number of ratings any subject could possibly receive from one judge

⁴ In the earlier report of this study (cf footnote 2) this correlation was based directly on the percentages of the A (positive) and Z (negative) ratings, rather than on the derived A-Z₁₅ Q's An approximate *r* of +.77 was obtained

more years of age and the other of 42 children between the ages of 6 and 13 inclusive.⁵ The approximate r between the A-Z₁₅ Q's and hand-smile dominance for the children is $+.53$ with a PE of $\pm .08$. In contrast, the same correlation for the adolescent-adult group is represented by an approximate r of $+.91$ with a PE of $\pm .02$. These correlations would indicate that the approximate r of $+.76$ obtained for the whole group of 84 subjects represents a compromise correlation occurring when the 42 highly correlating ($+.91$) adolescent-adults are combined with the moderately correlating ($+.53$) children.

A further analysis of the data indicates that this increase with maturity of the correlation of well-defined homolateral and contra-

TABLE I
AVERAGE A-Z₁₅ Q's
For Age and Handedness-Smiledness Groups
84 Normal Subjects (1937 Study)

HAND-SMILE DOMINANCE	42 CHILDREN 6 TO 13 YEARS		42 ADOLESCENT ADULTS 14 TO 75 YEARS		AVERAGE INCREASE IN A-Z ₁₅ Q VALUES WITH AGE	PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN A-Z ₁₅ Q VALUES WITH AGE
	NO CASES	AVERAGE A-Z ₁₅ Q	NO CASES	AVERAGE A-Z ₁₅ Q		
Homolaterals	24	$+.44$	25	$+.60$	$+.16$	27
Contralaterals	18	$-.20$	17	$-.46$	$-.26$	57

lateral hand-smile dominance with the A and Z patterns of adjustment is due to changes in A-Z₁₅ Q values alone and not to any changes in hand-smile relationships. This growth in the mode of adaptation with age is simply and clearly shown in Table I, which gives average A-Z₁₅ Q's. Here we see that the homolateral group as a whole, and regardless of age, is rated as developing a stronger A

⁵ The group of subjects was divided into those below 14 years and those 14 or above for the following reasons: (1) 14 years seemed to be the age after which there were maximum changes in the relative frequencies of the A and Z ratings in trait-pairs; (2) both in the camp situation and in school there generally occurs a change in social status and responsibility at about this age (e.g., from camper to junior counselor, and from grammar school to high school); and (3) the 84 subjects happened to split at this age into numerically equivalent groups

mode of adjustment (+.52 average) than the contralateral group does a Z mode of adjustment (— .32 average). This difference is especially pronounced during childhood, where the homolaterals show an A pattern which is more than twice as strong (+.44) as the Z pattern (— .20) of the contralaterals. Moreover, while we see in both hand-smile groups a significant increase in average A-Z₁₅ Q values with age, the contralateral subjects have an increase of 57 per cent, which is more than double the 27-per-cent increase of the homolaterals.

It can be seen from the above that *the Z pattern of adjustment is not strongly established in the contralateral subjects until adolescent-adulthood. In contrast, among the homolaterals, the A mode of adaptation is relatively well established in childhood and develops little after the age of 14 years.* This conclusion seems to suggest that the A pattern of adjustment, in general, may be more primitive and thus perhaps less dependent upon later cortical development and educational factors, while, conversely, the later developing Z pattern, in general, would appear to be less primitive and more influenced by cortical maturation and education.

THE 1938-39 STUDY

Purposes and Material

The objectives of the present phase of the study have been threefold. First, by virtue of the clear-cut definition of the problem attained by the earlier study, we endeavored to replace the former unavoidably more subjective and qualitative procedures by well-controlled objective and quantitative techniques, permitting the use of the product-moment method of statistical correlation. Secondly, we have aimed to test in this experimental manner the validity of the earlier conclusions which were based upon cases of marked and easily observable involuntary smiledness alone. Thirdly, we wished to determine whether the hand-smile dominance and behavior correlations extended to the intergrade group consisting of about four-fifths of all subjects and distributed between the two extreme hand-smile groups as well as to the subjects with well-defined homolateral and contralateral hand-smile relationships.

These objectives have been achieved by making a controlled study of a group of 104 subjects and by determining experimentally the extent of correlation between *degrees* of handedness, smiled-

ness, and behavior traits. The subjects consisted of all of the more cooperative patients⁶ at the Psychiatric Institute,⁷ New York City, during the month of October, 1938.

Out of the 104 patients studied and photographed, 15 were eliminated for various reasons. Eight of these failed to give any facial reaction, four were found to have definitely pathological air-encephalograms, and three were ambidextrous. Unlike the 1937 procedure, the seven subjects who were found to be left-handed were treated separately. Thus the main data and results of this study are derived from the 82 definitely right-handed patients of both sexes. Of these, 66 were adolescents and adults (14 to 57 years of age) and 16 were children (4 to 13 inclusive).

Method of Studying General Behavior

The investigation procedures fell into two main phases: On the one hand, general behavior ratings were obtained on the patients from the nurses; on the other, the *degrees* of laterality of handedness, footedness, eyedness, and involuntary facial expression were determined. The rating method which was developed for determining each subject's degree of A or Z response pattern will be considered first.

A questionnaire⁸ was constructed on the basis of four pairs of A and Z traits derived from the 1937 study. The four pairs, (1) ascendant or aggressive *vs.* submissive or retiring socially, (2) belligerency and anger *vs.* timidity and fear (comparable to "fight-flight" in the previous study), (3) emotional independence *vs.* dependence on authority, and (4) initiative *vs.* lack of initiative, were among the traits giving the highest correlations with hand-smile dominance in the 1937 study. All four of these trait-pairs had additional advantages in that they were adapted to being scored easily and objectively by the nurses on the basis of their experiences

⁶ Psychiatric patients were used as subjects not only because we wished to study possible differences between normals and psychotics with respect to A and Z reactions, but also because of the fact that such patients are under 24-hour observation by nurses trained to give adequate, intelligent, and unbiased judgments of their behavior.

⁷ The authors wish to acknowledge their indebtedness to Dr. Nolan D. C. Lewis of the New York State Psychiatric Institute for making available the subjects of this investigation and to the members of the nursing staff who painstakingly filled out the questionnaire for the behavior of patients under their care. Dr. Carney Landis and Dr. Joseph Zubin of the same Institute gave freely of their time and advice in planning and statistically evaluating the material of the study. Lastly, we are indebted to both Dr. Landis and to Mrs. Nina Bull for their generosity in supplying the super-sensitive film used.

⁸ This questionnaire is printed in full in the Appendix, page 276.

with the *overt* behavior of the patients studied. Moreover, these traits seemed especially pertinent in the behavior of psychotic patients.

In addition to questions on these four pairs of traits, a fifth question on strong *vs.* weak emotional responsiveness or affectivity was added. This trait was found to have a significant correlation with hand-smile dominance among the adults, who unfortunately were the only group on which it was rated. Because of this limitation, the ratings on this trait-pair have not been incorporated into the A-Z Q's but will be treated separately. (See Figure 3.)

On each of the wards, there were, on an average, 20 patients attended by four to six nurses. Each nurse independently filled out the questionnaire. She was asked to select those patients on her ward who in her judgment showed any of the defined behavior traits to a *marked* degree. The average number of raters for each subject was 4.7, and no subject received ratings from less than three nurses.

From the nurses' ratings it was possible to obtain an individual index, the A-Z₄ Q, by which each patient could be scored and compared with other patients with respect to his relative A or Z response tendencies on these four representative traits. The A-Z₄ Q of this study is more limited in scope than the A-Z₁₅ Q of the 1937 study as it considers only four pairs of A and Z traits. Moreover, it is based directly on the ratings of the nurses rather than being derived, as in the 1937 study, from the judges' ratings on the counselors' personality and behavior sketches. The formula used is

$$A-Z_4 Q = \frac{A-Z}{4R},$$

where

A = the number of times a subject has been rated by the nurses as displaying marked A behavior with respect to the four paired traits;

Z = the number of times a subject has been rated as displaying marked Z behavior;

4 = the possible number of ratings (4 trait-pairs) from any one nurse on any one subject;

R = the number of raters (nurses) on a particular ward;

∴ *4R* = the greatest possible number of ratings a subject could receive from all the nurses on his ward.

If, for example, from five nurses rating the subjects on a ward, a particular subject was selected as marked or extreme in *independence* by 3 nurses; in *initiative* by 2 nurses; in *ascendancy or aggressiveness* by 2; in *belligerency* by 1, and in *fear and timidity* by 1, his A-Z₄ Q would be:

$$\frac{A-Z}{4R} = \frac{(3+2+2+1)-(1)}{4 \times 5} = \frac{8-1}{20} = \frac{7}{20} = +.35$$

In a similar manner, an A-Z₄ Q has been computed for each of the 82 right-handed and 7 left-handed subjects.

The A-Z Q's range from -1.00 to +1.00. The plus sign indicates the predominance of A ratings and the minus sign the predominance of Z ratings, while the numerical values show the *degree* of predominance of either A or Z ratings respectively.

In order to determine whether the four A or four Z behavior traits selected are genuinely representative of the original 1937 set of 15 paired A and Z traits, the A-Z₄ Q was computed from the ratings on these four pairs of traits on each of the 84 subjects of the 1937 study. The degree of agreement between these (1937) A-Z₄ Q's and the original (1937) A-Z₁₅ Q's (based on all 15 paired traits) on the same subjects was then determined by the product-moment method of correlation. This gave an *r* of +.90 with a PE of $\pm .01$, which is a sufficiently high correlation of the (1937) A-Z₄ Q's with the (1937) A-Z₁₅ Q's on the same subjects for the former to be accepted as representative of the latter.

The reliability of the individual raters and of the A-Z₄ Q's obtained on the subjects of this study was determined by splitting the group of raters on each ward in half and correlating the average A-Z₄ Q's of the first half with the corresponding A-Z₄ Q's of the second half. This gives a reliability coefficient of +.75 with a PE of $\pm .04$, which indicates a sufficiently high agreement between the raters for us to accept their evaluations as dependable for group purposes.

Methods of Measuring Forms of Laterality

Handedness, Footedness, and Eyedness. Handedness was tested and rated on the basis of a series of 20 performance items⁹ which had been found by Hull¹⁰ and Koch¹¹ to have a reliability on retest of over +.90. A handedness quotient was determined for each subject on the basis of actual performance on these tests.¹²

⁹ The Van Riper Critical Angle Board was also used to test handedness but was found to be unreliable with psychotic patients Cf C Van Riper A new test of laterality *J. exp. Psychol.*, 1934, 17, 305-313

¹⁰ Catherine J. Hull. A study of laterality test items *J. exp. Educ.*, 1936, 4, 287-290

¹¹ H J. Koch. A study of the nature, measurement and determination of hand preference *Genet Psychol Monogr.*, 1933, 13, 117-122

¹² The formula used was
$$\frac{(R + \frac{E}{2}) - (L + \frac{E}{2})}{R + E + L}$$

The subjects were questioned about any possibility of native left-handedness.

In order to determine the possible relationship of smiledness and behavior to other forms of laterality than handedness, foot- and eye-dominance tests were also given. Footedness was determined by a performance test consisting of items prepared by Twitmyer and Nathanson¹³ and by Eyre and Schmeeckle.¹⁴ Eyedness was ascertained by the standard hole-in-the-card test.

Method of Simultaneous Stimulation and Registration of Involuntary Smiling. Since one of the chief aims of the present study was to replace subjective judgments of facial laterality by objective measurements, the major technical problem consisted of the construction of an apparatus which would simultaneously induce and register involuntary facial reactions under standard conditions. The problem was solved by the development of the facial cinérecorder. A detailed description of this apparatus and of the technique of mapping and measuring facial expression has been published elsewhere.¹⁵ However, some idea of its construction and use may be gained from Figure 1.

The cinérecorder combines a continuous automatic sound movie projector with a concealed moving-picture camera, so that facial expression is first auditorially and visually stimulated and then photographed under standard conditions without the subject's




FIG. 1. DIAGRAM OF FACIAL CINÉRECORDER

¹³ E. G. Twitmyer and Y. Nathanson. The determination of laterality *Univ. Pa. Psychol. Clin.*, 1933, 22, 141-148

¹⁴ M. B. Eyre and M. M. Schmeeckle. A study of handedness, eyedness and footedness. *Child Devel.*, 1933, 4, 73-78

¹⁵ The complete description of the construction and use of the facial cinérecorder is given in John G. Lynn, An apparatus and method for stimulating, recording and measuring facial expression *J. exp. Psychol.*, 1940, 27, 81-88

knowledge. Using this apparatus, film records of involuntary smiles were obtained on 96 out of 104 abnormal subjects. The cinematographic records were then subjected to an objective analysis in which the dynamic patterns of smiles were translated into graphic representations by tracing and measuring the paths of motion of the corners of the mouth. The method of mapping smiles was found to have a reliability of $+.98$ on remeasurements by a disinterested person.

As a measure of lateral overactivity or dominance in a smile, the actual difference between the distances traveled by the right and left corners of the mouth during the total upward motion was found to be too variable and inconsistent, being influenced by the breadth of the smile, size of the subject's face, etc. However, a consistent pattern was observed during the initial phase of the smile. It was noticed that 91.5 per cent of all the smiles, during the initial periods of upward motion, show one mouth corner traveling farther and hence faster than the other. At some later time during the upward course, the initially slower mouth corner usually catches up with and often passes the mouth corner which led at first. When the difference in right and left initial millimeter distances is divided by the sum of the right and left initial distances, a smiledness quotient, or SQ, is obtained.¹⁶ This is expressed exactly by the formula:

$$SQ = \frac{R - L}{R + L}.$$

Thus, if the right side travels 3 millimeters and the left side 6 millimeters before the right side catches up with the speed of the left, the SQ would be:

$$\frac{R - L}{R + L} = \frac{3 - 6}{3 + 6} = \frac{-3}{9} = -.33$$

This index, like the previously devised A-Z Q, has a value which lies somewhere on the algebraic scale between -1.00 and $+1.00$. Any degree of right-smiledness is represented by a plus sign and of

¹⁶ The initial millimeter lead was not used as a measure of laterality because it was noticed that another factor entered into this measurement which partially masked the pure laterality factor. The average of these initial measurements on subjects with a definite right initial millimeter lead was found to be one and one-half times greater than the average of the same measurements on left-faced subjects. Moreover, this quantitative difference in the two extreme smiledness groups extended also (and to a like degree) to the sum of the initial distances traveled by the right and left sides. The neutralization of this quantitative factor, with final isolation of a pure index of mimetic smiledness, was achieved by dividing the difference by the sum of the initial distances traveled by the two sides.

left-smiledness by a minus sign, while the 4 per cent of the individuals who were "even-faced" have an SQ of 0.¹⁷

Reliability of the Smiledness Quotients. The reliability of the SQ's as an index of initial laterality between involuntary smiles occurring during a three-minute test period was found to be $+.61$ with a PE of $\pm .05$ among the 47 subjects with two or more smiles. In order to determine the consistency over a longer time interval, 20 of the subjects were retested three weeks later, and the reliability coefficient between the average SQ's of the smiles recorded at the first and at the subsequent test period proved to be $+ .60$ with a PE of $\pm .10$. These coefficients would indicate that, under similar conditions, the reliability of smile samplings taken during a three-week interval is about the same as when the sampling is done during a three-minute period.

The degree of invariability of the SQ's may be stated more clearly in the following manner. The median variation in SQ's among the 47 subjects with two or more measured smiles is $\pm .10$ on the algebraic scale between -1.00 and $+1.00$. Furthermore, there is not a single case of a subject's showing individual smiles which vary between the definitely right- and the definitely left-smiledness groups (SQ $\pm .25$ and above). This marked *qualitative* consistency of the *extreme* groups on the SQ continuum confirms the finding of the 1937 study that there is an r of $+ .98$ on the consistency of involuntary smiling in the well-defined or extreme smiledness groups over a three-week period.

*Reaction and Coordination Time.*¹⁸ In the 1937 study it was noted that the counselors who gave the personality sketches spontaneously described the reactions of many of the homolateral subjects as "quick" and of the contralaterals as "slow." As it was not possible to define objectively from the data just what had been meant by quick or slow reactions, the subjects of the 1938-39 study were tested for (1) their simple reaction time and (2) their coordination time.

In the study of simple reaction time and coordination time, the

¹⁷ Recently the authors have found it practical and simple to utilize the electroencephalographic apparatus, with leads to both sides of the face, as a means of obtaining a graphic record of the relative amounts of laterality of smiling or other facial activity. The further utilization of such myographic records would seem to offer a very direct, simple, and relatively inexpensive means for the quantitative analysis of facial laterality.

¹⁸ The authors wish to acknowledge their appreciation to Mr Irvin Hochberg, graduate student in psychology at Columbia University, for his services and assistance in administering the reaction-time tests.

procedures outlined by Miles¹⁹ were used as a basis for the study. An analysis of the results revealed that, although great individual differences were present both in the speed and variability of the subjects, there was no significant correlation between either simple reaction time or coordination time and homolateral or contralateral hand-smile dominance.²⁰ Therefore, it would seem that the "quick and slow reactions" referred to by the counselors in the 1937 study are not related to simple reaction or coordination time, but represent a more complex reaction, probably involving the *speed* of emotional responsiveness, in connection with the degree of delay or inhibition of spontaneous emotional expression. This should be investigated in subsequent studies. Unfortunately, the present study includes a question only on the strength, rather than the speed, of emotional responsiveness.

Results

Smiledness and Handedness. No correlation whatsoever could be found between handedness and either the degree or kind of smiledness. These two forms of laterality were found to function as independent variables, as was the case in the previous study. The distribution curves of handedness and smiledness differ widely. (See Figure 2.) Most individuals are definitely right-handed, a relatively small percentage is markedly left-handed, and there are very few ambidextrous individuals. Smiledness, however, forms a much more normal distribution curve. The majority of the individuals studied have been found to be relatively even-faced, and there is an approximately equal distribution of subjects with right- and left-smiledness, few of these being markedly asymmetrical.

Operationally defined, handedness is the exhibition of a consistent laterality preference during the performance of complex and highly differentiated manual adaptive patterns. In contrast, involuntary smiledness is a laterality difference in the initial activity of the mouth corners exhibited during spontaneous smiling and laughter. While handedness reflects the well-known lateral dominance of one cerebral motor area over the other, involuntary smiledness reflects a heretofore unsuspected lateral predominance in initial

¹⁹ Walter R. Miles. Correlation of reaction and coordination speed with age in adults. *Amer. J. Psychol.*, 1931, 43, 337-391

²⁰ In general, the findings of Huston, Lundholm, and others were confirmed in that the schizophrenic patients were slower and more variable in their reactions than any of the other diagnostic groups. The children, also in confirmation of Florence Goodenough's work, were found to be slower and more variable than the adults

intensity of emotive discharge, presumably at a subcortical level (probably thalamostriate). This finding of an independent "emotional" motor laterality manifested in smiledness, which is just as




FIG. 2. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF INVOLUNTARY SMILEDNESS, A-Z BEHAVIOR, AND HANDEDNESS QUOTIENTS

objective but somewhat less stable than the "cortical volitional" motor laterality manifested in handedness, should be emphasized and will be discussed in a separate paper.

Smiledness and A and Z Behavior Ratings. With the degree of reliability of the A-Z₄ Q's and the SQ's having been determined, these two sets of indicators can now be correlated. In this and

subsequent correlations, the *average* SQ for all of the smiles recorded on a subject during the first test period will be used as a measure of the degree of smiledness. An average of 1.84 smiles for each individual was recorded during this three-minute interval.

When the average SQ's are correlated by the individual product-moment method with the A-Z₄ Q's an *r* of $+.60$ with a PE of $\pm .05$ is obtained.²¹ In other words, in the 82 right-handed subjects studied, right-smiledness (homolaterality) tends to be definitely associated with ratings on aggressiveness, belligerency, independence, and initiative; while left-smiledness (contralaterality) is connected with ratings on retiring tendencies, timidity or fear, dependence on authority, and lack of initiative.

The coefficient of $+.60$ gives a quantitative experimental confirmation of the more qualitative correlation of an approximate *r* of $+.76$ obtained by the mean square contingency method on similar data in the 1937 study. It shows further that there is a definite correlation between *degrees* of smiledness and *degrees* of A-Z₄ Q values, which extends not only to extreme smiledness groups (comparable to the subjects of the last study) but also to the intergrade group of individuals with even or near-even smiledness. The latter are seldom rated as extreme in any of the behavior traits and hence rarely have high A-Z₄ Q values. (See Figure 3.)




FIG. 3 PERCENTAGE OF A AND Z BEHAVIOR TRAITS SCORED IN RIGHT-, "EVEN-", AND LEFT-FACED GROUPS

²¹ The reliability of this correlation is limited by the fact that the *quantitative* consistency or stability of the SQ's is expressed by an *r* of only $+.61$

Besides the A-Z₄ Q's based on all four paired traits, individual trait-pair A-Z Q's were computed for each subject, so that the separate traits could be analyzed and compared in relation to the SQ's. It was found that the quotients for ascendance-submission, belligerency-fear, and independence-dependence correlate with the SQ's approximately equally, with r 's of $+.52$, $+.51$, and $+.50$ respectively and PE's of $\pm .06$. The r between the initiative-no-initiative quotients and the SQ's is $+.37$ with a PE of $\pm .07$.

When the individual trait-pair A-Z Q's are intercorrelated, it is found that ratings on the separate A and Z traits are by no means independent of each other. For example, an individual who is rated as submissive also tends to be rated as dependent on authority, fearful and timid, and lacking in initiative. The intercorrelations between the individual trait-pair A-Z Q's give coefficients which range from $+.65$ between ascendance-submission and belligerency-fear to $+.37$ between initiative-no-initiative and belligerency-fear. Keeping in mind both the fact that the A-Z₄ Q's have a higher correlation with the SQ's than do any of the individual trait-pairs, and that ratings on these trait-pairs are strongly interrelated, it would seem probable that the four trait-pairs are merely manifestations in behavior of a more basic temperamental organization. The possibility must also be considered that this temperamental disposition is expressed *only in part* by the four trait-pairs studied and not adequately represented by any *one* of them.

Age and the Smiledness-Behavior Correlation. If the 82 subjects are divided into two groups consisting of 16 children under 14 and 66 adolescents and adults, 14 or more years of age, the effects of the age groupings on the degree of correlation of the SQ's and A-Z₄ Q's can be determined.

Only 16 right-handed children were studied, and, as these children were primarily aggressive behavior problems and therefore largely of the A behavior type, it was not possible to substantiate fully the findings of the 1937 study regarding the relation of age to the handedness-smiledness and A-Z patterns. However, the r between SQ's and A-Z₄ Q's for these 16 children proves to be only $+.39$ with a PE of $\pm .13$, whereas the same correlation with the 66 adolescent-adults gives an r of $+.69$ with a PE of $\pm .04$. The r of $+.60$ obtained for the total group of 82 subjects represents, as it did in the 1937 study, a compromise correlation resulting from a mixture of the two age groups.

Between the age groups of 4-13 years and 14-57 years, inclusive, there is only a slight and non-significant decrease in the average value of the smiledness quotients. Therefore, the lower correlations of smiledness and behavior (+.39) occurring among the children of this study cannot be dependent on any age change of smiledness and must be determined by behavior deviations. That this is the case can be seen from Table 2,²² where there is a con-

TABLE 2

AVERAGE SMILEDNESS QUOTIENTS AND A-Z BEHAVIOR QUOTIENTS FOR AGE AND
HANDEDNESS-SMILEDNESS GROUPS

82 Right-Handed Patients

1938-39 Psychiatric Institute Study

HAND-SMILE DOMINANCE	16 CHILDREN 4 TO 13 YEARS OF AGE			66 ADOLESCENT-ADULTS 14 TO 57 YEARS OF AGE			AGE CHANGES IN AVERAGE A-Z Q's
	NO CASES	AVERAGE SQ	AVERAGE A-Z Q	NO CASES	AVERAGE SQ	AVERAGE A-Z Q	
Homolaterals (SQ + 1.00 to +.01)	8	+.31	+ .37	35	+ .24	+ .15	.22 decrease
Ambilaterals (SQ .00)	1	.00	+.06	2	.00	.00	.06 decrease
Contralaterals (SQ - 1.00 to -.01)	7	-.33	-.01	29	-.29	-.15	.14 increase

spicuous absence of a well-defined Z pattern (-.01) among the contralateral children, in contrast to the strongly developed A pattern (+.37) found among the homolateral children. The degree of development of the Z pattern of adjustment (-.15) among the contralaterals becomes just as great as that of the A pattern (+.15) among the homolaterals during the adolescent-adult period. This, in general, is a confirmation of the findings of the last study, namely, that, *among the contralateral subjects, the Z mode of adjustment has been found to develop little if any in childhood and strongly in the adolescent-adult period. In contrast, among the homolaterals, we find the A mode of adaptation developing more rapidly and fully in childhood.*

²² Compare Table 2 with Table 1

By themselves, the foregoing figures, based on only 16 abnormal children, would mean little. They are of some significance, however, insofar as they substantiate and compare with the findings among the 42 normal children of the 1937 study.

Sex and Intelligence. This study confirms the findings of the 1937 study in showing no significant correlation between sex and smiledness or A-Z Q's. Likewise, intelligence bears no significant relation to smiledness or behavior ratings.²³

Emotional Responsiveness. The question as to the strength of emotional responsiveness or affectivity was rated on only 33, or half of the adults, and was not rated on any of the children. When high-low affectivity quotients are derived from the ratings on each of these 33 subjects in a manner similar to the derivation of the A-Z Q's (that is, high minus low affectivity ratings divided by the total number of possible ratings) and these quotients are correlated with the SQ's for the same subjects, an r of $+.40$ with a PE of $\pm .10$ is obtained. That is, on the 33 right-handed subjects rated, high affectivity tends to be associated with right-smiledness and ratings on low affectivity or emotional responsiveness are associated with left-smiledness. The correlation of these affectivity quotients with the A-Z₄ Q's on the same individual is $+.55$ with a PE of $\pm .08$. Therefore, it would seem that there is a fairly definite relationship between ratings on high and low affectivity and the A and Z traits respectively. Although these correlations on so few subjects are not by themselves of much significance, they may be considered of some importance when supported by other data which follow.

The ratings from the nurses are only one possible way of determining the strength of the emotional responsiveness of the subjects. It would seem conceivable that the strength of the affectivity might also be partly represented by the total amount of smiling under the standard test situation. As the facial cinérecorder has photographed in a uniform manner each subject's facial reactions during the three-minute test period, and as all smiles have been graphed and measured, it has been possible to measure accurately the total distance traveled by the mouth corners during the upward motion of all smiles recorded during that period.

²³ The intelligence ratings of 52 per cent of the subjects were obtained from psychometric examinations. The remainder were obtained from the ratings in the standard psychiatric mental status examinations.

When the high and low affectivity quotients on the 33 subjects rated on affectivity are correlated with the total upward distance traveled, an r of $+.52$ with a PE of $\pm .09$ is obtained. Thus, it would seem that the affectivity ratings are definitely related to the total amount of smiling. When the total upward distances traveled during smiling are correlated with the SQ's on *all* subjects, an r of $+.33$ with a PE of $\pm .07$ is obtained. The r of the total smiling measurements with the A-Z₁ Q's is found to be $+.21$ with a PE of $\pm .07$. These coefficients, by themselves, are scarcely significant. However, when considered in relation to the coefficients on the affectivity ratings, they are at least suggestive. In general, it may be stated that there is a tendency for the right-handed, right-smiled subjects to have higher affectivity and greater emotional responsiveness than the right-handed, left-smiled subjects, as indicated both by the affectivity ratings from the nurses (on only 33 adults) and by the total amount of upward motion of the mouth corners during smiling in a standard situation (on all cases studied).²⁴ (See Table 3.)²⁵ A plausible explanation for the association of

TABLE 3

AVERAGE TOTAL SMILING DISTANCES (TSD) AND AFFECTIVITY QUOTIENTS FOR THE HANDEDNESS-SMILEDNESS GROUPS

HAND-SMILE DOMINANCE	AVERAGE TSD IN MMS.	No. CASES	AVERAGE AFFECTIVITY QUOTIENTS	No. CASES
Homolaterals (SQ $+1.00$ to $+ .01$)	66.9	41	$+.28$	17
Ambilaterals (SQ $.00$)	43.8	3	$-.20$	1
Contralaterals (SQ -1.00 to $-.01$)	43	34	$-.04$	15
Total Average	55.6	78	$+.12$	33

²⁴ Three other measures relating to smiling were also found to correlate moderately or slightly with the smiledness quotients. These were (1) the average rate of motion of the two mouth corners, (2) the number of smiles during the standard test period, and (3) the average upward distance traveled by the mouth corners per smile. It is to be noted that the measure studied (the total amount of upward motion of the mouth corners during the test period) is a combination of the second and third smile measures. These smile factors also partially explain the quantitative differences in the initial millimeter lead noted in footnote 16.

²⁵ As the measurements from the projections of the cinematographic records were exactly double the same measurements on the subject's face, the TSD's are twice as great as the *actual* smiling distances.

the amount of affectivity with the SQ's is that both the form of involuntary smiledness and the level of emotional responsiveness have a common neurological determination, which is further expressed in the basic temperamental differences of the A and Z reaction patterns.

Diagnoses in Relation to Behavior Ratings and Smiledness. Most of the children of this study had been diagnosed as "primary behavior disorders," and hospitalized because of their asocial beligerency and aggressiveness. Therefore, this particular diagnostic group offers an opportunity to validate the A-Z rating scale directly. The A-Z₄ Q's of the 11 children diagnosed simply as primary behavior problems ranged between $+.06$ and $+.88$, with an average of $+.45$. The average SQ for this same group of children was found to be $+.24$. These figures may be compared with those for the total group of 16 children, where an average A-Z₄ Q of $+.18$ was found, along with an average SQ of $+.01$.

Among the adults there is no association whatever between the main diagnostic groups and the A and Z behavior ratings. With regard to smiledness, the average SQ of the neurotics was $+.05$. The schizophrenics alone showed a tendency to deviate slightly toward left-facedness with an average SQ of $-.13$.²⁶ In general, it would seem that psychiatric patients can be considered as relatively equivalent to normal subjects with respect to the relation between A and Z behavior and smiledness.

Left-handed Subjects. Unfortunately, there were only seven left-handed subjects among all the cases studied. These formed too small a group to be considered statistically. However, insofar as any general tendencies can be determined from so small a group, it would seem that the left-handed, left-smiled (homolateral) subjects tend to be rated more often as possessing the A behavior pattern, while the subjects with contralateral hand-smile dominance (left-handed with right-smiledness) are rated more often as possessing Z behavior traits. This meager evidence is substantiated by the findings of the 1937 study.

The connection of handedness to smiledness and A-Z reaction types is a most important one. It is, however, very difficult to get a sufficiently large number of natively left-handed subjects in any

²⁶ It was also found that the affectivity quotients and the average total smiling distances of the schizophrenics are decidedly lower than those of any other diagnostic group

fairly well-organized group who have not had their laterality complicated by efforts to retrain their handedness. Many more untrained natively left-handed subjects must be studied before anything more definite than a tendency can be noted on this point.

Smiledness, Footedness, and Eyedness. As we are dealing with a laterality problem, it was thought desirable to consider the relationship to smiledness and behavior of other laterality items than handedness.

Foot dominance was ascertained for each subject by means of standard performance tests. Ninety-five of the 100 right- and left-handed subjects tested had the same footedness as handedness, four had mixed or indeterminate footedness, and only one individual was definitely crossed or contralateral in his hand-foot dominance relationship. Thus, foot dominance, in most instances, is identical with hand dominance.

A moderate positive association was found between eye and smile laterality expressed by an approximate r of $+.43$ with a PE of $\pm .07$. However, as similar data in the 1937 study gave no significant correlation whatsoever, the positive findings of the present investigation cannot as yet be accepted without many reservations. There is no appreciable difference between the smiledness-behavior correlations of the subjects with homolateral and the subjects with contralateral smile-eye dominance. This would apparently indicate that eyedness bears no direct relationship to the correlations between smiledness and the behavior patterns.

Subjective Judgments of Smiledness. The subjects of the 1937 study were selected on the basis of the unanimous agreement of three independent observers regarding the presence of definite right or left involuntary smiledness. The criterion of the laterality was the observable relative decrease in the lengths of the two "eye-mouth lines" during involuntary smiling. As an index of smiledness in the 1938-39 study, the SQ's have been used. These are derived from actual measurements from cinematographic records and take into consideration only the *initial* phase of the smile. These measurements have already been ascertained to have a technical reliability indicated by an r of $+.98$.

In order to determine the relationship between these two methods of judging facial laterality, the three examiners in the present study independently observed and recorded the facedness of each of the subjects during the initial test period. When the subjective judg-

ments of smiledness on those subjects whom all three observers agreed to be definitely right- or left-smiled are correlated with the plus and minus SQ's on the same subjects, an r_{op} of $+.77$ with a PE of $\pm .05$ is obtained. This coefficient indicates the approximate reliability of the subjective method in terms of the objective method. It also indicates the relationship between the subjective method (based on relative changes in the lengths of the eye-mouth line) and the objective method (in which the measurements were derived from the initial phase of the smile alone). The $+.77$ coefficient would indicate that the subjective method is sufficiently reliable for selecting groups of cases of *extreme* smiledness, as was done in the 1937 study. This reliability, in view of the findings of the present study, could probably be increased by instructing the observers to concentrate their attention on the laterality differences in the initial phase of the smile rather than on the total changes in the length of the eye-mouth lines.

DISCUSSION OF A AND Z PATTERNS

An intensive analysis was conducted on the relative growth and character of the individual A and Z traits, both in the 1937 and 1938-39 studies. A comparison was made between the rated frequency of occurrence of the various traits in the childhood and the adolescent-adult groups. This investigation brought to light certain fundamental developmental sequences and tendencies which help to clarify and redefine the nature of the A and Z behavior patterns as a whole. The following tabular outline summarizes briefly certain of the facts and inferences gained from this analysis.

A MODE OF ADJUSTMENT

1. *Prevailing form of hand-smile laterality.*

Characterizes individuals with *homo-lateral* hand-smile dominance.

2. *Predominant and subordinate motives of most goal responses inferred from the A and Z behavior patterns:*

Predominant motive: the expression and realization in thought and action of drives and potential capacities (capacity realization).

Subordinate motive: the achievement of self-preservation and security.

Z MODE OF ADJUSTMENT

Characterizes individuals with *contra-lateral* hand-smile dominance.

Predominant motive: the achievement of self-preservation and security from actual or potential dangers.

Subordinate motive: a minimum of self-expression and capacity realization through authority-sanctioned avenues, safe hobbies and sports, etc.

A MODE OF ADJUSTMENT

Z MODE OF ADJUSTMENT

3. *Predominant modes of achieving goals*

Through the independent development of techniques for mastering and controlling the physical and social environment, even in the face of frustration and opposition.

Through (a) conformity to social conventions, (b) the avoidance of potentially dangerous physical and social situations, and (c) dependence on authority for security and for initiation, guidance, and support.

4. *Prevailing mode of interaction with environment*^{*}

Predominantly *acts* on environment.

Predominantly *acted on* by environment

5. *Attitude toward environment*^{*}

Tendency to evaluate a *minimum* number of environmental situations as potentially dangerous

Tendency to evaluate a *maximum* number of environmental situations as potentially dangerous.

6. *Usual threshold of frustration*:

Evaluations and performances *highly resistant* to disruption by external physical and social influences

Marked vulnerability of evaluations and performances to disruption by external physical and social influences.

7. *Period of greatest development*

Childhood (4-13 years).

Adolescent-adulthood (14 or more years).

8. *Prevailing form of subcortical-cortical motor interaction* ²⁷

a. Anatomical integration as inferred from form of smile-hand laterality:

Homolateral *few*-neuroned direct and strong subcortical excitatory reinforcement of dominant motor cortex.

Contralateral *many*-neuroned indirect and weak subcortical excitatory reinforcement of dominant motor cortex.

b. Functional integration as inferred from character and developmental sequence of A and Z traits:

Early development of maximum determination of goal responses and evaluations by strong subcortical (emotional) drives

Later development of maximum cortical inhibition and control of subcortical drives

Minimum cortical inhibition of subcortical drives.

Minimum subcortical (emotional) initiation and reinforcement of cortical adaptive patterns

²⁷ Possible neural mechanisms which may chiefly determine the correlation of the A and Z behavior patterns with both age and the prevailing form of hand-smile relation were discussed before the combined meeting of the New York Neurological Society and the Section of Neurology and Psychiatry of the New York Academy of Medicine, November 11, 1941. Abstracts of this discussion are published in *J. nerv. ment. Dis.*, 1942, 95, 481-489, and *Arch. Neurol. Psychiat.*, Chicago, 1942, 47, 1060-1065.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Purpose

The present investigation has aimed to retest the validity of the findings of the earlier 1937 study of hand-smile laterality in relation to behavior by the use of well-controlled objective and quantitative procedures. It has, moreover, attempted to determine whether the hand-smile dominance and behavior correlations extended to the intergrade group distributed between the two extreme hand-smiledness groups as well as to the subjects with well-defined homolateral and contralateral hand-smile relations.

Methods

The subjects of this investigation consisted of all of the cooperative patients at the New York Psychiatric Institute, New York City. These patients had their general behavior tendencies rated by means of a questionnaire on which each nurse indicated those patients under her supervision who showed certain of the so-called A and Z behavior traits to a *marked* degree. The four A *vs.* Z trait-pairs selected for analysis were: (1) *ascendant or aggressive vs. submissive or retiring*, (2) *belligerency and anger vs. fear and timidity*, (3) *independence of authority vs. dependence on authority*, and (4) *initiative vs. no initiative*. An A-Z behavior quotient (the A-Z₄ Q) was obtained as an index of the degree to which a subject possessed these contrasting patterns of traits. A fifth trait on *high and low affectivity or emotional responsiveness* was also rated by the nurses. The agreement of the individual raters among themselves on the A-Z behavior questionnaire is expressed by a coefficient of reliability of $+.75$ with a PE of $\pm.04$.

In order to measure smiledness more objectively, an apparatus, the facial cinérecorder, was devised and constructed. By the use of this apparatus, facial expression was simultaneously stimulated by a Walt Disney cartoon and recorded by a concealed motion-picture camera in a standard manner. The film records were then subjected to an objective analysis, the paths of motion of the corners of the mouth traced off and measured, and a numerical index of smile laterality, the smiledness quotient (SQ), was obtained. This method of measuring smiledness was found to have a technical reliability of $+.98$.

Handedness, footedness, and eyedness were tested for each subject by means of standard performance tests.

*Materials and Methods of the 1937 Study Compared with Those of the 1938-39 Investigation**1937 Study*

1. 84 normals used as subjects.
2. Study limited to 84 (out of 398) normal subjects who exhibited well-defined or extreme right or left involuntary smile laterality in so marked a degree as to allocate them at opposite extremes of a distribution curve.
3. The study includes both right- and left-handed subjects (71 right-handed and 13 left-handed).
4. Fifteen A-Z trait-pairs studied.

Aggressive *vs.* Retiring (socially)
 Dominating *vs.* Subservient
 Fight reaction *vs.* Flight reaction
 Independent of authority *vs.* Dependent on authority
 Initiative *vs.* No initiative
 Self-confident *vs.* Shy (socially).
 Courageous *vs.* Timid (physically)
 Hard to mold *vs.* Easy to mold
 Prefers new and unfamiliar *vs.* Prefers old and familiar
 Quick *vs.* Slow reaction
 Adventurous *vs.* Cautious (physically)
 Individual orientations *vs.* Conventional orientations
 Creative *vs.* Imitative.
 Secure *vs.* Insecure (socially).
 Leader *vs.* Follower

5. Prevailing behavior and personality traits determined by judges' ratings of camp counselors' spontaneous descriptions of subject.
6. Kinds (right and left) of involuntary smiledness determined by unanimous agreement of three independent observers.
7. Because of the qualitative nature of the classes of data, it was necessary to use the Pearson mean square contingency method in connection with the formula for transforming values of *C* to an approximate *r*

1938-39 Study

82 psychotic and neurotic patients used as subjects.

Study includes all cooperative patients. Among these the frequency of measured degrees of involuntary smile laterality approximates a "normal" distribution, with most subjects exhibiting on even, slightly right or slightly left smiledness.

The main results of the study are based on right-handed subjects alone.

Only four A-Z behavior trait-pairs studied:

Ascendant or aggressive *vs.* Submissive or retiring.
 Belligerency and anger *vs.* Fear and timidity.
 Independent of authority *vs.* Dependent on authority.
 Initiative *vs.* No initiative.

Objective questionnaire rated by nurses on prevailing behavior of patients.

Degrees of smiledness measured from motion-picture records.

Because of the quantitative nature of the data, it was possible to use the more reliable product-moment method of correlation.

Main Findings of the 1937 Study Compared with Findings of the 1938-39 Investigation

Bearing in mind these differences in materials and methods, the main results of the two studies may be tabulated and compared as follows:

1937 Study

1. Stability of Involuntary Smiledness:

Over a period of 3-5 weeks, normal subjects with well-defined or extreme smiledness maintained almost complete *qualitative* (right or left) stability or consistency in laterality. $r_{ap} = +.98$

Well-defined smiledness is equally stable among children and adults

2. Reliability of Behavior Ratings.

The agreement between the counselors in their descriptions of the behavior reactions of the subjects was found to be $r_{ap} = +.81$ with a PE of $\pm .01$.

The degree of agreement between the two judges' ratings of the counselors' sketches was $r = +.99$. The coefficient of reliability between the ratings of two control judges and those of the regular judges was $+ .95$.

3. Handedness and Smiledness:

There is no significant correlation between kind of handedness and kind of smiledness. The two forms of laterality function as independent variables

4. Hand-Smile Laterality and the Prevailing Form of Behavior and Personality

Among the 71 right-handed and 13 left-handed normals of all ages, the kind of homolateral and contralateral hand-smile relation shows a strong correlation with the A and Z response patterns respectively ($r_{ap} = +.76$, PE $\pm .03$)

Among the 42 *adolescents and adults*, homolaterality and contralaterality show a strong correlation with the A and Z modes of adjustment respectively ($r_{ap} = +.91$, PE $\pm .02$).

1938-39 Study

Over periods of 3 minutes and 3 weeks, patients show a *quantitative* stability in smiledness represented by reliability coefficients of $+ .61$ and $+ .60$ with PE's of $\pm .05$ and $\pm .10$, respectively. There are no *qualitative* shifts between the extreme right- and left-smiledness groups.

Smile laterality shows the same stability among children and adults.

Reliability of the raters determined by the split-half method. $r = +.75$, PE = $\pm .04$

A similar lack of correlation between handedness and the kind or degree of smiledness.

Among the 82 right-handed patients of all ages, degrees of right and left smile laterality (SQ's) show a substantial correlation with the degrees of A or Z behavior (A-Z₄ Q's) as represented by an r of $+ .60$, with a PE of $\pm .05$.

Among the 66 right-handed *adolescents and adults*, the SQ's correlate with the A-Z₄ Q's to give an r of $+ .69$ with a PE of $\pm .04$.

1937 Study

Among the 42 *children*, homolaterality and contralaterality show a moderate correlation with the A and Z modes of adjustment respectively ($r_{ap} = +.53$, PE $\pm .08$).

1938-1939 Study

Among the 16 *children*, degrees of homolaterality and contralaterality (SQ's) show only a moderate correlation with the prevailing mode of A or Z behavior (A-Z₄ Q's) ($r = +.39$ with a PE of $\pm .13$).

5. Relative Development of Prevailing Mode of Adaptation in Childhood and Adolescent-Adulthood:

Among the 49 *well-defined homolaterals*, the A mode of behavior is strongly predominant over Z behavior in both children and adults.

Average A-Z₁₅ Q for 24 children = $+.44$.

Average A-Z₁₆ Q for 25 adults = $+.60$.

Among the 35 *well-defined contralaterals*, the Z mode of adjustment is only moderately predominant in childhood, but shows a marked increase in development after the age of 14 years.

Average A-Z₁₅ Q for 18 children = $-.20$.

Average A-Z₁₆ Q for 17 adults = $-.46$.

Among the 43 right-handed *homolaterals*, the A mode of behavior is well developed in both children and adults.

Average A-Z₄ Q for 8 children = $+.37$ (primarily aggressive behavior problems).

Average A-Z₄ Q for 35 adolescents and adults = $+.15$.

Among the 37 right-handed *contralaterals*, the Z behavior trait-ratings are not definitely predominant over the A trait-ratings until after the age of 14 years.

Average A-Z₄ Q for 8 children = $-.01$.

Average A-Z₄ Q for 29 adults = $-.15$.

6. Emotional Responsiveness or Affectivity and Hand-Smile Laterality:

An analysis of the individual A and Z traits leads to the inference that well-defined *homolaterals* tend to show a maximum determination of goal responses by strong "subcortical" emotional drives; while well-defined *contralaterals* appear to develop a maximum of cortical inhibition of emotional drives.

Homolaterals tend to be rated as having "quick reactions"

Contralaterals tend to be rated as having "slow reactions."

7. Eyedness and Smiledness:

No association was found between eye and smile laterality.

Same inferences as in 1937 study.

Homolaterality and contralaterality are moderately related to ratings on high and low emotional responsiveness respectively ($r = +.40$, PE $\pm .10$), and to the measured amount of smiling activity during the 3-minute test period ($r = +.33$, PE $\pm .07$).

A moderate positive association was found between eye and smile laterality ($r_{ap} = +.43$).

The 1938-39 study of 82 right-handed abnormal subjects has confirmed by means of quantitative and experimental methods the

main findings of the more subjective and qualitative 1937 study of 84 normal subjects, namely, that there is a definite relation between the *kind* of hand-smile laterality and the prevailing mode of so-called A or Z behavior. It also indicates that there is a definite correlation between *degrees* of involuntary smiledness and *degrees* of A-Z behavior quotients which extends not only to those subjects with extreme laterality in smiling but also to the intergrade group of even or near-even smiledness.

APPENDIX

A-Z PSYCHIATRIC QUESTIONNAIRE

Ward: Date:

Questions answered by:

Your position in the institution:

About how many patients in your ward do you believe that you could judge in regard to their *outstanding* personality characteristics?

The following pages contain questions which will guide you in selecting for our future study groups of patients who display particular traits of behavior and personality. Limit your choice of patients to *those few* who, in your judgment, display the trait defined in a *marked* degree. Please do not consult with others in answering the questions.

- I (a) Which patients constantly display a markedly ascendant or aggressive attitude towards other patients, attendants, or nurses?
- (b) Name those patients who constantly display a markedly submissive or retiring attitude towards other patients, attendants, or nurses.
- II (a) Name those patients who, although they have no physical disability, are *constantly* appealing to some member of the hospital personnel or any real or unreal authority for help, approval, or guidance.
- (b) Name those patients who do not "lean on" members of the hospital personnel or on any real or unreal authority, but remain emotionally self-sufficient and independent.
- III (a) Which patients display the most initiative, *i.e.*, often set and start themselves on new tasks deviating from customary routine?
- (b) Which patients display the greatest *lack* of initiative; continually have to be started on every new task or deviation from routine?
- IV (a) Which patients display the most timidity and fear?
- (b) Which patients display the most anger and belligerency?
- V (a) Name those patients who are well oriented for time, place, and person, and yet display a marked emotional poverty or apathy, manifested in lack of interests and lack of emotional responsiveness.
- (b) Which patients display the greatest affectivity and emotional drive, manifested in many strongly developed interests and strong emotional responses?

SHORT ARTICLES AND NOTES

ATTITUDES TOWARD ENEMY AND ALLIED COUNTRIES

BY RAYMOND G. KUHLEN

Syracuse University

IN a previous paper¹ the writer presented certain data regarding the changes in attitudes toward various countries during the course of what was then largely a European War. Since that time, Russia, Japan, the United States, and a number of other countries have become involved in the conflict. The present paper summarizes (a) ratings of various countries as to approval or disapproval, obtained about five months after the United States entered the war, and again about a year after our entry into the war, and (b) certain "free response" materials regarding attitudes toward our major allies and enemies. Certainly, the events of the past two years (the time since the last data published) would be expected to cause important shifts in international attitudes.

ATTITUDE CHANGES REVEALED BY RATINGS

Ratings of countries were obtained by means of a simple survey blank which listed forty different countries with directions asking the subjects to divide the nations into five classes (not necessarily an equal number in each class), rating in the highest class (Class A) the country or countries listed which they most approved, in the lowest class (Class E) those most disapproved, and using B, C, and D for those in between. Unfamiliar countries were to be rated X. The data previously published demonstrated the sensitivity of this device to attitude changes. About the first of May, 1942, five months after the United States entered the war, 156 students in elementary psychology at Syracuse University and 186 students in elementary educational psychology at Ohio State University,² were tested. A group reasonably comparable to the groups tested before our entry into the war (Ohio State students) and groups from a different section of the country were thus available for comparison and contrast. On December 2, 1942, another group of 140 Syracuse University students rated the countries.

The results were summarized by assigning quantitative values of +20, +10, 0, -10, -20 to ratings of A, B, C, D, and E, respectively, and by computing a mean index of attitude for each country. The sexes were not separated in the analysis. Table 1 contains the mean ratings for selected countries that seem of most interest. The four columns of ratings, when taken in pairs, offer possibility of three comparisons. Columns I and II provide data for Ohio State students indicating attitudes one year before our entry into the war and five months after. The changed status involved in becoming a belligerent power might be expected to cause pronounced

¹ Kühlen, R. G. Effect of war developments on attitude toward countries. This JOURNAL, 1941, 36, 423-427.

² The writer is indebted to Drs Ernst Thelin and Roland C. McKee for collecting the Syracuse University data, and to Dr. S. L. Pressey for the Ohio State University data.

TABLE I

MEANS OF STUDENT RATINGS INDICATING ATTITUDES OF APPROVAL OR DISAPPROVAL
TOWARD VARIOUS COUNTRIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE ENTRANCE
OF THE UNITED STATES INTO THE WAR

Positive values indicate favored countries; negative values, disapproved countries.*

	I OSU 11/25/40	II OSU 4/22/42	III SYR U 5/1/42	IV SYR U 12/2/42
Argentina	8.4	8.5	5.8	3.3
Australia	12.0	16.2	18.7	17.9
Brazil	7.2	10.0	10.6	10.0
Bulgaria	-0.8	0.6	-3.3	-2.8
Canada	15.3	17.7	18.1	18.1
China	6.3	12.8	14.4	17.4
Finland	15.7	10.0	5.3	8.0
France	6.2	2.9	1.9	4.6
Germany	-13.6	-13.7	-16.9	-17.7
Great Britain	14.0	11.6	13.9	15.7
Hungary	-0.4	1.8	-2.2	-1.6
Italy	-14.2	-12.4	-15.8	-15.6
Japan	-15.6	-15.7	-18.6	-18.7
Mexico	0.2	8.5	9.2	7.9
Netherlands	13.1	14.6	15.3	12.2
New Zealand	8.3	10.4	13.6	13.7
Philippines	12.5	16.6	16.7	15.6
Roumania	-2.6	0.1	-4.1	-3.1
Russia	-10.1	6.1	8.3	10.9
Spain	-4.9	0.3	-4.3	-4.3
United States	19.6	19.5	19.9	19.9
No. of Cases	414	186	156	140

* The statistical reliability of the differences in attitude from November, 1940, to April, 1942 (Ohio State students), toward Australia, Brazil, China, Finland, France, Great Britain, Italy, Mexico, Philippines, Russia, and Spain has been evaluated in terms of proportions of students indicating approval and disapproval and in terms of the differences between the mean attitude. Except in the cases of Italy and Great Britain, these shifts are highly reliable. Even these exceptions approach statistical reliability. In general, differences as large as 2.5 or 3 will represent CR's of at least 2, usually 3, or more.

changes in attitude. Columns II and III represent attitudes of midwestern students (Ohio State) and eastern students (Syracuse University) at about the same date, and thus might reveal sectional differences. Finally, Columns III and IV represent for comparable groups attitudes five months after our entry into the war, at a time when the press and radio carried news primarily of allied reverses, and attitudes almost a year after our entry, when the Allies had seized the initiative on a number of fronts, particularly in North Africa, and papers and radio carried news of allied successes all over the globe.

When data for November, 1940, are contrasted with those of April, 1942, rather striking changes in attitude are apparent. These are best seen in Columns I and II of Table I, where data from Ohio State University students are presented. These figures represent attitudes prevalent about a year before and five months after the

United States became involved in the war. Attitude toward our allies has improved. Greater approval was expressed in April, 1942, regarding Australia, the Philippines, New Zealand, Canada, and China. Great Britain is among the approved countries, but the fact that she is surpassed by seven other countries or national groups suggests that the students studied were not overly impressed with our foremost ally. Russia has improved from a position of being markedly disapproved to one of moderate approval. In view of the marked change in the case of Russia, detailed figures (in percentages) for that country at three different dates are given below:

	RATING					AVE RATING
	A	B	C	D	E	
December, 1939	2	2	10	21	65	-14.5
November, 1940	1	8	18	34	39	-10.1
April, 1942	24	33	28	5	5	+6.2

While the last row reveals a decided shift in attitudes, some students still indicated marked disapproval and others were unable to rate Russia better than a neutral C. It is clearly evident from these percentages that any single figure used to indicate attitude by no means tells the whole story. But lack of space prohibits such detailed presenting of all data.

Interestingly enough, little change is evident in attitude toward our enemies Italy, Germany, and Japan were about as heartily disliked a year before we got into the war as five months after our entrance. It is noteworthy that the Axis countries could be rated lower on this instrument, but were not. It is significant that even five months after our entrance into the war 9 per cent of all ratings assigned to the Axis powers (Germany, Italy, Japan) indicated approval of those countries, and an additional 8 per cent were neutral.³ If Pearl Harbor has affected our attitudes toward these countries to any really significant degree, the present instrument was not sensitive to that shift. It is interesting to examine also the position of our quasi-enemies. Finland, who is fighting side by side with Germany against our most successful ally, Russia, is rated higher than that ally—in fact more students rate Finland A than any other position. She has, however, dropped from a still higher position earlier. Roumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary are ignored with very neutral ratings, and France also has fallen into this group, evidencing a continuation of the steady decline in popularity shown since December, 1939.

The recent emphasis upon hemisphere solidarity and its attendant propaganda should make changes in attitude toward Central and South American countries especially interesting. Of the four countries included in the study, Brazil and Mexico have shown clear gains; little-heard-of Bolivia (not shown in the table) has gained but slightly; and Argentina, uncertain as she has been of her affections, has changed hardly at all.

When attention is directed to a comparison of the data in Columns II and III of the table from midwestern Ohio State students and from eastern Syracuse

³ These findings may raise the question of the validity of the responses. In this connection, it might be pointed out that students signed their names to the blanks, a fact which would seem to discourage factiousness of response. Further, samples of various populations, before and after our entry into the war, show similar results.

University students (unfortunately the data were obtained one week apart) one generalization seems warranted: Syracuse students disliked our enemies more and liked our allies better than did Ohio State students. Whether this represents sectional differences in sensitivity and responsiveness to the total war situation or is due to selective factors creating differences in the sample is, of course, not evident from the data.

Very little change is evident when the mean ratings for Syracuse University students in May, 1942, are compared with those of December, 1942. Though the change in the general outlook for the Allies has been considerable with the wide-scale offensives that had been successfully begun by the latter date, only slight changes are apparent in the data. While some of the differences are statistically reliable (see footnote to Table 1), their greater significance cannot be adequately determined until later follow-ups indicate whether they represent beginnings of trends. That reversals in trends may here be suggested is especially plausible in the case of France.

ATTITUDES REVEALED BY "FREE RESPONSE" MATERIALS

Data such as those just presented reveal interesting facts regarding attitudes, but also raise many questions which cannot be answered by the data themselves. In order to broaden the base of the study which has now been going on for three years the attempt was made at the last testing (December 2, 1942) to obtain qualitative data which might provide more revealing insights into the nature of the attitudes students hold toward various countries. Mimeographed booklets were prepared and students were asked to: "Describe briefly in the space below your attitude toward China. Also tell why you feel this way toward China"⁴ Such data were obtained regarding seven of the major belligerents. Anonymous responses were obtained from a total of 117 students, some of the blanks being filled out in class others outside of class. All respondents were elementary psychology students at Syracuse University.

The first step in the analysis of the data was to have two judges (graduate students) classify the statements regarding each of the countries as to whether they contained (a) exclusively favorable statements, (b) statements indicating both favorable and unfavorable attitudes, or (c) exclusively unfavorable statements. Some few statements that could not be so classified were thrown into an "Other" category. Where the judges disagreed, the writer determined into what category the statements best fit. The results of this classification, and the extent of agreement between the two judges, are contained in Table 2. Even though this is a somewhat subjective procedure, and others might classify the same statements in different categories, the results add decidedly to the information presented in the first part of this paper. In the earlier data, for example, Japan and Germany were rated rather close together. That Japan is very much more disliked than Germany is evidenced by the fact that 81 per cent of the statements regarding Japan, as contrasted with 45 per cent of those regarding Germany, contained exclusively unfavorable comments. Also many fewer statements regarding China contained unfavorable remarks than in the case of Great Britain, though the ratings previously described did not show great differentiation between these countries at this date. Decisiveness of attitude with respect to Japan and ambiguity in the case of Russia are suggested by the degree of agreement between the two judges in classifying

⁴ The same request was made at the top of each of the several pages in the booklet, though each page referred to a different country.

TABLE 2

PERCENTAGES OF 117 "FREE RESPONSE" STATEMENTS WHICH EXPRESSED EXCLUSIVELY FAVORABLE ATTITUDES, BOTH FAVORABLE AND UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDES, AND EXCLUSIVELY UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDES TOWARD OUR MAJOR ALLIES AND ENEMIES

COUNTRY	GENERAL ATTITUDE EXPRESSED				PERCENTAGE AGREEMENT ON RATINGS †
	FAVORABLE	FAVORABLE UNFAVORABLE	UNFAVORABLE	OTHER *	
China	86	13	0	1	86
France	29	50	14	8	85
Germany	0	54	45	1	89
Great Britain	60	32	8	1	84
Italy	1	46 *	50	3	86
Japan	1	15	81	3	94
Russia	38	54	2	7	77

* "Other" includes cases of no data, expressions of complete indifference or neutrality, and statements that could not be classified in other categories

† Two judges classified statements independently; these figures indicate extent of agreement between the two judges

the statements. That there are so many unfavorable comments made with regard to Russia, and also with regard to Great Britain, implies a situation not exactly conducive to best peace efforts at the close of the war, though the fact that many students can say nice things about Germany would seem to be a good omen for post-war planning. Obviously, of course, the situation with respect to attitudes may change markedly by the end of the war.

The above comments are based solely on the data presented in Table 2; the picture is much more significant if the actual statements are examined. In order to provide this broader and more qualitative picture in brief space, certain words used by the respondents in describing the several countries and their attitudes toward these countries have been brought together in "thumbnail" summaries of the 117 statements. The eight or ten most frequently used words describing countries have been listed in terms of frequency of use, those most frequently used appearing early in the series. Though space prohibits the inclusion of all descriptive words used, with their many connotations, these few indicate quite well the tenor of the more complete list. The frequency with which words such as "hate," "pity," "feel sorry for," were used to describe attitudes toward the several countries was also ascertained. The following summaries, then, are based essentially on frequency counts of certain "value" words the subjects used. Where the writer's impressions regarding attitudes expressed are included in the summaries, they had been recorded during or immediately after reading the 117 statements regarding a country.

Great Britain The subjects described Great Britain as *courageous, great, selfish, good, imperialistic, democratic, domineering, fine, persistent*. Most students expressed admiration and liking for her, but there was considerable evidence of mistrust and questioning of her motives, "her desires for glory and credit while others do the work." Her "self-centered, selfish egotism" was pointed to even by some who admired her. "Slightly less than favor-

able" is the way one student described his attitude. "Rather eccentric in practicing what she preaches," said another. Many pointed out the similarity between Britain and the United States in government and culture as reasons for liking her.

Russia Russia was described by such terms as *courageous, strong, wonderful, valiant, Communistic, brave, determined, looking out for self*. Admiration and distrust were the two most frequently mentioned attitudes. Some conflict and uncertainty as to attitude were evident, many indicating that they had once disliked her, now were favorably inclined, but uncertain as to what their attitude would be after the war. Practically all admired her spunk and courage; many disliked her form of government; all were glad she is on our side.

China "Courageous" was the word most frequently used with respect to China. Other terms used were *wonderful, brave, valiant, loyal, persevering, endurance, underdog, fine, backward*. Favorable attitudes of admiration and liking were most frequently expressed, fewer unfavorable remarks (in fact, very seldom did any appear) were made than with respect to any other country. Feelings of sympathy, sorrow, and pity were, however, frequently mentioned. Great admiration was expressed for her courage and stamina; a number feel she has a great future.

France Attitudes toward none of the six other nations studied were as conflicting, as varied, and uncertain as in the case of France. She was described as *courageous, weak, gives up too easily, good, disunited, wonderful, gay, romantic*. "Sympathy" was the word most frequently used to express attitudes. Many pitied and felt sorry for her. Many also liked and admired her. Feelings ranged from "mild hate" and contempt to admiration. Some admired her for her "spirit"; others disliked her for her lack of spirit—this is typical of the inconsistency and confusion. A number indicated that their attitudes were becoming more favorable since the French fleet had been scuttled, and believed that France will rise again. A distinction is frequently made between the French people, the "corrupt government," the Free French.

Germany This country is described as *cruel, militaristic, ruthless, brutal, unscrupulous, scientific, aggressive, misled, barbarous, inhumane*. A very clear distinction was made between the German people and the government. Admiration was expressed for the culture, science, intelligence of the people. Pity and "feel sorry for" were most frequently used with respect to the people, dislike and hate were the most frequent terms used with respect to the government or when reference was made just to Germany. Some felt that their feelings were so obvious that comment was superfluous.

Italy More feelings of contempt and scorn were expressed with respect to Italy than any of the six other countries. She was described as *weak, cowardly, a puppet, a stooge, easily influenced, untrustworthy, Fascistic, poor, peace-loving*. "Italy doesn't count!" was the only comment made by one student. Many expressed dislike of Fascism, though fairly clear distinction was made between leaders and government on one hand and the people on the other. "Dislike" and "hate" were frequently used to describe attitudes toward the government or the country generally, though "contempt," "scorn," "no respect" were also used frequently. Sympathy, sorrow, pity were frequently expressed regarding the people.

Japan None of the other six countries was so thoroughly hated by this student group as was Japan. She was described as *treacherous, sneaky, sly, cruel, untrustworthy, ruthless, underhanded, deceitful, unscrupulous*. "Hate," made more emphatic by such modifiers as "uncontrollable" and "intense," was the word most frequently used to describe attitudes toward Japan. The term "bitter" appeared several times in this group of statements but not in those regarding other countries. In the entire 117 statements only a few favorable things about the Japanese culture or people were mentioned. Some students apparently felt very restrained by convention and made such comments as "Afraid people would wince at my language," "Must use nice language," "Can't say things bad enough against Japan." Two characteristics of the attitudes toward Japan were evident in the statements. First is the deep-seated and long-established nature of the attitudes expressed. "As long as I can remember I've felt this way," said one student who seemed typical of many. Second, little distinction is made between the Japanese people and the Japanese government. In the case of all the other enemy nations this distinction was clearly apparent. These students simply hate Japan and all that it stands for.

DISCUSSION

The free-response data just discussed indicate clearly the multi-dimensionality of international attitudes and emphasizes the inadequacy of any single device, such as the rating presented in a previous paper and in the first portion of this paper, to describe the attitudes that do exist. While such ratings are useful as quantitative indicators of certain over-all judgments and are a desirable aspect of a study of attitudes, every additional analysis of further data has broadened and made more meaningful the total picture. The adjectives and other descriptive terms used in describing countries suggest national stereotypes that exist in the thinking of people. The terms they use in describing their own attitude—hate, contempt, pity, admire—add connotations that the numerical ratings ignored. Even the classifying of attitude statements into rough categories as favorable, unfavorable, or both is an instructive procedure. In brief, a variety of methods of data collecting and several methods of analyzing the data would seem recommended in attitude study. Especially not to be neglected is the "free response" approach. Counting of emotionally toned words used and other types of "value analysis" can make such material at least semi-quantitative.

The multiple bases upon which attitudes rest is a second point emphasized by free-response materials described in this paper. Space does not permit an analysis of the reasons students give for thinking as they do. Many frankly recognized the effect of propaganda, some suggest trivial causes (stereotyped responses), and others arrive at a judgment as the result of deliberate weighing of a mass of evidence. Many cannot arrive at a single judgment but express many, even conflicting, opinions with the varied reasons involved.

SUMMARY

In a previous paper, changes in attitudes toward various countries, as measured by a simple rating technique, were reported. Testing had been done at five times, each date following a major development in the war. The present article reports similar data obtained from 186 Ohio State students and 156 Syracuse University students, five months after the United States entered the war and from 140 Syracuse University students about a year after our entry into the war. There seems to have been an increase in favorable attitude toward our allies, with Russia being moderately approved now instead of markedly disapproved, as earlier, and China showing a marked gain. The ratings revealed no greater disapproval of the Axis partners apparent in April, 1942, five months after Pearl Harbor, and the entrance of the United States into the war, than in November, 1940, one year before our entrance. Eastern Syracuse students appear to disapprove of our enemies to a greater degree and approve of our allies more than do the midwestern Ohio State students. Our "quasi-enemies" (such as Hungary, Roumania, and Bulgaria) are rated near the neutral point, and Finland is moderately well liked. Only slight changes occurred in mean ratings between May, 1942, and December, 1942. "Free response" statements obtained from 117 Syracuse students proved valuable in describing qualitatively the attitudes that exist and in revealing differences obscured by the over-all ratings approach.

THERAPY IN GUIDANCE CLINICS

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IN recent years there has been an increasing element of unity in the practice of therapy in the child guidance field. Treatment of the child and the parent, whether carried on in the child guidance clinic, by the school psychologist, by the visiting teacher, or by the case worker in child welfare, is likely to be carried on in certain rather well-defined ways and in pursuance of certain general principles. Furthermore, we are for the first time beginning to see the development of psychological research concerned with therapy, and this is a most fortunate sign for the future. It is as we examine therapeutic procedures with the tools of critical research that we can build on those elements which are proven to be sound and discard those which are shown to be unnecessary. The purpose of this paper is to picture some of the more important characteristics of present-day therapy as it is practiced in child guidance, and to indicate some of the significant psychological research in this field.

The basic principle which represents the core of all therapy with children and their parents is that we can help individuals only by promoting growth. There is no doubt that we are placing much more reliance upon the individual drive toward growth and maturity and adjustment than was formerly the case. The aim of therapy is not to change the individual in ways which we approve, but to release the normal processes of growth. More and more frequently in writings about therapy we find this view expressed, that therapy is aimed toward more independent, more responsible growth on the part of the client, that it is a way of helping the individual to help himself. Such a viewpoint is built on the conviction that the resources of the individual for change and adjustment are far greater than the puny influences which we can bring to bear upon him. Our work becomes that of releasing constructive forces already present rather than the much more hopeless task of marshaling pressures which will bring about change.

One of the outcomes of this fundamental purpose is the increasing agreement among professional workers that the client is the one who is ultimately responsible for his own destiny, and that both parent and child have a very basic right to select their own solutions to their problems, whether or not these correspond to the aims and wishes of the therapist. The era of the reforming impulse is almost over in the child guidance field, and we are seeing instead the development of professional skills in the offering of assistance. Even the rather unfortunate word "guidance," which seems to imply the direction of the life of another, is coming to have new and less coercive connotations.

This change in emphasis—and it is a change, as will be evident from examining records of ten or fifteen years ago from any clinic—does not mean that workers no longer recognize social norms of behavior, or that they are becoming namby-pamby in dealing with behavioral maladjustments. It is based on a recognition that social behavior originates in a genuine desire to be social, that mature behavior grows out of the desire to be grown up, that affectionate behavior can come only from feelings of affection. We cannot *make* people social, or mature, or affectionate.

We can, however, help parent and child to see themselves more clearly, to explore their own purposes more deeply, and to make a more clear-cut conscious choice as to the direction they wish to take and the behavior which is in accord with their own deepest purposes. Even when society steps in and lays its restraining hand on delinquent or asocial behavior, it is still the aim of the clinician to respect the integrity of the individual. It is recognized that the responsibility for choice still exists within the framework of social compulsion, and that growth can come only through the making of choices.

We already have evidence that the viewpoint which the counselor takes on this important issue sharply influences the type of counseling technique he uses. Porter (7), in a study of psychologists carrying on counseling, found that those who tended to direct the client, who took upon themselves the responsibility for solving the client's problems, used techniques sharply different from the non-directive counselors. The directive group did most of the talking in the interview, tended to ask many specific questions, gave a great deal of information, frequently made suggestions, and often urged a certain course of action upon the client. Nondirective counselors, on the other hand, permitted the client to do most of the talking and used primarily those techniques which reflect the attitudes the client is expressing. These techniques will be discussed more fully in a later section.

We might summarize this first basic aspect of therapy by saying that it is based on a deep respect for the growth potentialities of the individual and a corresponding desire to respect his right to make responsible choices. This attitude is not a theoretical one, but has a profound effect upon the type of approach used by the therapist.

Another characteristic of modern child guidance procedures is the fresh emphasis which is placed upon catharsis. The value of "talking out," in the presence of an accepting person, all the defensive, repressed, and conflicted attitudes which are troubling the client, is recognized more than ever before. Our growing inventiveness in this area accounts for the whole development of the concept of play therapy, which is built on catharsis at the nonverbal level. As we direct our counseling procedures toward helping parent and child to release their feelings, we find that we are increasingly successful in doing so. Lewis (6), in a study of the intensive treatment of several cases, reported verbatim, found that 55 per cent of the client's conversation dealt with his own problems and the attitudes which were related to them. Royer (9), making a somewhat more detailed analysis of three counseling cases, arrives at a very similar finding, with approximately 50 per cent of the client's conversation falling within this definition. Clinicians are evidently becoming quite successful in developing those therapeutic techniques which enable the client freely to express his feelings.

Psychologists have gone further than this in their investigation of the values of catharsis. Baruch (2; 3) has not only given an excellent description of catharsis as it exists in play therapy, and the methods used to promote it, but also reports on the high degree of success in the readjustment of 23 maladjusted youngsters of preschool age. Bixler (4) has also made a suggestive study in this same field, on a smaller number of cases. Allen (1) pictures the way in which expression is encouraged through play therapy at the Philadelphia Child Guidance Clinic. Haggard (5) has attempted a laboratory study of experimentally induced anxiety and finds that catharsis is the most effective of three therapeutic procedures in reducing the disturbance which had been aroused.

If, then, it is characteristic of child guidance treatment that the worker refrains from imposing patterns or goals upon the client, and if the initial aim of therapy is

to promote the free expression of feeling, what is the role of the clinician? It seems clear, both from subjective descriptions given by psychologists and psychiatrists, and from more objective psychological researches, that the function of the therapist is to hold a mirror to the client's feelings. As the mother talks out her bitterness toward her son, criticizing, blaming, telling of his faults, the therapist does not argue, does not reproach her for these unmaternal attitudes, and does not agree with them. Instead the modern therapist recognizes and accepts these feelings as a part of the total situation, without blame, praise, or comment. The therapist may simply remark, "You feel your son is mostly bad," or, "You feel Johnny has a great many faults." The therapist who is working with the child adopts a similar attitude with the youngster, even though the attitudes may be diametrically opposed. As Johnny tells, directly through words, or indirectly through play, of his hostility toward his parents, the therapist recognizes his feelings. If he pounds a mother doll, and shows other signs of such hostility, the therapist may say, "Perhaps you would like to do that to your mother." Such a procedure is simple enough to describe, but exceedingly difficult for workers to put into practice, because it runs so deeply counter to our ordinary ways of behaving. It has several aims. In the first place, it continually brings into the client's consciousness the pattern of his own emotional attitudes, thus clarifying his picture of himself. Because it is completely noncritical, it does not arouse defensiveness or resistance and permits the client to view himself objectively. It enables the counselor to develop a satisfactory conversational relationship with the client, encouraging catharsis without intruding his own wishes, desires, or judgments.

Some of the research we have done at Ohio State University with phonographically recorded treatment interviews throws light on this process. Porter has shown, as mentioned before, that nondirective counselors use this technique of recognition of feeling more than any other type of response, contrasting most sharply in this respect with the directive counselors. Royer shows that 42 per cent of the nondirective therapist's responses are of this type, and another 9 per cent are simple acceptance—such responses as "I see," "M-hm," "I understand." These studies would indicate that more than half the time the therapist is introducing nothing new into the situation except clarification of the client's attitudes. Rogers (8) makes a detailed analysis of a number of phonographically recorded interviews, illustrating the way in which feeling is released, defensiveness is largely eliminated, and insight is encouraged, when the therapist sees his function as that of reflecting the client's emotionalized attitudes. Bixler has made the interesting experiment of conducting play therapy with six youngsters, limiting himself as completely as possible to this one type of response, simply clarifying the attitudes expressed. The results were very good in four cases, less satisfactory in two instances.

All of these studies indicate the trend which is clearly apparent in the child guidance field. The therapist is not trying to reform the parent or child. He is not trying to interpret the client to himself, an approach which often brings on resistance. He is not pouring out suggestions or advice. He is using procedures which reveal the client to himself, enabling him to see his own feelings clearly, without the defensive resistance which has always prevented this acceptance of himself. We find this approach typical of work both with the parent and with the child, and used in play therapy as well as in interviewing situations.

We turn now to another aspect of therapy which grows out of the steps thus far described. We find that this process of acceptance and catharsis leads to spontaneous and effective insight on the part of parent and child. Such insight is

not the "parrot" type of verbal insight in which the individual has learned some verbal pattern to apply to himself, but it is genuine self-understanding, couched in the individual's own terms. The fact that this does come about spontaneously and is not forced by the therapist is shown in Royer's study of counseling interviews. She found that interpretation by the counselor was almost nonexistent—constituting 3 per cent of the responses as compared with 42 per cent of responses which simply recognize or clarify feelings—but that insightful statements on the part of the client constituted from 10 to 25 per cent of the client responses in some interviews. This study helps to confirm the viewpoint that if the client is enabled to see himself clearly, and to accept his "bad" as well as his "good" impulses and feelings, self-understanding develops without the intervention of the therapist.

It has long been recognized that the development of insight was an essential part of any successful child guidance. The rejecting mother must come to realize both her own attitudes toward the child and the effect these have upon his behavior. The oversolicitous mother needs to realize how satisfying it has been to her to live her child's life for him. Still another parent needs to see how the feelings of inadequacy which the family and the school have built up in the child have resulted in violent and perhaps delinquent compensations. In the past, as records show, the attempt has often been made, mostly unsuccessfully, to *give* such parents the insight they need. At the present time it is recognized in child guidance work that both parent and child need to *develop* such understandings themselves, and that the therapist's skill is best devoted to the creation of conditions in which insight can easily grow. In the adolescent or adult these insights are likely to be put in verbal terms. In the child such insights may never be clearly verbalized, but may be evident only in the changed goals and actions which result.

These new goals, the self-initiated actions which result from insight, are the crowning characteristics of modern therapy. Obviously there is no point to undertaking therapeutic procedures with either parent or child unless out of these experiences the clients are able to reorganize their lives in ways which are more satisfying, more mature, more socialized. They must undertake a positive redirection of their lives. Does this actually take place?

Again two researches, as yet unpublished, indicate that positive actions and steps do grow out of the sort of therapy described. Lewis, in the study of adolescent girls previously mentioned, shows that after the girl understands a number of the relationships between herself and others, and between various aspects of her own behavior, new plans are made, and actions are redirected toward more socialized and satisfying goals. Royer's study also gives striking confirmation of this fact. In early therapeutic contacts the client responses which are concerned with discussing plans of action, or with making positive decisions, are almost nonexistent. In the later therapeutic contacts, however, there are a significant number of such plans and decisions, and a number of responses which tell of constructive actions already taken. Responses of this sort constitute approximately 7 per cent of the client's responses during the last half of the series of interviews. Therapy clearly has its conclusion in a fresh choice of goal direction and the implementation of that choice in appropriate action.

The points which have been covered touch upon the outstanding features of therapy as it is carried on at the present time. We might, however, miss one important fact which underlies the material given. These various elements, taken together, constitute a definite and predictable therapeutic process, which does not, to be sure, operate satisfactorily in every case, but which does show a high

degree of consistency from situation to situation. We are forced to realize that the field of child guidance effort has permanently left behind the opportunistic, well-intentioned attitude toward treatment which dealt with cases by intuition and has substituted a point of view in which a predictable process can be initiated by the therapist with either parent or child or both. The studies just mentioned, by Lewis and Royer, help to define in research terms the essential outlines of this process, while the books by Allen and Rogers describe it in more subjective terms. We may summarize these studies by saying that the skilled therapist now understands how to create a therapeutic relationship which will enable the client to embark on three major types of activity. First is the process of releasing pent-up feeling, the process of catharsis. This is followed by the development of self-understanding, of insight. Out of self-understanding comes the choice of more appropriate goals and the decisions and actions which lead toward those goals, the third step of self-initiated redirection.

Thus far the discussion has been kept on a somewhat abstract level, stressing some of the newer knowledge which we have gained about therapy. Let us take now the situation of Mrs. Jones and her son, coming to the modern child guidance clinic for help, and let us see how these characteristics of therapy express themselves in practical clinical procedure.

When Mrs. Jones arrives, the clinical worker does not take over responsibility for the situation. It is assumed that Mrs. Jones is coming because she feels some need for help, but it is also recognized that she is ambivalent about coming and may be unable to take help. The clinic does not coerce.

If, after explanation, Mrs. Jones decides to come in with her son for treatment help, the mother and son have appointments with different therapists. It may be possible for one person to work with both, but the likelihood of defensiveness, of trying to "put the best foot forward," is greatly increased.

Johnny, her son, in his contacts, is made to feel free to express his attitudes toward his parents, toward other persons and elements in his environment, and toward the clinic and the therapist. He is free to vent his angers by bitter talk, by shooting toy soldiers, by criticizing the clinic equipment, or in any other way which gives free expression to his feelings. The only limitation is upon destructive action which has social consequences. He can hate the therapist, if he wishes, and can destroy a doll which represents him, but he cannot attack the therapist directly. All of John's attitudes are recognized and clarified. The therapist shows his understanding, but he does not criticize, does not approve, does not try to meet the boy's needs himself. If Johnny feels unloved, the worker may recognize this ("You feel that nobody cares about you at all") but he does not try to become a parent substitute. Gradually, as Johnny begins to see himself in a certain way—for example, as a boy who feels very much unloved, and who in return hates his parents and torments them, but turns to others who will give attention—he finds that he has more control over his actions. He begins to see that there are some limited things he could do about his own situation. Perhaps he puts these into words. Perhaps he merely surprises his mother by offering to help her in her housework. A slight, but deeply significant change, takes place.

In her interviews, the mother goes through a parallel experience. For the first time in her life she finds herself able to talk of hidden attitudes which she has never admitted to herself. She does not know how the therapist makes this possible, but the dropping-away of the necessity of defending all her actions is something which is vividly experienced. Gradually she can admit how much she prefers her other child to John. Suddenly it occurs to her, and she can face the

thought, that this is one of the reasons why John likes to do mean things just to annoy her. Because of her new understandings, her tone of voice changes when dealing with the boy at home, her discipline loses its slightly sadistic quality, and when John offers to help with the dishes, she is able to respond with a thoroughly sincere expression of her gratitude, and of her affection for him. Freed from the necessity of always being "right," she decides to discard some of the rigid methods she has devised for controlling him and to put their relationship on a more realistic and comfortable basis—a relationship in which each may express annoyance at the other, but in which there is also room for real affection. In her case, as in John's, a release of feeling leads to self-understanding, and this in turn leads to actions directed toward a more satisfying goal—a more genuine, more mature parent-child relationship.

Although these changes may seem small, we find that they are highly effective. As the relationship with his mother is more satisfactory, Johnny's troublesome behavior tends to diminish. As the mother has less need of punishing John to satisfy her own guilt feelings, she finds that he has good qualities, that she does enjoy him at times, and that she feels a real affection for him. The fundamental goals of both mother and child have been significantly altered, and satisfactions are found in constructive rather than destructive ways.

This is the process we call therapy. It develops spontaneously, providing the therapist has the skill to create conditions under which it can take place. To recognize that it is a process, that it can be studied and improved through the methods of scientific analysis and research, is indeed a heartening challenge to workers in the field, whether they be psychologists, psychiatrists, or social workers.

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REVIEWS

EDITED BY EDNA HEIDBREDER

JEWS IN A GENTILE WORLD Edited by Isacque Graeber and Steuart H. Britt. New York: Macmillan, 1942. Pp. x+436. \$4.00.

Of this book, which can boast two editors and sixteen collaborators, nine of whom are non-Jewish, it may truly be said *Tot homines, tot gustes*. Here sociologists, anthropologists, economists, psychologists, an historian, a philosopher, and a political scientist have foregathered to draw in the open those problems which center around the Jew-Gentile relations, particularly in America. A chapter on the legal aspect of the situation has been omitted, allegedly for technical reasons.

The volume begins with an introduction by Carl J. Friedrich, who argues for a better understanding between Jew and Gentile and rightly sees in anti-Semitism a menace to Western civilization.

On the racial entity of the Jews, the Jewish anthropologist, Melville Jacobs, takes a negative position, while the non-Jew, C. S. Coon, gives evidence of a positive stand.

It would take altogether too much space to present the gist of the sixteen chapters. Suffice it to say that the airing of views gives the reader much to think about, but we are as far from a solution as ever.

The authors range themselves in three categories: (a) the advocates of assimilation, (b) the *laissez-faire* spokesmen, of whom there are but very few, and (c) the compromise group, who remind us of the domestic arrangement by which the husband was to have his way in the large issues and the wife in the small ones—and there were never any large issues. In general, the writers favor complete assimilation, and even most of the Jewish contributors to the volume tend to look forward to such an outcome with relief.

There is much repetition, as would be natural, in the various essays, and certain themes recur again and again. There is the harping on ethnocentrism and Judeocentrism; and at least in the chapters by Hertzler and a scholar who hides behind anonymity, a descanting on the well-known libels against the Jews, furbished up and couched in academic phraseology. Hertzler, *e g.*, saddles the Jews with the "Chosen-people" attitude, as if this were peculiar to the Jews. He comes out squarely and emphatically for assimilation:

First of all the Jew will most likely have to do most of the changing. . . . Second, to cease to be a cultural irritant the Jew must be completely assimilated. . . . Third, he will have to be completely absorbed ethnically. That means he will have to marry with non-Jews, generation after generation, until he has no grandparents who were considered as Jews. . . . Fourth, he will have to give up all pride in his group and his people's history. . . . Fifth, he will have to thrust himself into the background in his economic activities and never allow himself to be numerous or conspicuously successful. . . . Finally, he will have to be absolutely sure . . . while he is gradually disappearing as a Jew, that he does nothing or allows no chance thing to happen that might arouse any of the age-old latent anti-Semitic prejudices or attitudes of non-Jews . . .

Quite a big order—and what then? Would Dr. Hertzler countenance a mass movement on the part of the Jews to intermarry? Would there not be such an

outcry that, perhaps under a conservative administration, legal clamps would be resorted to? In a sense Hertzler is presenting here an American version of the Nazi Judeology. He might just as well have concluded with the decree "Eventually, he must cease to breathe"—for that is what it amounts to. As I have said elsewhere, Jews owe as much to their ancestors who for the sake of a principle—freedom of worship—allowed themselves to be burnt at the stake, as to their descendants who may or may not be worthy of the comforts thrust upon them, thanks to the sacrifices of the present generation.

In connection with intermarriage, the results obtained in a recent poll taken of a cross-section of 10,000,000 high-school students should once and for all halt the pointing of the taunting finger against the Jew; for it has been revealed by *Fortune* that while 51.6 per cent of the Protestant students would not marry Jews and 58.8 per cent of the Catholic youth would not marry Jews, only about 28 per cent of the Jewish students would not marry either Protestants or Catholics. The enlightenment on the part of the assimilationists, it would seem, should, like charity, begin at home. . . .

The anonymous article, "An analysis of Jewish culture," goes even farther than Hertzler, not so much in the ". . . or else" conclusion, as in the stereotyped charges which it piles up against the Jews. Indeed, this tissue of half-truths and false generalizations could well be used as samples of fallacious reasoning in a course in logic. Virtually every thesis of the writer will not bear examination. He doubtless is a highly trained man, but prejudice has gotten into his system to the extent that all his views on the subject will be colored by his wishes. Is it true, *e.g.*, that cultures, unless politically supported, are mutually antagonistic and must conflict? Or that Jewish culture must inevitably so influence American culture as to constitute a menace to it? Quite the opposite seems to be the case. American culture is a blend composed of the various foreign strains and strands. If I should read three Yiddish journals along with the dozen or more in English, am I doing violence to American culture? Moreover, let us ponder the exploits of those Moishes and Yankels in USSR, who speak Yiddish not in Biro-Bidjan, but in Moscow or Stalingrad, and who, when the Nazi tanks roll on to seeming triumph, fill their pockets with grenades, and hurl themselves in front of the Juggernaut, achieving the satisfaction of the blind Samson over the Philistines. In USSR a score of individual cultures are allowed, nay, are encouraged, to develop alongside the Russian, into which they flow, like tributaries.

His dichotomies are most questionable, *e.g.*, "American culture is civil; Jewish culture tribal," and his understanding of Jewish lore is deplorably inadequate. This, it must be said, holds true of most of the writers, who may be experts in their field, but are guilty of curious lapses when they endeavor to apply their results.

Our anonymous sociologist for the most part invokes an old logical trick of comparing some of one group with some of another group. Thus, he states that among Jews you will not find the ascetic ideals and mode of living you "associate with Protestant Christianity." He is probably contrasting here the Hollywood cinema magnates with the Calvinists in Geneva. He tells us that, in Jewish religion, mystical experiences are totally absent. Evidently he has never heard of the Cabbalists and the Khassidim. "The religion of Jew," he asseverates, "has been tempered to human nature, made easy. It demands very little—no searching of the heart, no moral conflict, no sacrifice. . . ." Only the merest smattering of Jewish religion with its 613 precepts, only one of which is not an imposition, would convince the author of the preposterousness of his statement. When he further tells us that "Jewish culture, on the other hand, is sensuous, good food,

fine clothing, a fine home," he apparently would have us believe that British peers, the French nobility, or even the pillars of American culture, Longfellow, Emerson, William James, and dozens of others in that category spurned all worldly pleasures. And this we are to accept as science! Or take his contrast between "Christian altruism" and Jewish egoism, based on a casual Talmudic opinion. We might well expect him to point out how Christians are different from Jews by referring to the injunction in the New Testament to love our enemy, while Shylock demands his pound of flesh!

In regard to the economic canards about the Jews, *e.g.*, that they are not producers, it is evident that although he might have read Miriam Beard's comprehensive article, "Anti-Semitism—product of economic myths," and Lestchinsky's "The position of the Jews in the economic life of America," which presents statistical data to prove that the large army of Jewish workers gives the lie to those who see in the Jews only a people of traders, he has not veered an iota from his anti-Jewish stand. His innuendo against the Jewish producers of moving pictures may seem just to many, but what guarantee have we that non-Jewish producers would consider the moral tone of the pictures rather than the box office? And what has prevented non-Jews from developing this industry instead of concentrating on steel and rail?

Nor are the articles by the Jewish writers free from a peculiar ambivalence, an illustration of which is to be seen in the very title of Jessie Bernard's paper "Biculturalism: a study in social schizophrenia." The excerpts from diaries or reports are interesting, but they offer no conclusive evidence. If the purport of the article was to show that all biculturalism leads to cultural schizophrenia, we might point out that the experiences cited are not general, but typical of a certain class of Jews who, in a recent sensational article, were designated as "adjusted Jews," and whom I should rather consider "maladjusted Jews," successful though they might be externally. Some of them may be cultured in general, but their acquaintance with Jewish culture is problematic. They may have attended a Hebrew Sunday school and learned the age of Methusaleh or the names of Noah's sons. They may even have listened to a number of sermons on Judaism, perhaps knew something about the characters of Daniel Deronda, David Alrov, or Rebecca (*Ivanhoe*), but this is a far cry from Jewish culture. How, then, can one speak of biculturalism here, when the scales are so uneven? From personal observations, I should say that social schizophrenia is rooted in personal schizophrenia. When a Jew bewails his lot for having been born into a persecuted race, he is really lamenting his own inadequacy. Such individuals remind us of the ne'er-do-well who blames his parents, either for a too rigorous upbringing or too great indulgence. When a Jew whines about discrimination in his special field, he usually is calling attention to his own personal frustrations, and, finally, when a Jew turns anti-Semitic, he is actually betraying his hatred for himself.

The *unintentional* moral that *Jews in a gentile world* teaches is twofold: (a) Scientists and scholars are not free from prejudice, and the "mine and thine" division holds fast in the academic aulæ as it does in the chamber of commerce. (b) To discuss the Jews intelligently, one must have first studied them from within. With the exception of one or two of the writers, this requisite is conspicuously absent. In a candid yet temperate chapter, "The position and future of the Jews in America," Raymond Kennedy goes so far as to inform us that the Jews have no language of their own (p. 420). He is either oblivious of the fact that even in the last census nearly two million Jews in the USA *admitted* Yiddish to be their mother-tongue, to say nothing of the millions of Yiddish-speaking

people in Soviet Russia, Poland, South America, and other parts of the globe; or else he thinks that Yiddish is not the language of the Jews, in which case English is not the language of the British. In this "no language of their own," prior to the Nazi war, 1000 books would be printed annually in some three million copies, and 400 newspapers and journals would make their appearance in all the four corners of the globe.

The fact that one is a sociologist or a psychologist, or an anthropologist does not yet entitle him to make emphatic assertions about the Jews, without having made himself familiar with their life and lore. A mere physicist would not undertake to write a disquisition on rubber, and a general biologist is not expected to give us an account of the kangaroo, unless he had made numerous field observations.

The burden of *Jews in a gentile world* is that Jews, in order to advance their status, should assimilate, that the majority have a right to expect conformity, but that is the very crux. (1) How profitable—and for whom—is Jewish assimilation? (2) If desirable, how is this process to be achieved in less than a million years? (3) Can enlightenment, aided by the outlawry of discrimination, as has been achieved in USSR not remedy the situation?

These questions have not been touched by any of the writers. Their panacea savors of the suggestion made that in order to do away with poverty the poor should become prosperous.

Prejudices are natural, although not innate, but it is the infamous propaganda which has been working its mischief here as everywhere else that can be scotched. If the majority must be catered to in respect to culture, does it mean that nothing but English is to be spoken? And why not extend this conformity to religion as well? Why is Jewish culture, whatever there is left of it, any less a private matter, even a matter of conscience, than one's form of worship or creed? Furthermore, why are the millions of Germans in the Middle West (in the last census several millions have stated their mother tongue to be German) carrying on their immigrant culture without the slightest stigma being attached to them, and without incurring any discrimination whatever, although in their case the political string is a serious menace; and indeed Nazi propaganda has been lurking beneath much that paraded as German culture? In the case of the Jews, there can never be any rivalry between Jewish and American culture, Mr. "Anonymous" to the contrary.

In fine, much worth-while material as *Jews in a gentile world* contains, the discerning reader feels very much like Faust when he exclaimed

*Da steh' ich, nun, ich armer Tor!
Und bin so klug als wie zuvor*

A. A. ROBACK

Cambridge, Massachusetts

DRIVES TOWARD WAR. By Edward C. Tolman. New York: Appleton-Century, 1942. Pp. xv+118.

Tolman's crisp little volume marks the first attempt of an experimental psychologist to generalize his laboratory knowledge so that it will apply to the most comprehensive of all human problems—the abolition of war and the formation of a World State. The leap from the behavior of *Mus norvegicus albinus* in a block maze to the behavior of *Homo sapiens* in a planetary maze is not inconsiderable. The author himself seems to find the jump so risky that he inserts two extra-

rodent supports in the course of his argument: evidence from the psychology of anthropoids, and a simplified Freudian psychology of human dynamisms. Equipped thus with a minimum store of psychological facts and theories the author frames his argument essentially as follows:

1. Man's *basic needs* are shared with the lower animals. The needs include such appetites as hunger, thirst, sex, maternal and nurturing drives, infantile dependence, and general activity, also the exploratory, sleep, play, and elimination drives. The basic needs comprise also the aversions of injury-avoidance, obstruction avoidance, isolation-avoidance.

2. To serve these basic drives there appear in the higher animals certain *social techniques* (such as establishing dominance status, submitting, imitating, mutual aid, loyalty to the group). There is probably some instinctive foundation for these social techniques, but, unlike the biological drives, they are culturally selected. Since this is so, culture may, and does, to an appreciable extent "change human nature." In other words, the basic needs are steadfast, but the means of achieving them are modifiable.

3. The instrumental social techniques are modified through *learning*, which may be defined as an activity tending to keep the individual well adjusted to actual environmental realities.

4. The *psychological dynamisms* are like learning in that they serve basic drives and help relate them to environmental exigencies. But the dynamisms are "relatively blind" and are far less "reasonable" than is learning. "Learning corrects itself when the environmental relationships change. The dynamisms, on the other hand, tend to persist in a hardened and blind form." For example, through *fixation* "an activity (originally hit upon by chance, or by learning, as instrumental to some more basic need) eventually comes to be persisted in for its own sake." Or, by virtue of *repression*, self-assertion may be disguised. Or, through *reaction-formation*, repressed sadism may express itself in maudlin sentiment. Or through *symbolization*, the Führer may usurp the role of one's own father.

5. The most important of the dynamisms is *identification* with parent or other adults. By means of this dynamism the child takes over parental conventions as his own approved patterns of culture. Group-identification also occurs, and is often so intense that the child who at first uses the group as a means to his own goals comes to take over the group goals as more insistent than his own.

6. When biological drives are frustrated the individual, through learning, comes to employ either (a) self-assertive techniques or (b) collective techniques. The latter are actually more effective in the modern world, but in our culture most men still have a stronger propensity to be self-assertive than collective in their conduct.

7. If a child who is self-assertive identifies with his parents he is likely to be socially approved, even while, through this identification, he is mastering his own bumptiousness. (Tolman obviously thinks highly of parent-identification, and seems to overlook the fact that through identification with bewildered and aggressive parents all the evils of one generation may be preserved. If parent identification were the only means of socialization how would progress ever come about?)

8. Much of our war-trouble, the author goes on to say, comes from the fact that in trying self-abusive techniques of social living (which are likely to spring up when self-assertion is repressed) we have not rid ourselves of our hostility. The hostility, being repressed, becomes elaborated through *reaction formation*, *symbolization*, *displacement*, *projection*. There result all kinds of revenge motifs, projection of one's own guilt feelings, scapegoating, and warlike attacks

9. Ordinarily the individual is likely to find a reasonable fulfillment of his biological needs if he employs collective techniques. If these techniques are frustrated by an attack from outside the group then through group-identification there arise various Group Assertive Techniques, which in turn lead either to an attack upon the enemies of the group or to an attempt to federate with opposition groups in order to achieve both the original group demands and the alien demands through a more comprehensive collective technique.

10 From the foregoing principles Tolman concludes that a stable and warless society requires (a) that biological needs be satisfied, (b) that self-assertive and collective techniques be regarded as both natural and necessary, (c) that self-abusive techniques which breed repressed hostility be regarded as bad, (d) that identification with parents and accepted authorities be encouraged, (e) that group loyalties be directed into useful channels, (f) that group-assertive techniques be directed against recalcitrant subgroups and into campaigns against hostile nature (James's moral equivalent of war), in order that group-identification with a World State may be enhanced.

11. These achievements can be realized (a) if we evolve an economic order which will abolish too great biological frustrations, (b) if we invent an educational program that will facilitate proper identifications, (c) if we create a supernational state to which individuals can become more loyal than they are to their present national groups, (d) if we evolve vital psychological props to sustain this loyalty, such, for example, as a common official language, a world flag, a world anthem, a world police; and if we identify common enemies against which to release all remaining hostility. Rebellious subgroups and a resistant nature will then be our only scapegoats.

Whatever one may think of the individual steps in this argument, we shall have to agree that Tolman has drafted a first outline of a psychological guide for planning a post-war world. This outline has its foundations in evidence which, so far as it goes, most psychologists would accept as sound. One suspects, however, that Tolman gives too parsimonious an account of the range of interests, desires, and motives that animate the adult personality. The biological drives plus the dynamisms fail to give an adequate account of the total catalogue of human interests. Hopes, aspirations, ideologies are also drives (and they are not mere identifications). The very idea of a World State, if it should succeed in firing the imaginations of people during the Twentieth Century, may have the power of outweighing and displacing biological drives just as patriotism does at present. Why is it such a common failing of psychologists to underestimate the dynamic force of a zeal-inspiring cause, and to overestimate the motivational press of tissue change?

Another minor blemish of the book lies in the author's quaint seizures of diffidence at important points in his argument. He becomes charmingly modest at inappropriate moments. He is completely sincere, believing in the possibility of progress toward the ideal of "The Psychologically Adjusted Man." His thesis is that "only when man's total psychology is understood and all his absolutely necessary psychological needs are allowed balanced satisfaction will a society permitting relatively universal individual happiness and welfare be achieved and war be abolished." This ideal he would substitute for the four preceding ideals held out to the Western Man (Drucker's list): the Spiritual man, the Intellectual man, the Economic man, and the Heroic (Nazified) man. The blemish of faint-heartedness occurs in the author's acceptance of the label "myth" for all these ideals of human development, including his own ideal of the Psychologically

Adjusted man. He consorts with both ethical absolutism and ethical relativism. Glimpsing a Utopia, he is "almost frightened to put it on paper." The phrasing of his vision—"a new society living by the myth of the Psychologically Adjusted man"—seems to me too watery to express the rising, expanding, pounding zeal of an increasing proportion of mankind for winning the crusade of the Twentieth Century. Had the author spoken of values (in place of myths) of passionate belief (in place of adjustment), and of adult motives (in place of animal and infantile motives), the book would carry more persuasion. But the fact remains that Tolman's courage in offering a psychological guide to future social policy is a model to be widely imitated. Now, if ever, psychologists should speak up and tell what they know about applying their science to problems of social reconstruction. Let them speak, if they can, with as much lucidity and sincerity as Tolman has spoken.

GORDON W. ALLPORT.

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RADIO GOES TO WAR. By Charles J. Rolo with an Introduction by Johannes Steele. New York: Putnam's, 1942. Pp. xviii+293.

RADIO IN WARTIME. By Charles Siepmann. New York and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1942. Pp. 32.

Both these books are written for the layman. Yet, since both of them chronicle current history which is grist for the analytic mill of the social psychologist and since they cover material which is otherwise not readily available to those outside of the circle who receive confidential Government reports, their appearance is worth noting briefly in this JOURNAL.

Mr. Rolo's well-written book on the part shortwave radio is playing on the "fourth front of the mind" is good journalese. In it are accounts of the radio strategy of the Axis, a description of the fumbings of the French *Paris Mondial*, a rather unjustly harsh discussion of the work of the BBC (Mr. Rolo is a Britisher), a very incomplete synopsis of work of the Russian official transmitters, some remarks about "penny-whistles" from the Far East, a chapter on "freedom stations," an altogether too charitable and optimistic account of America's work in the field of shortwave, and, finally, some good sense about propaganda for democracy. The author has done an interesting job of giving examples of the various technics of radio propaganda: confusion, diversion, division, terror, rumor-mongering, ridicule, and the "strategy of truth." As a descriptive piece, however, the book suffers from the fault that seems to be inherent in American and British journalism: balance is sacrificed to the desire for a good yarn. Thus, "Ivan the Terrible," the ghost voice used by Radio Center Moscow to cut in on German domestic broadcasts, is given top billing in the chapter of Soviet transmissions, while Russia's radio treatment of her allies and ideological topics goes begging for more space. By virtue of the same tendency, the author occasionally slips into the error of stating as absolute fact some of the hunches which are current among shortwave experts—mainly concerning the effectiveness of short-wave propaganda. But by and large, the book is full of good illustrative material on modern propaganda technics. As such it might profitably be used in courses on public opinion and propaganda.

Mr. Siepmann, formerly Director of Talks and Program Planning for the BBC and now Advisor on Radio to the OWI, has produced a succinct pamphlet on the general use of radio in wartime. Less journalistic and illustrative than Rolo's

book, this pamphlet gives an excellent outline of the propaganda strategy of the Axis and the United Nations, the theory and practice of radio intelligence work, and the manner in which telecommunication is used by the armed services. It too can be used for supplementary reading for courses in social psychology.

Although they both reveal to what extent the problems of radio are of concern to psychologists, neither of these works discusses the very important role that psychologists and the methods of psychology have come to play in the field of international broadcasting. This story will not be written till after the war. When it is, it will tell of how systematic content analysis of communication guided by psychological theories of motivation has taken its place in the battery of techniques known as intelligence work.

JEROME S. BRUNER.

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OUR AGE OF UNREASON. By Franz Alexander. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1942.
Pp. 371. \$3.00.

Like Gaul, the man created by Freud was divided into three parts. An imperious *superego* constantly battled with powerful asocial forces in the *id*. The *ego*, weak at best, did its utmost to help gratify the *id* and keep the *superego* placated.

The revolutionary changes resulting from Freud's discoveries have been felt in medicine, in the arts, and to a considerable degree in the social sciences. The "human nature" assumed by most nineteenth-century political scientists, sociologists, historians, *et al.*, was one of reasonableness motivated by self-interest. World War I blasted the assumption that men were primarily reasonable, and helped pave the way for an acceptance of the discoveries of Freud.

Medical men, social scientists, and psychologists are fairly easy to classify in terms of their reactions to Freud. First are those who reject Freud "completely." They think Freud is a German word for sex, and they will have none of it. Second are those who accept Freud "completely." They are apt to argue over minute terminological matters, and they seem to resent bitterly any critical analysis of "the master." Third are those who accept the methods and major conclusions of Freud but who try to add to the picture. They feel no compunctions about changing major conclusions, if the facts as they see them justify such changes.

At the present time some of the members of this third group are largely concerned with analyzing the *ego*. They seem to feel that Freud so emphasized the unconscious *id* and the stern *superego* that he rather devaluated the power of the *ego*, that is, men's rational functions. *Our age of unreason* by Franz Alexander, Director of the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis, is a distinguished contribution to this increasing literature of psychoanalysis which, for want of a better description, may be called "ego-psychology." It is concerned with a central problem of today: men's obvious lack of adjustment to a world of potential plenty.

The book is divided into three parts. "From reason to unreason" brilliantly traces social philosophy from Plato, through the Utilitarians and Marx, to Pareto and the other philosophers of violence. The weakness of much of this philosophy lay in its overemphasis upon the rational, intellectual, part of human nature. In contrast to this overrational bias, at present we are witnessing the "rule of unreason" in Germany, Italy, and Japan. Alexander analyzes the factors in the life of the people of these countries that make them susceptible to doctrines hardly to be dignified by calling them philosophy.

Part II, "The fundamentals of human behavior," presents in brief outline the author's analysis of human nature. It is a Freudian description, with several modifications due to the work undertaken at the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis. He feels that human beings have two basic dynamic trends: ". . . energy is as far as possible conserved and the necessities of life secured with the minimum expenditure of energy." Balancing this, or complementary to it, is "an internal tendency to mature which emerges as a spontaneous inclination of physical exercise, as curiosity, as competition, and as the desire for prestige through accomplishment" (pp. 209-210). The first Alexander calls the *energy-saving principle*, and the second the *principle of surplus energy*.

Part III, "From unreason to reason," analyzes the emotional structure of democracy, especially as it is expressed in America. Criminality in this country is contrasted with criminality in Europe. Stress is laid on the influence of the frontier. The differences between neurotics in America and in Europe are pointed out, and there are several stimulating passages which go far toward explaining those differences. Throughout, Alexander emphasizes that men are at present none too well adjusted. The book closes with a view of a more rational world.

But in his discussion of how to get a more rational world Alexander is extremely weak. Man's "instrument for adaptation is his intellect, which grasps the new situation and finds the required changes in his behavior. His inertia makes him adhere to older adaptations, and because these no longer satisfy his needs, he is frustrated and is forced to make new efforts and use his intellect for readjustment" (pp. 339-340). One characteristic of men's intellect which makes it so different from animals' is the use of language. Through language we are able to reason more efficiently, and to communicate the results of our reasonings. Yet there is not a single discussion of language in the entire 371 pages!

As Alfred Korzybski points out in his *Manhood of humanity*, our generation can start off from where our parents left off. We can do this because we can communicate. Our parents can pass on to us their experiences, and so *theoretically* we need not make the same mistakes they did. Freud's cures depend on the ego's awareness of conflicts which had been repressed. And this awareness comes largely through the use of words. The ego has a powerful weapon: language. It is mainly or even only through language that we can develop a more satisfactory social life.

There is a fundamental contradiction in our life today. We have developed adequate language habits in mathematics, in the physical sciences, and in some parts of the biological sciences. Social scientists, however, are using language which had its assumptions and structures in primitive times. Plato and Aristotle would be hopelessly lost in a modern metropolitan center—their orientations would prevent them from making sense of radio, modern transportation, much of laboratory science, etc. Yet they would find themselves perfectly at home in university courses of philosophy, sociology, history, economics, and some parts of psychology. They might not agree with the opinions of editorial writers, but they would at least understand them. Today we are futilely trying to manage twentieth-century technology with fifth-century-B.C. language. Until enough of us realize that the old, primitive assumptions inherent in our language just won't work any longer, we will run into troubles. And this does not mean at all that we should speak Esperanto, or even necessarily limit ourselves to the 800 words of Basic English. We don't need new words; we need to eliminate some of the harmful implications of the old ones we habitually use in talking about human relations and "society."

In reading *Our age of unreason* this reviewer got the feeling that only half a book had been written: the beginning. It is a brilliant analysis, as far as it goes.

But because it omits the considerable work which has been and is being done on language its usefulness as a guide to the future, as a guide to what ought to be done, is almost *nil*. It leaves this reviewer baffled. How does it happen that a man who cures people *through the use of words* writes a book about how we got this way without once so much as mentioning language?

ARNOLD THOMSEN.

Elmo Roper, Market Research.

THE INNER WORLD OF MAN. By Frances Wickes. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1940. Pp. 313. \$3.50.

This is the first comprehensive presentation of the psychology of Carl Gustav Jung by one of his American pupils. Frances Wickes, originally an educator but for more than a decade active as an analytical psychologist, has the unusual descriptive ability to find for Jung's conception the interpretative language which ought to be intelligible to those in whose eyes the Swiss psychiatrist's theories appear to be nothing but strange and mystical psychologism. Since this reviewer is convinced that the various psychological theories and schools actually represent different types of psychic disposition as different as the physically different races of man, he believes that the adherence to one of these psychologies as the only right and true one indicates that the adherent belongs to this or that "psychological race."

The psychology developed by Jung appeals to that religious or semi-religious type of person who has a rather broad inner psychic experience with a trend towards mythological personification of the individual dynamic forces and with a realistic experience of dreams, visions, and imaginations. It is especially fortunate that Frances Wickes considers it her task to present broadly this side of Jung's conception. Jung himself has never more broadly presented his dream theory and its therapeutical application in his published books. His conception of the role of dreams differs widely from the Freudian wish causation of our dream-life and makes the latter appear rather small and poor beside the rich and differentiated meaning which is attributed to the dreams here.

Frances Wickes offers unusually valuable material from her own analytical practice and viewpoints quite independent of those of her master. The part of the book presenting her application of Jung's art and drawing therapy is of greatest value for the social psychologist. Whether one agrees with Jung's general theory and its application as presented here, the discussion in itself must be considered an important advance in the direction of research in the field of the creative and imaginative effort as lived out in any art activity, and as a key to the understanding of mythological symbolism and imagination as it is still living and working in the major religious groups even in the Western world of today.

ERNST HARMS.

New York City.

INTRODUCTION TO SEMANTICS. By Rudolf Carnap. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942. Pp. xii+263. \$3.50.

It is perhaps appropriate that an introduction to a subject be reviewed by those who, like the present reviewers, are being introduced to it. But in spite of the title this book is not intended as an introduction to semantics so much as to a projected series of books by the same author under the general title *Studies in semantics*. The author points out (p. 240) that the word "semantics" is a misnomer and implies that the real object of the series will be the study of semantical and

syntactical systems and of the relations between them. In any case, the book under review is a fascinating introduction to the analysis of language as a tool of reasoning. It is not "light" reading, but anyone who has some familiarity with the recent work in the foundations of mathematics can follow the chief line of reasoning without difficulty, and presumably the same would be true of anyone with training in modern logic.

The format of the book is of aid to the reader. The main argument is in large type, while all material not absolutely necessary to its understanding is in small type. Included in the latter are helpful examples, discussions of more technical problems, and alternate methods of attack upon certain problems. Some of this is lost upon the reader who is not familiar with the literature of semantics and logic. There is also an appendix which includes chapters on terminology, on further semantical problems, and on the modifications which must be made in the views expressed by the author in his earlier book *The logical syntax of language* as a result of his new point of view of semantics.

The book begins with definitions of the more general terms and the introduction of a uniform notation. The second part is concerned with the construction of semantical systems and the definition of fundamental (radical) semantical concepts. These concepts are to be redefined in later chapters in terms of the manner of their determination as L-concepts (logical), F-concepts (factual), and C-concepts (syntactical).

The third part is concerned with the L-concepts, that is, with logical truth, logical deductibility, and related notions. The author is by his own acknowledgment treading new and uncertain ground in this part in that he is attempting to divorce these concepts from syntax and place them in semantics. Thus he proposes to define L-truth in such a way that the L-truth of a sentence is a consequence of the semantical rules of the system alone. For a particular semantical system this plan does not present any insuperable difficulties, but when he tries to give a rigorous definition of L-truth in general semantics according to this plan, he is confronted with the fact that any such definition must involve the concepts of truth and implication in the metalanguage (in which the semantical rules of the system are formulated). He gives fifteen postulates which must be satisfied by the five primitive logical terms, but he points out that the properties required by these postulates are not sufficient actually to define the terms in accordance with the desired meanings. After a discussion of the distinction between semantical (language) concepts and absolute (propositional) concepts, the notion of L-range is introduced and logical implication is based on this concept. Since an L-range is a class of propositions, logical implication becomes a matter of class inclusion of L-ranges. This, stated in the form of two postulates, is the guiding principle in seeking a general definition of L-range. A class of sentences in a system *S* is a maximum state description in *S* if it is not logically false (contradictory), is logically complete, and logically perfect in *S*. Roughly, the L-range of a semantical entity *A* (sentence or class of sentences) in *S* is the class *B* of maximum state descriptions in *S*, such that the proposition designated by *A* is identically that designated by the disjunction of *B*.

The fourth section of the book is concerned with syntax. Here purely formal procedures are dealt with (as, for example, in symbolic logic) and the syntactical concepts are defined on the basis of primitive sentences and rules of inference. The last section considers the relations between semantics and syntax. A semantical system which contains all the sentences of a syntactical calculus is called an interpretation of the calculus and this section is concerned with interpretations of calculi.

Among the most interesting features of the book are the discussions of various attempts to give rigorous definitions for semantical and syntactical concepts. The author points out wherein these attempts have failed to accomplish the intention of the definition and, although he is not always able completely to accomplish the intention himself, he has in nearly every case pointed out hopeful methods of attack.

In an apparent attempt to avoid being misunderstood, the author frequently has been guilty of repetitiousness. In particular, many of his theorems are merely restatements in different words or symbols of previous definitions or theorems. Also in many cases he states certain postulates which must be satisfied by a certain concept which he is about to define. These postulates state properties which the concept must have in order to be in accordance with the intention of the definition, but they are not sufficiently restrictive to define the concept completely. For example, he says in regard to the postulates for L-content (p 149): "These postulates leave open not only different formulations of definitions but essentially different concepts to be defined." He does not, however, always make it clear whether the postulates are intended completely to characterize the *intention* of the definition; that is, whether every definition which fulfills the postulates is a satisfactory definition of the concept in the sense that it defines the sort of thing intended. It would seem desirable that the postulates do exactly this, so that they alone delimit a class of definitions, any one of which is in accordance with the intention. In a sense, such a set of postulates would serve to define "adequacy" of a definition of the concept.

Obviously, such a book as this will not appeal to a large number of readers, but the reviewers can sincerely recommend it to readers who are interested in the analysis of language as a tool of reasoning, particularly to mathematicians, scientists, and logicians. Some may be inclined to condemn it as a futile attempt to systematize the unsystematizable, but most great accomplishments in the realm of ideas have had small beginnings. This work at least suggests interesting methods of attack. Only time can determine whether they are the methods best adapted to the larger and more important problem of understanding semantics in general.

KARL BUHLER.

L. E. BUSH.

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